The thing is, we always knew this, but we did it anyway.
Like we know that destroying all insects and and global warning are not sustainable. We know we can't have 7 billion humans eating meat. We know we should let not power concentrate too much into some entities. But we keep it up.
Since we don't react unless something forces us to, I'm starting to believe we need some medium crisis to happen like the covid19 so that a bigger one won't wipe us out in the future.
Sure it’s the teacher. South Korea and China only did as well as they did because H1N1 and SARS were more problematic in those counties. Haven been bitten twice, they revamped their health systems to be able to handle pandemics.
The reason for this global shortage is China was celebrating Chinese New Year, when every production simply stopped. It happens every February. And Covid-19 kicks in and workers are effectively locked in their towns and can not travel. Local governments organized some emergency hires from local but still struggles to meet the demand.
If Covid-19 happened in other months it would be totally different.
Given they didn't have the warning we had, and have a very dense population and hold the manufactures of the entire world, it could have been much worse.
I can't imagine what would have happened if patient zero had been in new york.
Now of course, they handled that the way a dictatorship handles it.
Have you paid any attention to the charts? Even if the numbers aren't truthful they can't be that far from the truth or the discrepancy would be much more obvious than it is. Just take a look at this [0]! And this despite being the first to be hit, and having hundreds of millions of people living in densely packed cities!
From my limited observations, it seems like China (or any city/country/culture for that matter) did well in some ways, and poorly in others. This shouldn't be too surprising, because that's usually the case in any complex endeavor involving large groups of people. What is a bit surprising (well, unless you're a political news junkie), is that it seems like most individuals, or at least very, very many, are only able/willing to see one side or the other, as if they see the world in black and white (to test this theory, try disagreeing with such a person, and observe their reaction).
It seems to me that planet earth, and the various interconnected societies that live upon it, can be viewed as a system, like any other. Vastly more complex than any other system we deal with, but a system nonetheless.
Normally when an undesirable incident occurs in a system, we would get a group of people who have a good understanding of the system (or, systems in general at least) together to perform an appropriate post incident analysis, with a goal of identifying the various root causes, solutions to the causes, and an implementation plan. The space shuttle Challenger disaster [1] is a good example of such an analysis, in that it has many similarities (and at least two particularly noteworthy differences: number of deaths, quality of analysis) to the current pandemic.
It is fairly well known that when the people doing an analysis [2] of a system also happen to be participants within the system being analyzed [3], a number of unusual and undesirable behaviors can manifest (a very worst case example may be that, if the system is too complex, people may not only fail to realize that it is a system that can be analyzed, but may even be vehemently opposed to simple consideration of the notion. Rather, they may insist upon using a far simpler, non-technical (and therefore inaccurate) approach of casting blame according to a combination of personal heuristics[4] and in-group dynamics[5], at times going so far as ostracizing any person who may advocate for a standard engineering approach. For these reasons, outsiders (notable in this case, Richard Feynman) are often included in the analysis team.
I wonder if something useful could be learned from comparing and contrasting these two scenarios.
The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster was a fatal incident in the United States space program that occurred on Tuesday, January 28, 1986, when the Space Shuttle Challenger (OV-099) broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, killing all seven crew members aboard. The crew consisted of five NASA astronauts, one payload specialist, and a civilian schoolteacher.
Investigation
In the aftermath of the accident, NASA was criticized for its lack of openness with the press. The New York Times noted on the day after the accident that "neither Jay Greene, flight director for the ascent, nor any other person in the control room, was made available to the press by the space agency." In the absence of reliable sources, the press turned to speculation; both The New York Times and United Press International ran stories suggesting that a fault with the space shuttle external tank had caused the accident, despite the fact that NASA's internal investigation had quickly focused in on the solid rocket boosters. "The space agency," wrote space reporter William Harwood, "stuck to its policy of strict secrecy about the details of the investigation, an uncharacteristic stance for an agency that long prided itself on openness."
The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, also known as the Rogers Commission after its chairman, was formed to investigate the disaster. The commission members were Chairman William P. Rogers, Vice Chairman Neil Armstrong, David Acheson, Eugene Covert, Richard Feynman, Robert Hotz, Donald Kutyna, Sally Ride, Robert Rummel, Joseph Sutter, Arthur Walker, Albert Wheelon, and Chuck Yeager. The commission worked for several months and published a report of its findings. It found that the Challenger accident was caused by a failure in the O-rings sealing a joint on the right solid rocket booster, which allowed pressurized hot gases and eventually flame to "blow by" the O-ring and make contact with the adjacent external tank, causing structural failure. The failure of the O-rings was attributed to a faulty design, whose performance could be too easily compromised by factors including the low ambient temperature on the day of launch. The O-rings would not work properly at ambient temperatures below 50 °F (10 °C)- and it was 36 °F (2 °C) on the morning of the launch.
More broadly, the report also considered the contributing causes of the accident. Most salient was the failure of both NASA and Morton-Thiokol to respond adequately to the danger posed by the deficient joint design. Rather than redesigning the joint, they came to define the problem as an acceptable flight risk. The report found that managers at Marshall had known about the flawed design since 1977, but never discussed the problem outside their reporting channels with Thiokol—a flagrant violation of NASA regulations. Even when it became more apparent how serious the flaw was, no one [citation needed] at Marshall considered grounding the shuttles until a fix could be implemented. On the contrary, Marshall managers went as far as to issue and waive six launch constraints related to the O-rings. The report also strongly criticized the decision-making process that led to the launch of Challenger, saying that it was seriously flawed: "failures in communication...resulted in a decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a conflict between engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers.
Richard Feynman
One of the commission's members was theoretical physicist Richard Feynman. Feynman, who was then seriously ill with cancer, was reluctant to undertake the job. He did so to find the root cause of the disaster and to speak plainly to the public about his findings. Before going to Washington, D.C., Feynman did his own investigation. He became suspicious about the O-rings. “O-rings show scorching in Clovis check,” he scribbled in his notes. "Once a small hole burns through generates a large hole very fast! Few seconds catastrophic failure."[70] At the start of investigation, fellow members Dr. Sally Ride and General Donald J. Kutyna told Feynman that the O-rings had not been tested at temperatures below 50 °F (10 °C).[71] During a televised hearing, Feynman demonstrated how the O-rings became less resilient and subject to seal failures at ice-cold temperatures by immersing a sample of the material in a glass of ice water. While other members of the Commission met with NASA and supplier top management, Feynman sought out the engineers and technicians for the answers. He was critical of flaws in NASA's "safety culture", so much so that he threatened to remove his name from the report unless it included his personal observations on the reliability of the shuttle, which appeared as Appendix F. In the appendix, he argued that the estimates of reliability offered by NASA management were wildly unrealistic, differing as much as a thousandfold from the estimates of working engineers.
"For a successful technology," he concluded, "reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled."
U.S. House Committee hearings
The U.S. House Committee on Science and Technology also conducted hearings and, on October 29, 1986, released its own report on the Challenger accident.[75] The committee reviewed the findings of the Rogers Commission as part of its investigation and agreed with the Rogers Commission as to the technical causes of the accident. It differed from the committee in its assessment of the accident's contributing causes: "the Committee feels that the underlying problem which led to the Challenger accident was not poor communication or underlying procedures as implied by the Rogers Commission conclusion. Rather, the fundamental problem was poor technical decision-making over a period of several years by top NASA and contractor personnel, who failed to act decisively to solve the increasingly serious anomalies in the Solid Rocket Booster joints.
Heuristics are simple strategies or mental processes that humans, animals, organizations and even some machines use to quickly form judgments, make decisions, and find solutions to complex problems. Heuristic processes are used to find answers and solutions most likely to work or be correct. This does not mean however, that heuristics are always right. In situations of risk, heuristics face an accuracy-effort trade-off where their simplified decision process leads to reduced accuracy.
Group dynamics is a system of behaviors and psychological processes occurring within a social group (intragroup dynamics), or between social groups (intergroup dynamics). The study of group dynamics can be useful in understanding decision-making behaviour, tracking the spread of diseases in society, creating effective therapy techniques, and following the emergence and popularity of new ideas and technologies. Group dynamics are at the core of understanding racism, sexism, and other forms of social prejudice and discrimination. These applications of the field are studied in psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, epidemiology, education, social work, business, and communication studies.
The three main factors affecting a team's cohesion (working well together) are: environmental, personal and leadership.
Human beings are complex, inconsistent, and many other things. Put them all into an interactive systems (cities, nations, global, cultures/ideologies) and the complexity increases.
It is easy to imagine this being an opening paragraph in the history books for the WWIII chapter. Large chunks of the world economy are currently on ice and we haven't even seen what horrible economic policies governments are going to use to respond to this in the medium term. I bet that when the dust settles it'll be just like every other crisis where the situation is decidedly different and substantially worse.
The economy is both critical and far too complicated for anyone to understand exactly what is going on at the moment. We could be looking at anything from a temporary wobble that disappears in 6 months to a long-rolling 20 year catastrophe.
Probably we'll go backwards -- the end death count will be compared with normal death counts and be likened to a bad flu season. People are less likely to panic next time, but also less likely to pay attention to things like lockdowns.
I suspect one outcome will be a long term reduction in civil liberties
The US has a government agency called BARDA (Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority), that estimated at some point that there are 10000 gaps worldwide when it comes to pandemic prevention. And to close these gaps one would need a budget of $10BN/year. They didn't get that.
Now, after a few trillion down the drain, I think they'll get it.
The web is the biggest threat they face to their App Store.
They see the writing on the wall with technologies like wasm blossoming, and with web APIs beginning to open up possibilities for “native”-quality apps.
So they’re interested in anything that can reduce the friction necessary to get into native iOS apps.
Is it me or are there a lot of articles indirectly promoting Microsoft on HN these days?
It's getting harder and harder to tell if those are genuine news or a PR firm at work, but "MS breaks a records in meeting minutes" feels even more like advertising than "Azur is getting 10 times more traffic".
If this is advertising, is there a way to prevent them from staying on the front page?
Some companies (like today’s Microsoft, apparently) have PR arms that are actually good at their jobs—writing articles that are, independent of their ability to advertise their company, actually intellectually gratifying in some way.
People who post things to HN, independent of being shills for any given company, like to post intellectually gratifying things. Sometimes those things happen to also be PR pieces. I don’t think the people who post these things really think about them as being PR pieces; or, if they do, they post them despite that, because in the balance, the piece still works out to be worth reading (in their opinion) even after giving it a demerit for being PR.
I’m not denying that there are shills on HN, mind you. I’m sure there are many of them. But I would say that even those shills probably have some sort of “standards”—only posting the PR pieces available to them if they think they’ll do well here (which means, only posting the pieces someone else who wasn’t a shill would have posted anyway.) To do otherwise might get them banned as spammers (which I do believe does happen—mods want to chime in on that?)
And then we still have the filter of some amount of upvoting being required to get things to the front page, plus (I assume) some sort of behind-the-scenes voting-ring detection. So the upvote signal is likely to express genuine community interest, and therefore to signal that the piece does have value independent of its PR-power.
Good PR is not doing the post yourself, but creating a post that is passable enough to be posted by a regular user on your behalf.
Just because it is well done does not mean it has good value as news.
Indeed, even if it's an ok read, it's giving a lot of attention to a company just because it has the money to attract said attention, no matter the quality of their service. Since the reader's time and energy is limited, it's taking the place of another possible read.
In the same way, by allowing this to happen, this lets a company create a fantastic image of itself, that is independent from it's real quality, just because it has the budget to do it. Cumulatively, this can, after years, end up rewriting history, and lead even educated people to make altered judgements and decisions in the future.
I'm not saying that as an anti-microsoft attack, I dislike the concept of such powerful PR in general, MS is just here a potential example for this.
As an HN reader, I wish there would be a policy about this. But I have no idea what it would look like, or how one could enforce it.
So maybe I'm just making a lot of noise for nothing.
It's not just Microsoft, I've seen similar articles from other telework apps (Zoom, Slack, etc) and from internet providers talking about the increased activity they are seeing. I think it just comes with out current situation.
I don't think Microsoft needs promotion currently, atleast during these times. Their main revenue is from Enterprise market and during such slow growth, no Enterprise shifts to newer platform over the night. I am just saying, we shouldn't be negative about everything, just because it's Microsoft.
Look for trends in the articles posted by the person who posted it. My guess is some people just post anything Apple/Microsoft/Amazon/Google/Facebook related.
My anecdote: I work for a F100 company that's in the midst of a (long) transition to Office 365. In a mid-level engineering staff meeting 2 days ago where we spent 20 minutes discussing the advantages of Teams over Skype for Business, and what could be done to accelerate our transition. All driven by WFH - Office 365 applications don't require a VPN connection in our org, while Outlook/Skype does.
HN has a demographic. If you're trying to influence the technocratic types you target this place, too.
Hell, HN is the organ of a startup incubator -- I'd argue that it exists to explicitly flog certain technical firms. That other companies are able to get their marketing teams on here too is may be a bug or a feature.
I doubt anyone's being paid by MS here, but MS puts out blog posts and will release numbers that news publications can write easy, free articles based on.
There are some things really neat in the switf example that they compare to python, like the literal range similar to ruby's, the fact that "+" is a function like in lisp, although I'm really not fan of the CFAbsoluteTimeGetCurrent().
But the python example doesn't make me trust the rest of the article. It is clearly a swift example, translated verbatim to python.
Idiomatic Python would be this:
import time
for it in range(15):
start = time.time()
total = sum((it,) * 3000)
end = time.time()
print(end - start, total)
Which is shorter, and way faster.
Now of course, Python is slower than swift (although a numpy version would not be, but I get it's not relevant in general purpose machine learning). But misrepresenting a language is not a good way to make a point.
Hi, author here, thanks for taking the time to read the article!
The objective of the demo was not to see which language could sum up a bunch of numbers the fastest. You could keep optimizing that until you are left with just `print(<the resulting number>)`. The objective was to have a simple example of looping over an array a bunch of times. The only reason I ended up summing the numbers in the array and printing them was so that LLVM wouldn't optimize it away and be unfair towards python. I actually wrote it first in Python tbh.
The title makes it look like the problem comes with the "~username" URLS naming scheme, while it really comes from any features that let the user host static files they upload AND link somewhere else on your website.
The site take the example of apache mod_sites, but alone it's not enough. You need apache mod_sites, and the ability inject a link served by it somewhere else.
Well, yes. If you let user input anything and then inject it anywhere in your website, it's a security whole. Not a surprised.
So if you let your users host entire application on your website, and let other users of your website visit those applications. Well, I mean, sure it's a problem.
The best sandbox is the one you don't need to use.
Yeah but then, do you want "whimsy" in sensible articles like political/religious/ethical related ones? Then would one expect wikipedia editors to enforce this policy on top of the work they already do? And using what criteria?
No, Wikipedia is not set up for whimsy. This kind of thing has to come from a single author with a point of view, not from a crowdsourced article with conflicting points of view.
Half of the pleasure of "baba is you" is to discover it. The game assumes this perfectly, and is actually structured to make that discovery part of the gameplay: it's incremental, pleasant, and it surprises you in good ways.
I sometime even laugh at the way the game designer played with me. With one specific block present or missing. With one rule you didn't know about, or didn't think about that way. It's communicating playfulness without a having to say a word.
Like we know that destroying all insects and and global warning are not sustainable. We know we can't have 7 billion humans eating meat. We know we should let not power concentrate too much into some entities. But we keep it up.
Since we don't react unless something forces us to, I'm starting to believe we need some medium crisis to happen like the covid19 so that a bigger one won't wipe us out in the future.