You were downvoted into invisibility because this type of discourse is not appropriate for Hacker News. Please, no shouting. No vague pronouncements to "wake up".
We try to have a reasoned, intelligent discourse here. There are many services provided by companies which may collaborate with the NSA or law enforcement which are pretty much unavoidable in modern society; the telephone network, the internet, and so on. Telling people that they need to completely disconnect from modern society or they shouldn't complain is unproductive.
Rather, we should be discussing realistic solutions. Pervasive end-to-end cryptography for everyday tasks would help. Better laws and legal oversight of both the government and of corporations would help. Protocols that encourage federated or decentralized use, rather than central storage that everything passes through unencrypted would help.
Here's the problem; you keep on assuming that good tools will magically appear, that help with debugging. But good tools take a lot of time and work to perfect. In reality, you usually wind up with just barely good enough tools.
With a text based protocol, you can inspect it visually with no special tools, and munge it with general purpose tools that you already know how to use (shell script, sed, awk, perl, python, ruby, what have you) with no special support libraries or anything of the sort. Support libraries can help you with the more complex aspects of the protocols, but for basic debugging purposes, you can do it all with general purpose tools.
With a binary protocol, you need those libraries to even have a chance of being able to work with it. Now you can't use a general purpose shell pipeline to munge it; no more nc | grep or what have you. You have to have a wireshark dissector; and good luck figuring out how to grep through the results of what a wireshark dissector generates.
The main point is that the overhead of the ASCII encoding isn't the main problem with HTTP. Reading ASCII encoded CRLF delimited headers is a solved problem (and heck, you could probably switch that to just LF delimiters, since I'm sure that most processors already handle that case just fine).
The problems are things like having to repeat headers over and over again for each request in a session, enormous cookies that need to get sent with every request, and the like. But you can solve those without throwing away the easily debuggable ASCII-encoded headers; and compression really does solve most of the problem with the inefficiency of ASCII encoding (and you're going to want to use anyhow, since the HTML, CSS, and JavaScript that you're delivering is all a fairly inefficient ASCII representation too).
Sure. But I'm pretty sure Ezra Klein means "under current law"; of course the law could change such that this is not the case any more.
I think you're reading a stronger argument into the original article than is present. He's not arguing that Roberts is constitutionally guaranteed this power, or anything of the sort. Just that under current law, he has this power, and under current law, it's a lifetime appointment since the position that grants such power, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, is also a lifetime appointment.
Maybe he does, but since Congress can't restrain the Supreme Court in other ways (eg by taking away the power of judicial review), omitting the caveat in this case is a serious oversight that is going to result in many, if not most, readers getting entirely the wrong impression.
Journalists who write on legal topics have an ethical obligation to provide proper context to their readers, few of whom have any legal training. Frankly, I think that journalists ought to have a JD themselves before covering these topics, in much the same way tht science journalists ought to have a BS.
If a group could be considered a "tea party" group, that pretty much indicates that it's primarily a political group; the term "party" specifically refers to a political institution. If a tea party group does some form of social welfare, that doesn't change the fact that it's primarily a political institution.
Planned Parenthood, on the other hand, is unquestionably a social welfare organization. It has offices which have doctors who provide a wide range of sexual and reproductive medical services to many women who would otherwise be unable to obtain them. If you look at their budge, 70% goes directly towards medical services. Less than 10% goes towards public policy; and what does, is advocating for policies to be able to continue the social welfare services that they provide, nothing else. Those figures you linked to for donations to political candidates represent less than 0.05% of their budget.
Where are the tea party offices that provide medical services to low income residents? Or heck, if you want to be fair to them, where are the tea party offices that provide tax advice to people who want to lower their tax burden? Of course, it's kind of hard to come up with examples of social welfare services that tea party groups could provide, because as far as I can tell, the tea party movement is primarily about opposition to social welfare, and a variety of political goals involving the reduction of the federal government. Even trying to stretch my imagination, I can't think of any social welfare programs that tea party groups would actually provide. I suppose they could qualify for tax exempt status if they shipped 51% of their revenues to other social welfare organizations that they supported, but that seems more like a tax dodge than an honest assessment of the purpose of the organizations.
Now, back on topic, I think that the software groups are sometimes more of a grey area. While there is a lot of open source software that is developed solely for social welfare reasons, there's also a good deal that is developed primarily by for-profit corporations. If there will be more than one for-profit company working on a joint project, it is common to set up a non-profit foundation that organizes the collaboration, or use an existing one. On the one hand, this can sound an awful lot like for profit companies trying to claim that their joint venture is actually a social welfare organization. On the other hand, due to the fact that the code is shared publicly and available for anyone to study and modify, it is arguably promoting social welfare and thus should be eligible.
If you check the actual recommendation, you will see that they have no specific recommendation for this type of situation; all it advises is "The [sic] is no specific guidance at this point. If you see a case, elevate it to your manager."
The entire point is that you really can't separate politics and social well-being. Often the most effective way to improve some groups life is through politics. Killing separate but equal for example.
No, the entire point is that political contributions shouldn't be tax deductible, no matter the goals.
I make lots of political contributions with the intent of improving social well-being. I just don't expect to also be able to deduct those contributions from my taxes.
The IRS wasn't preventing these groups from collecting money in support of a cause. It was preventing those donations from being deducted from your taxes.
I'm willing to take that tax hit to help people. It's the Tea Party supporters who hate taxes so much that are making a big deal of the fact that they can't get a deduction on their taxes on contributions made to elect people who will then try to reduce their taxes.
They want to double dip. Screw that. Make sure that the rules are fair in preventing any such political organization from being considered a "social welfare" organization, by all means. But don't let political contributions become deductible, no matter the politics.
So spending 10% of your budget on public policy is okay, but 49% is too much? You have to draw the line somewhere, they've chosen 49%. You can't just have IRS agents going "oh that sounds too political." You need actual enforceable rules.
He said that he couldn't come up with ANYTHING that a "Tea Party" group could do outside of politics with the 51% of their money, other than launder it by giving it to other groups.
Why don't YOU come up with something OTHER than changing public policy that a Tea Party group would do with that 51%? Any Tea Party group is a political group by definition, and shouldn't qualify as a charitable group. Period. It's just a tax dodge, plain and simple. Heck, that's pretty much the point of the party is they don't like taxes, so it's a blatantly obvious tax dodge.
My point was that it doesn't matter that HE can't come up with anything. The IRS agent can't just be like, "well I don't think there's any way that a tea party group could be doing social welfare. Denied!" They have to use actual facts. They look at where their money was spent. They look at the rules and regulation for what is considered social welfare and what isn't. Then they determine whether or not 51% of that money was spent on social welfare.
If I understand the process, it DOES involve judgement of IRS agents. The IRS requires that applicants describe what social welfare activities they're going to take part in. If they didn't put something in that blank that was reasonable, then of course they weren't rubber stamped.
The Tea Party is pretty much all about reducing government size and spending and reducing taxes, with a few other standard conservative (guns, military) and libertarian (privacy, intrusive government) positions thrown in [1]; what could a "Tea Party" organization do that would promote the social welfare? Looking at teaparty.org, there's nothing in their set of 15 core beliefs that fall under "social welfare", [2] except arguably "Traditional family values are encouraged." Pretty much a stretch to expect 51% of their money to be spent "encouraging family values" and only 49% on politics.
> When using GPL projects we treat them as if they were proprietary binary distributions, never looking at, changing, or contributing back code
Why? If you are OK with contributing back to the upstream project, why avoid doing so if the license is GPL?
> We would use GPL if we wanted to release code but didn't want it to be tooooo useful to our competitors.
Exactly. With the GPL, even once you do release your changes, you know that your competitors can't create a proprietary fork that builds on your work without benefiting you. It gives you a quid pro quo, while there's always worry when contributing to a BSD licensed project that a competitor may make a proprietary fork and you'll be left either continuing to push changes that benefit them without getting anything back, or making your own proprietary fork and now defeating the whole purpose of sharing changes.
Basically, permissive licenses lose at the prisoner's dilemma; GPL acts as a way to force cooperation, allowing your both to win. Remember, most of the time development is not a zero-sum game. You can gain market share by taking it from a competitor, or by increasing the size of the market. Working together on shared components helps to reduce the cost to increase the size of the market. Coming out with proprietary new features that your competitor doesn't have may increase the size of the market, or it may just steal marketshare from your competitor. And if it steals marketshare from your competitor, they have an incentive to retaliate in kind, developing proprietary features that they don't share and which steals customers from you.
Here's an example. To make the numbers simple, I'm going to assume big enterprise software, that you sell for a lot of money to a few customers. Let's say that you have two companies, Colorful Chapeau and Suzie, selling an open source system called Van Pelt (sufficiently customized, including support, perhaps with certified hardware, etc. to turn it into an actual business). For the sake of argument, to make the numbers simple, let's say it's enterprise software, sold at a high price to small number of customers. Each of them has 100 customers, who each pay $100,000 a year for the software and support, giving them a $10M a year budget (yes, I'm ignoring actual profits and the actual cost of support an whatnot; this is a simplified example).
Now, there are two major new features, A and B, that are the next big things in the industry. There are 50 more customers that would buy the systems if either A or B were added; plus, 25 customers would switch from one company to the other if they were able to add A or B and the other company isn't. Finally, there are an additional 50 new customers who would buy a system which had A and B (on top of the ones who need just A or B).
So, if Colorful Chapeau releases A, and in the kindness of their own heart, decides to push the changes upstream despite Van Pelt being BSD licensed, Suzie can spend all of their development budget on B, and release a product that incorporates A and B. 25 customers defect from Colorful Chapeau to Suzie because Suzie offers B and Chapeau doesn't. No customers defect from Suzie to Chapeau, as Suzie offers both A and B. There are 50 new customers which needed A, but both companies offer it, so they each get 25 new customers due to that. Suzie gets 25 new customers who wanted B. Suzie gets 50 new customers which needed A and B. So Chapeau is left in the same place; with 100 customers, after all of that development effort. Suzie is now up to 225 customers; with some stolen from Chapeau, and some new.
But of course, due to that expected outcome, Chapeau wouldn't do that; their stockholders would revolt. Instead, they would develop A as a proprietary feature. Suzie would develop B as a proprietary feature. Chapeau would get 50 new users, plus 25 defections, and minus 25 in the other direction, and Suzie the same, leaving them at 150 customers each. The last 50, who are holding out for a system that has A and B, are left to wait another year while Suzie and Chapeau spend duplicate effort copying each others features. The two companies are each left with less revenue, and the users lose out as no one offers A and B for another year.
Now, what happens if Van Pelt were released under the GPL instead of the BSD license? Well, releasing a proprietary feature is no longer an option. Colorful Chapeau can develop A, and Suzie can develop B, and they can both offer A and B. They will each split the 50 new customers who need A, 50 new customers who need B, and 50 new customers who need both, and will have no defections. They each now have 175 customers, and all customers can now take advantage of A and B.
Now, of course the real world is more complex than this; there can be multiple actors, benefits will not be so symmetric, full on leeches can sell the same bundled support and services without developing any new features of their own, people can sell bundles of GPLed and proprietary software as long as they don't link, the GPL does allow you to develop in secret and then do a big release to get a jump on your competitors, forks can interfere with actually sharing A and B in the same codebase, etc. But you can see how there is substantial economic value to the GPL. In development, just like the prisoner's dilemma, given a fixed strategy for your competitor, defecting is better than cooperating. But both players cooperating is better than both players defecting. So if you have an independent competitor that you can't trust, and permissively licensed software, you will likely default to defecting (not sharing code).
I suspect the cases in which permissively licensed software does the best are the ones in which the features it offers aren't a significant competitive advantage, but instead the software is more of a cost-center (something you need, but it isn't terribly important what you pick, so you might as well pick the cheapest). There the economic benefits of cooperation become more important, while you don't have as much of the reason to be afraid of sharing your code, as it won't lose you any customers or allow a competitor to gain customers that they otherwise couldn't have.
Sure, but there are lots more companies that have contributed patches and funded dedicated upstream development for the Linux kernel, in part because they knew that their competitors couldn't just take it and release a proprietary product built on top of it without revealing their changes.
As a developer who works with a boss who has a somewhat equivocal position on open source software, I'm glad for the GPL requirements on the software that we modify and ship. He likes to use open source software, and in theory likes to pay lip-service to contributing change upstream, but when push comes to shove he's always worried that we'll let competitors get a jump on us. With GPL licensed software, I can always make the argument that we have to release the source code anyhow, so we might as well push the changes upstream and avoid the pain of maintaining a fork. With other software, well, it's always somewhere far down on the priority stack to actually release the code, and so we wind up maintaining patch stacks for years and shipping with major security vulnerabilities because we're afraid to update as it will take a lot of work to port our changes forward.
You're giving two entirely separate reasons for why it makes sense for you to contribute patches upstream:
* You're modifying GPL'd software, which means you're required to release the source code including your modifications.
* Pushing the patches upstream reduces the costs to your business in the long-term, because it avoids the need to maintain separate branches for your own changes.
IMO, the second reason is a much bigger win for businesses, and exactly the reason permissive licenses (BSD, Apache 2.0) are getting more and more popular. Permissive licenses allow businesses to collaborate on code which is going to be common within and across industries (reducing development costs and time-to-market) while allowing them to keep some other parts of their code private.
Right, I am giving to separate reasons. The thing is, the second is a real benefit, but it's hard to convince my boss of it, because he winds up being afraid that we'll be releasing technology that our competitors could use.
The first is an unquestionable reason; it's a lot easier to get him to agree if it's a legal requirement. So even though the real reason why it benefits the company is the second, the first provides the leverage to tip the scales in favor of releasing the code. If the code were BSD licensed, we would likely never ship it upstream, because of his fear that our competitors will take advantage of it.
And there's an additional, third factor in play: if you release it under the GPL, you don't have to worry about your competitors making a proprietary fork of it, thus taking advantage of your work while keeping their own secret. So that further tips the scales. Sure, with GPL you may be required to release your modifications, but at least you know that by doing so, you won't be giving your competitors a major advantage if they then build something proprietary on it.
And finally, in many cases with GPLed licenses, you can keep your own code proprietary. Just write a separate application, rather than linking it with the GPLed components. That's how most of what my company does works; we sell a system based on Linux and many other GPLed components, but we tune it to the hardware we sell, and have our own proprietary management tools on top of it that make it integrate well into our market. This is why the LGPL or more permissive licenses are generally preferred for libraries (with very few exceptions, such as readline), which are designed to be reused regardless of the license of the application, while the GPL works so well for components like the kernel, system services, and so on.
I guess that he works on something SaaS, web probably, where you aren't distributing the software, so there you are not obligued to release your modification.
It's not really clear that Linux's market position is thanks to the GPL, or because Linux was able to move ahead in the marketplace while BSDs were encumbered by the AT&T lawsuit at a most critical point in time, or some other facet of history.
Sure, it won't "block the NSA" from discovering anything about you. But it raises the stakes.
It is much easier for the NSA to backdoor/crack/make deals with a few telecoms, collect all of the encrypted data, and then decrypt it at their leisure (via stealing RSA keys, getting them via legal channels, cracking RSA, taking advantage of compromised random numbers, or the like), than it is for them to backdoor your hardware (much larger surface of possible discovery), install keyloggers (need physical access, much more expensive to do so only makes sense to do in a targeted fashion) etc.
The whole point of this brouhaha is that the NSA appears to be hoovering up massive amounts of data, which it keeps and which even fairly junior employees at government contractors have access to and could abuse. I don't think that anyone (or most people, anyhow), object to specific, targeted wiretaps of targets that you have appropriate warrants for. It's the incredibly broad based collection of all records, without targeting, for later data mining, coupled with the first-amendment destroying demands of secrecy about discussion these practices, that have people up in arms.
The NSA has admitted that they retain encrypted data for longer than unencrypted, as they cannot as easily discard it as irrelevant. If you use a protocol with perfect forward secrecy, it substantially undermines the value of that collection.
Edit to add:
> It won't stop them from storing the encrypted communication until (for example) quantum computers make it possible to decrypt it (assuming RSA).
Actually, it will stop them from using quantum computers to crack RSA and thus be able to read past communications. That's the who point of perfect forward secrecy; even if you can crack the RSA layer (or obtain the private RSA keys), which is used for bootstrapping the authenticated encrypted channel, perfect forward secrecy generates the symmetric key in a way in which it is never actually communicated over that channel.
Perfect forward secrecy protocols, such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange, work by both sides coming up with two values, one of which is secret and one of which is passed over the channel, such that both of them can compute the same secret value by combining the private and public values. Even if the "public" values are intercepted, for instance by cracking RSA, you cannot determine the secret values, because you do not have the secret portions of the keys that each side generated.
The reason to use RSA in addition to key exchange is that Diffie-Hellman key exchange is not authenticated; someone could MITM you, doing both sides of the Diffie-Hellman protocol, and intercept your communication that way. RSA allows for signing of certificates which can be used to bootstrap the authentication process.
So, if RSA gets cracked in the future, then the NSA could at that point MITM all of your future connections. But they could not decrypt your prior conversations, which had been encrypted using a private key generated via a key-exchange protocol that provides perfect forward secrecy.
edit 2:
Hmm. After further investigation, it looks like quantum computers would be able able to break the common "perfect forward secrecy" algorithms as well. So yes, in the case of RSA being broken due to quantum computing taking off, it's likely that DH and other discrete log based perfect forward secrecy algorithms will be broken as well.
Sigh. Why can't we have any NP-complete problems that work cryptographically? While even that isn't a guarantee of security against quantum algorithms (after all, it may still be the case that P == NP), there's a fairly strong belief that P!=NP and that NP-complete is a disjoint category than quantum polynomial algorithms, and so would give us a better security margin against quantum attacks.
Cryptography needs problems that are hard on average, not in the worst case. This doesn't fit well with P/NP/NP-complete, which are all about the worst-case difficulty of a problem.
For example, see the Merkle-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem [1], which is based on the subset sum problem --- a NP-complete problem! Nevertheless, it is broken. As you can see, using a NP-complete problem as a computational basis for a cryptosystem is not a silver bullet.
Apparently it is very hard to prove results in average case complexity theory. We don't even know if computational problems that are hard on average assuming P!=NP exist, let alone actually designing a cryptosystem out of one.
It's true that we don't seem to know how to build a cryptosystem out of them. Part of it is that a cryptosystem needs something stronger than average-case complete, a property more like every instance being hard (possibly excluding trivially easy instances that can be detected and filtered out).
Average-case complexity is a not a topic I know a lot about, and I can't easily get the paper itself, but what the abstract seems to say is that for some particular NP complete problem, if an efficient average case algorithm exists for that problem then efficient average case algorithms exist for all NP complete problems. There is no mention of showing that such an algorithm does not exist.
My reference is Impagliazzo's 1995 survey paper "A Personal View of Average-Case Complexity" where he lays out five possible worlds based on open problems in complexity theory. He calls the world where P!=NP but all NP problems are easy on average "Heuristica." This is still an open problem as far as I know.
On your second point I can say a bit more. Cryptosystems in general do not need all instances to be hard. With RSA for example, there are all kinds of weird attacks, like the modulus n can easily be factored if phi(n) or phi(phi(n)) are products of small primes. There is no need to filter out these cases because the probability of them occurring is so small. There are cryptosystems where an arbitrary instance of the problem is as hard as the average case. This was a notable selling point for lattice cryptosystems when they were first invented.
In the RSA case the probability of these corner case attacks decreases with the size of the instance. So for current parameters the probability is near zero. However, even if you only had a scheme where the probability didn't diminish with the instance size and there are attacks that you can't check for, you can still securely send messages. Say the probability that your key generation algorithm gives you an instance that is hard is 50% (or any constant). You can securely send messages with arbitrarily small probability of having your message decrypted by using multiple keys and breaking up your message with a secret sharing scheme (Shamir's for example) and encrypting each message share with each of the keys. The attacker, able to only get a constant number of decrypted message shares will not be able to get decrypt your message.
I don't think it really subverts the message. The default browser style is simply unusable given the widths most people have their browser set to. A minimal stylesheet to bring it back to usability is reasonable.
The point is that people have, at times, become a bit too obsessed with style, interactivity, pictures, colors, fonts, video, audio, etc. Sometimes, you just need to focus on the content. If a minimal stylesheet helps with that (just keeping a reasonable column width, and reasonable font size, to make the text readable), that doesn't really affect that message at all.
It played fine on my machine; but I have a brand new high-end laptop. It completely brought my phone's browser to a halt; none of the images animated, and it took seconds for it to respond to scroll events.
I find it odd that animated GIFs are suddenly in vogue again, right when HTML5 video is starting to become ubiquitous and is much more efficient and high-fidelity than a GIF could ever be.
We try to have a reasoned, intelligent discourse here. There are many services provided by companies which may collaborate with the NSA or law enforcement which are pretty much unavoidable in modern society; the telephone network, the internet, and so on. Telling people that they need to completely disconnect from modern society or they shouldn't complain is unproductive.
Rather, we should be discussing realistic solutions. Pervasive end-to-end cryptography for everyday tasks would help. Better laws and legal oversight of both the government and of corporations would help. Protocols that encourage federated or decentralized use, rather than central storage that everything passes through unencrypted would help.