Guy Lewis Steele Jr. RABBIT: A compiler for SCHEME ftp://publications.ai.mit.edu/ai-publications/pdf/AITR-474.pdf
OK, I think the first two sections are plenty. You can search for the rest yourself on Google Scholar (I found most of these as the first hit on Google Scholar, one or two took looking through a few hits or doing a Google search as well)
At least one point in its favor is that it's smaller and lighter weight than XMPP. XMPP feels fairly over-engineered, and then you need to trawl through a huge pile of extensions to figure out which ones you will actually need to implement for interoperability.
XMPP is old, and mature. I'm afraid this "over-engineered" feeling comes to just about every successful technology that reaches such an age :)
Technology is full of people reinventing the wheel (sometimes better, obviously), but more often than not, unnecessarily.
Once you start to dig into any domain deeply, you encounter so many details you would never have imagined existed at first glance. Federated IM is no exception, and it's not easy. XMPP still has problems that are currently being solved that any new protocols won't even be thinking of for 10 years yet.
XMPP dates back to the early '00, which puts it right smack in the middle of the XML craze. It is as mature as it is bloated, a very strong subjective hurdle to overcome.
Also worth trying are Privacy Act requests about data that they have collected on you personally; the Privacy Act is separate from the FOIA, and allows you to request information that they have collected about you.
Of course, there is an exemption for information needed for law-enforcement and counter terrorism. So they may simply deny your request (or provide entirely redacted documents) for that reason. But it's still worth a shot.
Also remember that technically, it's the FBI which conducts domestic operations. While the NSA may provide services to the FBI to help them collect information, it's the FBI which is officially gathering that information. So any requests, either Privacy Act or FOIA, should be made of both the FBI and NSA.
It's generally not copyright infringement to simply collect data available on the internet. For example, Google downloads tons of copyrighted information; but that's not considered copyright infringement because using it for a search engine is a "transformative" use. Google is not replacing the copyright owner by redistributing the page, but is instead using it in a completely different way to provide an index of all pages.
The same would be true of the NSA. They aren't redistributing the data they download to anyone who asks, they are instead compiling an index to be searched for intelligence gathering purposes.
Never used akka; but in erlang, actors (processes) are frequently long-lived, which is what he means by "unbounded lifetime. An erlang process generally doesn't do a single computation and then join back with the spawning process; instead, it usually stays alive as long as the resource it is managing is alive.
For example, in a chat server, you might have one process per user, and one process per channel; when someone says something, it's passed via TCP to the user process, which passes it to the channel process, which hands it out to the other user processes, which send it back to their users. Each of the user processes and channel process are long lived; they are there to sit around idle until they need to react to an event, at which point they wake up, do their work, and go back to sleep until another event comes along.
Fork-join, instead, is about shorter-lived processes, that are treated essentially as parallel subroutines, and go away as soon as that computation is done.
Note that both actors and fork-join may be mapped to long-lived hardware threads, but both are used fairly differently; I see a pretty big distinction between long-lived Erlang actors and short lived fork-join patterns. And of course, you can emulate fork-join with actors, but based on the paper you linked to, it sounds like there might be some efficiency benefits from treating them differently.
BTW, Java has an incredible fork-join scheduler (was excellent in Java 7, and has gotten even better in Java 8), which both Akka[1] and Quasar[2] use for actor scheduling (and fiber scheduling in Quasar's case).
Could that just be mitigated by spawning a pool of processes (there are multiple examples, one even in the LYSE book) and then executing the computation then returning them to the pool?
This basically follows the "Erlang process is quickly checked out of the pool, runs a single computation and returns back to the pool"
Why should it matter whether he has a high school diploma?
That type of attack is precisely the definition of an ad-hominem. The truth of his claims does not depend on whether he has obtained a high school diploma. It depends on whether or not his claims are true. Someone with no high school diploma can tell the truth just as well as someone with a PhD.
And it's not like his claims require an advanced education to understand. If he was claiming to have built a cold fusion reactor, that would be one thing; it would be pretty hard to believe that someone without formal education and with no prior results in the area had made such an advance. But all he's claiming is that the systems he administered had the ability to wiretap any given American at his whim. That just takes some basic technical knowledge and being in the right place at the right time.
To quote jessedhillon from another comment on this article:
Snowden did have a difficult time in HS and he does not possess a formal CS/technical education. He was a sys admin, not an engineer. His claims, in that light, do seem bizarre and uninformed. I mean, ffs he seemed to insinuate in the Guardian interview that the NSA keeps a list of undercover assets and he had access to it!? These are the people who created selinux -- if I extend him some credibility, I doubt greatly that he had any real idea what it is he was looking at.
Elsewhere he talks about every machine being bugged and things like that. And the tapping he claims to have intimate knowledge of -- that kind of stuff would be happening inside of some kind of data store, maybe like Apache Accumulo which the NSA also developed. Let alone the implications of what he's saying on the security of all crypto systems everywhere -- how many uneducated sys admins do you know who can inspect a data store and actually understand what they're looking at, and also understand deeply how consumer encryption works.
And this all presumes that the NSA's systems are so poorly configured that a contractor in HI could access all this. My verdict is that all he had was some slideshow that he turned over to the Guardian, the rest is a bullshit story.
Personally, I don't think what he's saying is 'a bullshit story', I just know the only definitive facts we have right now are the PRISM slides.
Amount of formal CS/technical/college education that is relevant to accessing data in a database system in which you have priveleges == 0.
"High school dropout" doesn't mean "dumb", it means "not socially compatible with school". This is not anti-correlated to comfort using computer systems.
I once worked with a sysadmin with all the stereotypical features: weak credentials, puffed-up self-important attitude of "God of knowledge", constatn bragging of his hacking skillz, poor root-cause analysis of complex software failure modes. But did hew know how to install a database and read its contents? Of course.
The NSA and CIA are both supposed to be for foreign intelligence only. Only the FBI is supposed to directly conduct domestic operations, though frequently they do it with the assistance of the NSA. And the NSA has interpreted "foreign" as anything involving at least one foreign party.
The difference between the CIA and NSA is that the CIA primarily does HUMINT (human intelligence), while the NSA does SIGINT (signal intelligence). HUMINT includes spies directly living in the target countries, mingling with the people they are spying on. SIGINT involves intercepting communications and decrypting them. There is some crossover; in particular, HUMINT can frequently be used to place bugs, keyloggers, rootkits, and the like which can be used for SIGINT, and SIGINT can fill in information that HUMINT is not privy to.
You mean, you can't imagine the US government executing its own citizens for speaking out against the government in a foreign country without trial? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anwar_al-Awlaki
On the other hand, America would have shown no regard for the citizenship of the enemy in the equivalent situation of a German-American serving in the Nazi armies.
Congress has told the President to use military force to eradicate Al Qaeda, al-Awlaki was in AQ, so even that isn't what you make it seem.
I am a guy in a 3rd world country. Your government could assassinate me tomorrow, and then simply say that I was in Al Qaeda. They have proof of this, but of course they can't reveal that information for reasons of "National Security".
You think this is OK, because your Congress has given the president authority to kill anyone who (according to whoever is holding the trigger) is involved in that organisation.
"Military force" doesn't actually mean indiscriminate killing is OK, otherwise we wouldn't consider My Lai a massacre.
So my government would have to, at the very least, demonstrate that you actually play some operational role within AQ where a targeted killing of you would appreciably impair the military capacity of AQ.
This was the logic used by the U.S. to send what was essentially a kill mission against the Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto during WWII, but it probably helped end that war faster so people don't seem to complain as much about that one, for some reason.
But either way, if you're a non-U.S. citizen in a 3rd world country then for whatever reason you're not someone that our civil libertarians in the U.S. care about, as they only care about the extrajudicial killing of American citizens.
I'm assuming when you say that they have proof that you are implying that the government is pretending they have proof but won't show it. If you're actually in AQ and involved in the violent death and destruction of Muslims, Americans, civilians and our allies throughout the world then I can't honestly say that I'd feel too sorry for you...
If 'you' (not you personally) really thought My Lai was a massacre then there would have been some more serious sentencing around that event.
From the relevant wikipedia page:
"While 26 U.S. soldiers were initially charged with criminal offenses for their actions at Mỹ Lai, only Second Lieutenant William Calley, a platoon leader in Charlie Company, was convicted. Found guilty of killing 22 villagers, he was originally given a life sentence, but only served three and a half years under house arrest."
Putting this event forward as an example of how well the US deals with military excesses is really not clever. See Fallujah for a more recent example.
My point is not that the U.S. "deals well" with military excesses. Like most other nations we have a hard time coming to grips at the time of an atrocity with the blood on our hands. We do usually come around though, such as My Lai which is now considered a massacre even by the U.S. Army, which now uses My Lai (among other notable crises) as a case study in their officer training curriculum at West Point. The massacre is taught as a "massacre" in our history books, and our guilt is not shirked or avoided.
On the other hand you'll even today see people claim that the German Heer (Army) wasn't so bad during WWII, that they were simply a professional army that wasn't involved in atrocities like the actual villains such as the Nazis, the Waffen SS, and the Gestapo. It's not actually true; senior German Army officers were just as involved in atrocities as the rest, even if they didn't participate in the worst extremes. I won't say that the current German Army training curriculum and senior leadership don't look at that aspect of their own history (in fact I'm sure they do), but if more armies had been like America's over the past 100 years world history would have been very different.
My point instead related to the comment about Anwar al-Awlaki. He was playing a military game and was treated as such, nothing more or less. If he didn't want to be treated by military rules then he shouldn't have joined a quasi-military organization that ended up at war with the U.S. But once it became a martial conflict different rules apply, including the Law of Armed Conflict and the Geneva Conventions.
Anwar-alAlaqui was a lot closer to being an Alex Jones, or Glenn Beck type of figure than being some terrorist mastermind; he was basically killed for calling for spiritual struggle against the United States Government. There's not much in the way of evidence that he was more than a loudmouth with a youtube channel. And while I wouldn't feel to broken up if Glenn Beck's RV were taken out in the parking lot of the Preakness; I would still object on principle if it were the US Government doing it, rather than one of his creditors.
This close after the leak? Surely give it some time before snatching him, this is such a hot story right now that people are going to draw this conclusion...
(Although obviously China etc might also want him for a few "questions")
What's legal and what's right aren't always the same thing. For example, in Nazi Germany, it was illegal to be Jewish; and communicating heavily with Jews may have increased suspicion that you were Jewish. Or in Rwanda in 1994, communicating with Tutsi's may have given rise to suspicion that you were a Tutsi. Or in North Korea today, communicating with defectors may raise suspicion that you are likely to defect.
Here are some legal, or questionably legal but morally correct things you may use this for, in the modern day US: you would like to notify news organizations about a secret NSA spying program, but don't know who to trust, since some news organizations may hand your information over to the federal government when pressured to do so, to root out the source of the leak.
You are a lawyer for a detainee in Guantanamo. To collect evidence, you need to contact several people who you know are on terrorist watch lists, but want to avoid being placed on such a list yourself and be restricted from flying.
You have are in the process of divorcing an abusive husband who is a high-ranking FBI official. You want to be able to contact your lawyer and his, without worrying that he may abuse his authority to find out information about where you are now living.
You are a founder of a whistleblowing operation, which has recently done a large exposé on US forces killing innocent children in the Middle East. You would like to keep in touch with your friends and family, without them also being added to watch lists that cause all of their electronics to be confiscated every time the fly.
You are helping to get information out of China about human rights abuses about Tibet. Given that the Chinese government has done hacking deliberately targeting surveillance back doors of networking systems of US companies, you worry that they may be able to track you.
It seemed to hijack in Firefox but not Chrome (Ubuntu), but it's a little hard to tell since the site's dependency on documentup.com, which appears to be taking a shit right now, is screwing with page loads and such.
C. A. R. Hoare. An axiomatic basis for computer programming: http://sigpl.or.kr/school/2005w/slides/2_17_1.pdf
Peter J. Landin. The next 700 programming languages: http://www.thecorememory.com/Next_700.pdf
Robin Milner. A theory of type polymorphism in programming: http://courses.engr.illinois.edu/cs421/sp2012/project/milner...
Gordon Plotkin. Call-by-name, call-by-value, and the λ-calculus : http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/03043975759... (PDF link at upper right of page)
John C. Reynolds. Towards a theory of type structure: http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2289&c...
Pretty great works:
Luca Cardelli. A semantics of multiple inheritance: http://lucacardelli.name/Papers/Inheritance.pdf
Luis Damas and Robin Milner. Principal type schemes for functional programs: http://web.cs.wpi.edu/~cs4536/c12/milner-damas_principal_typ...
Edsger W. Dijkstra. Recursive programming: http://oai.cwi.nl/oai/asset/9253/9253A.pdf
Edsger W. Dijkstra. Go to statement considered harmful: http://www.massey.ac.nz/~kahawick/159331/Goto-Harmful-Dijkst...
William A. Howard. The formulas-as-types notion of construction: http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~crary/819-f09/Howard80.pdf
Robert Kowalski. Predicate logic as programming language: http://65.99.230.10:81/collect/computer/index/assoc/HASH0183...
Peter J. Landin. The mechanical evaluation of expressions: http://ropas.snu.ac.kr/lib/dock/La1964.pdf
John McCarthy. Recursive functions of symbolic expressions and their computation by machine: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.111...
Eugenio Moggi. Computational lambda-calculus and monads: http://pdf.aminer.org/000/267/711/lazy_lambda_calculus_theor...
Greg Morrisett, David Walker, Karl Crary, and Neal Glew. From System-F to typed assembly language: http://staff.ustc.edu.cn/~xyfeng/reading/p527-morrisett.pdf
George C. Necula. Proof-carrying code: http://www.utdallas.edu/~kxh060100/Papers/necula96.pdf
Gordon D. Plotkin. LCF considered as a programming language: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/03043975779...
Gordon D. Plotkin. A structural approach to operational semantics: https://www.alice.virginia.edu/~weimer/2006-655/reading/plot...
Guy Lewis Steele Jr. RABBIT: A compiler for SCHEME ftp://publications.ai.mit.edu/ai-publications/pdf/AITR-474.pdf
OK, I think the first two sections are plenty. You can search for the rest yourself on Google Scholar (I found most of these as the first hit on Google Scholar, one or two took looking through a few hits or doing a Google search as well)