Guice docs: “There are many advantages to using dependency injection, but doing so manually often leads to a large amount of boilerplate code to be written. Guice is a framework that makes it possible to write code that uses dependency injection without the hassle of writing much of that boilerplate code”
This is a common misconception. Guice’s docs delineate between dependency injection as a pattern and Guice as a framework that supports that pattern.
Dealerships are major job providers in small towns and provide some of the better jobs. Salespeople, loan officers, etc.
Think replacing local grocery stores with Walmart. Low end jobs stay, high end jobs go away. Further hurts small towns.
My guess is that a good chunk of the efficiencies from this model will go to Ford corporate so it’s a wealth transfer from small towns to big co managers / stockholders.
Different types of diagrams highlight different aspects of a system.
If you can, try to put together 2 different diagrams presenting different views. For example, sequence diagrams, model diagrams, etc. each tell you something different. Having a few different perspectives on the same system will give you a richer understanding.
Not specifically related to visualization, but, also, if you spend a lot of time trying to understand a piece of code, once you understand it, document it (e.g. in a function or method comment). Over time, this makes a huge difference and will help you and others out when you revisit the code later.
Some books that I read and found useful. These are mostly older books that have withstood numerous market cycles. Even if you decide to branch out, these are a good base to start from.
1. “Random Walk Down Wall Street” to understand index funds and why they generally outperform.
2. “Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits” for a general understanding of how to choose stocks (and companies) for the long-term
3. “The Intelligent Investor” for understanding the some of the human challenges of investing.
If you’re short on time and don’t want to make this a hobby, read #1.
Read the Wikipedia article on Tulipomania, or _Famous First Bubbles_.
OP should too, actually, since his comment that
> The price of tulip bulbs has yet to recover from its 1637 peak.
betrays several fundamental misunderstandings of the tulip market at the time. Of course the top tulip bulbs depreciated. That is like saying 'a patent has never recovered its peak value' or 'Windows 3.1 never recovered its March 1992 peak'.
That wikipedia article seems to fully support the idea that tulips did "go that high"; it also notes that a legal change transformed tulip futures contracts into tulip option contracts, which enabled the price of tulips to rise substantially without costing speculators extra. It shows a catalog page of the time offering one tulip bulb for over ten times the contemporary annual earnings of a "skilled craftsman". If I assume that a "skilled craftsman" in the US earns $20 / hour (less than I made as a summer intern at amazon before graduating college), that puts the price of the bulb at at least $400,000. For the price listed in that catalog, you could also have bought 25,000 pounds of cheese.
It also notes that while flowers in general averaged 40% annual price depreciation at the time, tulips averaged a more impressive 99.999% annual depreciation.
> Many of the sources telling of the woes of tulip mania, such as the anti-speculative pamphlets that were later reported by Beckmann and Mackay, have been cited as evidence of the extent of the economic damage. These pamphlets, however, were not written by victims of a bubble, but were primarily religiously motivated. The upheaval was viewed as a perversion of the moral order—proof that "concentration on the earthly, rather than the heavenly flower could have dire consequences".[53] Thus, it is possible that a relatively minor economic event took on a life of its own as a morality tale.
^ From the same wiki page ^ No idea with the picture you reference where it's from.
The point about economic theory is the market needs to be fluid. It says nothing about crazy people in a small private market(obvious I guess)
The "Tulip" craze seems to me to just be the normal fundamental dogma that you get when people don't fully understand systems. People distorting instances that are not linked to push their views. To me the interesting thing is people 400 years ago also feared financial systems.
Seriously, understand what other people are saying (or make some sort of note in your comment that it's unrelated to the one you're responding to).
The wiki page says that there was very little financial damage from the tulip crash. It also says that "There is no dispute that prices for tulip bulb contracts rose and then fell in 1636–37". I responded to the claim that high tulip prices were a myth. The wiki page cited does not support that idea to any degree. And the portion you cite, in particular, also does not support that idea. It says there was little economic damage from the crash, which I acknowledged, but barely mentioned, because it was irrelevant to my point.
> If I assume that a "skilled craftsman" in the US earns $20 / hour (less than I made as a summer intern at amazon before graduating college), that puts the price of the bulb at at least $400,000. For the price listed in that catalog, you could also have bought 25,000 pounds of cheese. It also notes that while flowers in general averaged 40% annual price depreciation at the time, tulips averaged a more impressive 99.999% annual depreciation.
I don't think you understood my point: these were scarce, expiring, novel luxuries. High initial prices often followed by vast depreciation is normal, and we see it all the time in the most comparable market, fashion and art, where artists who once commanded stratospheric prices tumble into obscurity and their works get junked. Pointing out the claimed performance (and remember the extenuating factors here like a lot of the sources being polemical lies) betrays a lack of appreciation for the volatility and time factor involved.
I didn't even understand that you had a point of your own; I saw the conversation go "It's stupid that tulips would go that high, and funnily enough it didn't happen." > "citation?" > "look at the wikipedia page for Tulipomania", and then a comment that it's in the nature of tulips to depreciate over time (side note: I get the analogy to patents, but I don't get the analogy to windows 3.1).
The tulipomania page does not support the idea that high tulip prices didn't happen. Those tulip catalogs were not the polemical pamphlets (admittedly, it doesn't appear to be clear who put the prices in). The only thing my comment mentions that came from a propaganda pamphlet is the price of cheese, but I figure there's no real reason to doubt them on that. A law really was passed for the relief of people who had bought tulip futures. It seems to have been effective, but none of that means prices weren't high; it means tulip prices didn't have a major effect on the Dutch economy.
Anecdotal but I would imagine it's similar in reputable state schools in red states: Texas has very few Keynesians yet economics professors at the University of Texas are overwhelmingly Keynesian.
Virtually everyone you encounter in the government subscribes to Keynesian economics to the degree that they understand anything at all about economics. When economics is explained in the media at all it is through the lens of Keynesian economics.
"it does raise questions about why the school's arguments which seem so utterly convincing to so many people, don't manage to gain many converts among people who research the subject professionally."
I think it would be easier to convince people with no physics knowledge that a bowling ball falls faster than a golf ball. Intuitively, it seems that bowling ball should fall faster. Austrian economics seems to follow a similar thread. It's more intuitive and easier to grasp than the economics taught in the textbooks, but doesn't have much data to validate it.
Most Austrians understand mainstream economic theory much better than mainstream economists understand Austrian theories. Evidence being Krugman's disastrous attempts to discredit Austrian Business Cycle Theory. It isn't a perfect theory but Krugman can't even explain it let alone criticize it.
You've accidentally illustrated the disconnect. Because the fundamental disagreement between the Austrians and the more mainstream academic schools of thought is epistemological. Data can only settle differences when both sides agree on the epistemological ground rules.
I have an advanced science degree. I'm not afraid of math, and I've plowed through Keynes "General Theory". It doesn't come close to passing the sniff test for basic scientific rigor. It can't.
Economists can't control their variables, and they have no way of knowing what their error bars are. They can make empirical models that work most of the time, but they can't know what regime those models are valid for, and where the breaking point is. There is every indication that economic systems are chaotic, and prone to sudden discontinuous phase changes.
Worse, unlike a chaotic system like weather, the underlying primitives are not at all primitive. We can say very precisely how a cubic meter of air (for example) behaves under widely varying conditions. This is why our weather and climate models keep getting better -- you can use more processing power and better algorithms and use the basic laws of physics to get the right answers, despite a system of incredible complexity.
But economists have nothing like that to work with. There is no meaningful sense in which we have good statistical models of human economic behavior. We have very limited snapshots, that are invalidated the moment customs or conditions change beyond the originally observed regime.
All of this means that you can't even build empirical models unless you have a preexisting, a priori theory of economic cause and effect, and you have no experiments strong enough to falsify bad a priori assumptions. The Austrian argument is simply that all economists are actually engaged in a priori theorizing, despite their protestations claiming to be empiricists.
I find the assertion that the Austrian school is more "intuitive" and accessible to be silly. Nobody who has actually tried to study the primary texts would claim so. It takes a pretty strong background in philosophy just to follow the first several chapters of Human Action -- precisely because they focus on epistemological issues.
It doesn't require a conspiracy theory to explain the popularity of econometrics. Lots of social sciences spent the whole 20th century pretending to be as rigorous as physics and chemistry, to bask in the reflected glow of progress. Nobody likes to admit that their field has no experimental lodestone, and so drifts along as a popularity contest.
The whole problem with Austrian economics is that they reject scientific epistemology entirely by waving a big flag on which is written, "Human Free Will makes everything unpredictable!"
And then they go ahead and make predictions anyway, out of sheer ideology.
If Keynes is epistemologically worthless, fine, but so are von Mises and Hayek. More so, in fact, because they adamantly refuse to employ an empirical method.
> "Human Free Will makes everything unpredictable!"
Well in practice it currently does. That's not to say that in principle we won't eventually develop a real quantitative science of human behavior -- but it's going to require some major advances in neurobiology.
> And then they go ahead and make predictions anyway, out of sheer ideology.
Yes, but the Austrian response is that all other economists are doing the same, while deceiving themselves that they have no ideology at all. So most economists' axioms and deductions remain unexamined and unchallenged.
> I think it would be easier to convince people with no physics knowledge that a bowling ball falls faster than a golf ball. Intuitively, it seems that bowling ball should fall faster.
Do you have any reason to believe that their intuition is wrong? If the bowling ball and golf ball were both spheres, so they differed only in size and mass, the bowling ball would have a higher terminal velocity. The golf ball's dimples reduce its air resistance, and I have no idea how to calculate if they reduce it enough to let it have the same terminal velocity as the bowling ball.
Perhaps I should have used a different example, but the main point was that Galileo's supposed Leaning Tower experiment (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galileo's_Leaning_Tower_of_Pisa...) is counter intuitive and it's harder to convince laypeople of counter intuitive ideas especially when the "competing" idea is more intuitive.
there is no data to validate either model. there are far far too many variables, and you can't test both of them side by side by definition. If one fails in a certain environment, you can't say the other would have succeeded. We've been doing keynes for quite awhile now, and it has mostly been going poorly. There is no way to say that doing the opposite would have gone better though. It might have, it might have gone the same, it might have done worse. We don't know, and we can't know, because we can't go back to 2008 and try it.
We could switch tomorrow, and again it wouldn't matter if it succeeded or failed. You couldn't say that doing the opposite would have a different total outcome.
This is a common misconception. Guice’s docs delineate between dependency injection as a pattern and Guice as a framework that supports that pattern.
https://github.com/google/guice/wiki