There is Tarsnap. While it has licensing restrictions that prevent it from meeting the Free Software or Open Source definitions, the source code is available to study and build yourself. It's run by Colin Percival (cperciva here on HN, former FreeBSD security officer and designer of scrypt, bsdiff, and other useful tools), who many consider quite trustworthy. Data is stored on Amazon AWS, which you may not like, but since it's all encrypted client side all they can really do is traffic analysis.
The big advantage of Tarsnap is that it supports efficient encrypted deduplicated snapshots; it only stores block that have not been stored before, so you can have many versioned backups using much less space than they would otherwise.
I think it's incredibly relevant. Many of the criticisms she's received seem quite gender biased.
Let's see. One of the big ones is "she had a baby." Well, that's something that only a female CEO could do. And she took two weeks of maternity leave for it; no more than many CEOs take for vacation. That entire criticism seems to be "she's a woman", and wouldn't be applied to a male CEO who took a similar length family vacation.
Time claims that she has a "princess problem". Would any male CEO be described the same way? And they go on to say "She is one of only 21 female CEOs in the Fortune 500. Doesn’t she owe it to us to tell us how she got there?" Um, why would she owe anyone anything just because she's a female CEO?
The problem isn't that she's made enemies in the business sense. The problem is that lots of writers and columnists seem to focus more on her gender, and apply criticisms simply because she's female.
>>The problem isn't that she's made enemies in the business sense. The problem is that lots of writers and columnists seem to focus more on her gender, and apply criticisms simply because she's female.
When I said "enemies" I was focusing on people within Yahoo!. Who cares about what writers and columnists say? They will write anything to get readers.
It's not clear to me that a criticism that is unique to a gender is gender biased. Any person part of a group has things/actions that are unique to that group and criticizing based on those isn't necessarily biased.
Re: princess problem...men have many times accused of thinking they're kings. And if you read the next line regarding "owing" an explanation - it's regarding spreading the word to females about how she has had success. It's about female empowerment and inspiring girls/women.
I haven't followed the Yahoo saga too closely, but I thought the baby related criticism was related to her revoking people ability to work remotely while simultaneously building a nursery right next to her office so she could be near her own child. I don't recall any criticism of her 2 weeks of maternity leave.
Focus on the inane criticisms of her, things she cannot control or are natural, like child birth, then move onto other criticism that may be valid but with the link established in the readers mind the writer can openly dismiss these as extensions of the previous.
It is an all too common mechanism to deflect valid criticism of a person's actions. First by finding the obviously offensive, linking normally unrelated valid, and dismissing as a whole.
It is almost always seen in politics when a person in power sycophants line up to bemoan criticism. When they find they themselves cannot support the actions being criticized, let alone rationally defend them, they then in turn portray those who criticize of an offensive behavior, belonging to an offensive class of people, or worse suffering from severe personal defect, usually mental.
See it before, will see it again.
I am not saying criticism of her is valid or not, I really don't care. What she has been doing does not affect me in any other way. Being on the top of the pile means you get barbs from every direction, she definitely gets them from both sexes does she not? Its part of the game. The only dishonest people are those pulling the tricks I listed.
As a man, Its assumed I should OK with anything that comes my way. Almost anything! I mean I've put up with some crazy things in the past. I can only imagine the crap storm that would erupt if a women were to held to same standards or if the same treatment were to meted out to them.
Its assumed that when it comes to freedom, men are supposed to own up its biggest burden called 'responsibility'.
We are judged with a very different definition and standard of freedom.
Look I'm not saying people don't get discriminated or harassed for their identity. People face this issues all the time, some one because of their gender, some because of their skin color, religion, or ethnicity or anything.
But if you keep justifying all your failures and problems by saying 'Bad things happen to you because your are X'. Replace X by black, women, muslim etc. The problem is very likely with your and not the world.
Having said this I still insist, men are constantly judged by very different standards compared to women.
I strictly believe by repeatedly playing the victim card and asking more benefits based on that, women are actually doing disservice to their original cause.
I'm male, and I'm saying that I don't think some of the criticisms she's received are warranted. There are definitely some legitimate critical points (the work from home policy, for example), but there also seem to be a lot of criticisms that merely revolve around the fact that she's a woman.
You need to distinguish between "playing the victim card" and "calling out behavior which is odious and unacceptable." I think that it's odious and unacceptable to make such a flap about the fact the Marissa Mayer had a kid, or call her a "princess" for not having a better answer for how she got where she was than "worked hard and got lucky."
> 'Bad things happen to you because your are X'. Replace X by black, women, muslim etc. The problem is very likely with your and not the world.
So, if you're forbidden from going to the same school, and having as much opportunity to learn, that's a problem with you? Remember, many schools were both racially and gender segregated until the 1970s; we've only had a single generation grow up into adults since that happened. Do you think that a single generation can be enough to remove all bias?
> There is absolutely zero reason why HR/recruiting people should have final say on a candidate.
I can think of one. If they are responsible for doing a criminal background check, and have found serious criminal activity in the prospective employee's past.
That's not to say that some prospective hires can't be rehabilitated; but in certain cases, hiring someone with a criminal background is just too much of a risk, and it's not unreasonable for HR to have a final say on this.
I used to work for a pre-employment background screening agencies. It's illegal to reject someone based on any criminal history as long as the person has not lied about their background. Unfortunately, it's not illegal (federally, with the EEOC, each state may have their own differences) to discriminate by personality test.
This is definitely something I saw prevalent in the hiring world: if it isn't outright illegal, use it to prevent someone from being hired. In many cases we had clients that'd tiptoe the line and ask if certain reasons would be valid for rejecting a person, and some HR managers were upset when they learned it was against the law to disallow someone who had admitted their criminal history from being hired. So they found another reason.
There is still a massive amount of hiring discrimination. It's just not the "official" reason anymore since that'd be illegal. That job was soulbreaking.
It's illegal to reject someone based on any criminal history as long as the person has not lied about their background.
I'm not sure if you are in the US, but that's not true here. As a specific example: if the crime involved money and the position is with a financial institution. We have a big problem in the US where felons can't get jobs which can obviously lead to a lot of recidivism.
> It's illegal to reject someone based on any criminal history as long as the person has not lied about their background.
Source? As far as I know, it's legal, but you have to show a good reason to do so, and finely tailored policies, that aren't simply a broad "we don't hire anyone with a criminal record."
There are plenty of cases in which you may, or even may be required by law, not hire someone based on particular crimes on their criminal background check, such as sex offenders for jobs involving children or felonies for people who need to get a security clearance.
I was overly broad with that, excuse me. It's much more complicated, but generally you can't exclude someone based on a criminal record alone as you rightly point out, and that's not accounting for other circumstances. So yes, financial will matter (of course, any financial crime means that license will be revoked and that record will be accessible as well), but unrelated crimes are different.
The main reason someone gets rejected from criminal reasons, in my experience, is having an old record that's been cleared or expunged, and then answering "No" when the employment application asks a specific wording of "Have you ever been convicted of a crime?" - The answer would be yes, and a criminal check would reflect something had happened, but that the record has been expunged due to enough time passing for that particular crime. It sounds convoluted, and it is. Not sure it really should, but I only worked in the industry. Whether or not the industry followed the letter of the law is much, much different.
Its ironic that in an America that lets legal shenanigans turn all kinds into criminals, that the same legal weaselling lets people get away with what is completely illegal, just because they say they didn't do it for the illegal reason, just some other reason they choose at the time.
Even in that case, HR can identify the risk paramters (likelihood of risk manifesting, expected cost if it manifests, overall expected cost taking all of that into account, etc.) but they can't weigh the cost against the expected benefits.
There are plenty of cases in which the company just needs to have a policy that it's an unacceptable risk. For instance, if the job involves getting a security clearance, a felony on your background check basically means that you are unfit for the job. Or if you are dealing with highly sensitive financial data, there can just be too much of a risk.
I'm not saying that all HR departments should have such a policy (in fact, in some cases it can be illegal to request criminal background information, at least on the initial application form). But there are some cases in which a policy like that could be necessary and final.
> There are plenty of cases in which the company just needs to have a policy that it's an unacceptable risk.
Sure, but HR generally shouldn't be setting that policy, and whoever is setting that policy is logically making the decision, HR is gathering an input to that decision (a potentially decisive input, but that's because of decision criteria set outside of HR.)
> Robots They're rather less common or good than Asimov supposed. As with cooking gadgets, it turns out that it's difficult to design something that can navigate a home (including stairs and uneven surfaces), perform tasks, usefully, and not cost a bundle. Especially when competing with low-cost maid services.
He did say they'd be uncommon and not very good. What he didn't forsee is that they would not be humanoid robots.
Roombas are available, and can help clean your house. They aren't all that common, and aren't all that "good" by his metric of what a robot should be able to do, but they do exist, and people really do use them.
Furthermore, UAVs are increasingly common in the military. While some of them, like Predator drones, are remote controlled, some of them can operate fully autonomously for the vast majority of their flight.
And of course, industrial robots are so ubiquitous that they've faded into the background long ago.
So I would say that "uncommon and not very good" (according to his vision of humanoid robots that can replace most manual human tasks) is a fair assessment. He just figured that they would be clumsy humanoid robots, as opposed to more specialized robots that were fairly good at an individual task but can't do anything else.
Calling a Roomba a robot ... is somewhat on par with calling a blade of grass a tree. A Roomba randomly careers across a floor probabalistically providing sufficient coverage to fully vacuum or mop it.
Yes, we've got more intelligent robots, but they're a tad more expensive. Industrial manufacturing robots exist, but the reprogramming costs exceed the manufacture cost of the robots themselves. They make sense in very high-value, generally high-volume production. They're not particularly adaptive, though they can switch between different modes (programs) fairly well.
Flying through empty space is a reasonably simple problem. We've had ICBMs for ages. Navigating through complex terrain (ground-based robots, autonomous vehicles) is a markedly more complex domain space.
Most robots we've got at present are very, very highly specialized. Or incredibly stupid, though good enough for the task at hand.
> The most logical conclusion that I can come to is that a law enforcement agent searched Mukerjee's apartment and probably took the photo so that it could be scanned or for some other reason but accidentally forgot to put it back.
Have you ever considered that his landlord could have come into the apartment to make sure it had been cleaned up properly by the outgoing tenants (remember, he had moved in the night before his trip). If the landlord had found a poster that had fallen off the wall, he may have thought it was trash left by the other tenants and thrown it away. His landlord would not have had to break in.
I don't think it's impossible that law enforcement searched his apartment; but if they had, wouldn't his bags have been unpacked, rather than just one of them a little out of place?
But really, why doesn't he just ask his landlord or super? If the police came, they probably would have asked the landlord to let them in. I mentioned the landlord idea on the previous thread, but he never responded.
> Have you ever considered that his landlord could have come into the apartment to make sure it had been cleaned up properly by the outgoing tenants
If that's legal in the US, or something one might expect, that's almost more shocking to me than the original story. If any of my past landlords had entered my flat without permission, I would have called the police on them, with good cause.
> In general in New York City, a landlord may only enter a tenant’s apartment for three reasons: emergency repairs, non-emergency repairs or improvements, and apartment inspections. Emergency repair requires no advance notice to the tenant. However, access for non-emergency repairs and improvements requires a minimum of one week’s advance written notice, and access for inspection requires a minimum of 24 hours advance written notice.
If he was on vacation, then 24 hours written notice for inspection could consist of putting the notice on or under his door, waiting 24 hours, then going in for the inspection and removing the notice.
I've had my landlady enter my apartment without permission or notice before, and it was a little bit creepy, but I let it slide since she was such a nice lady. She wasn't some owner of a big apartment complex or anything, just had a second house down the street that she rented out, I think mostly so she could store all of the extra furniture she picked up at flea markets and couldn't fit into her own house. In fact, the reason she had entered our house was to stash a few lamps that she did't want her sister to sell at a yard sale, so we came back one day and there were extra lamps sitting around.
Off topic, but here in Australia if the landlord entered a the apartment without sufficient notice or permission from the tenant, then he DID break in (well, not 'break' in, but certainly entered illegally)
I read the original article. I don't see any particularly good evidence his apartment was searched without a warrant. He says a picture on his wall was missing, and some luggage was moved. Now, his apartment being searched is one possible excuse; but the landlord of the apartment he just moved into, or some maintenance staff, coming in to fix something or check on something, and finding a poster that had fallen off the wall and thrown it out in the assumption that it was the previous tenant's, is a lot more likely to me than the government searching his house without a warrant.
It sounds like the TSA's actions were excessive and heavy handed. It sounds like perhaps he got a little argumentative, due to being hungry (as he said, he hadn't eaten; I know I get cranky when I go too long without food), thirsty, and upset about missing his trip.
The TSA, and whatever other officers interviewed him, should probably be trained better in dealing with this kind of situation. In particular, using behavioral excuses to detain someone who's been singled out for extra screening is silly. Many people get upset about that kind of thing. And given that none of these TSA agents have ever actually interacted with a terrorist, and most likely never been trained with anyone who has, it's hard to believe that their training is any good at actually distinguishing a terrorist from someone who's just mad that they haven't had food or water in many hours. Heck, if you were a terrorist, you would prefer to blend in and act calm to singling yourself out for more screening by acting angry.
I feel like his article was a bit of an overreaction, but likewise the TSAs screening policies are much bigger, costlier, more painful overreaction.
Your source code (or a running image of your program, that has the extra salt in memory) is rarely harder to get access to than your password database. Remember, all of your developers have access to it, and likely have it unencrypted on their machines, which may not be terribly secure. It would be a small enough extra value, and a large enough extra hassle (making it difficult to re-use the same encrypted password in other code, for instance use the same encrypted password for basic auth over HTTPS as you use for your webapp in a different area) that I don't think it's worth it.
I also worry that promoting this practice would make some developers think that they didn't need a random, per-password salt as well. It's hard enough to convince developers about the value of using strong key derivation functions and a per-password salt, and if you added a global salt I'd worry that some would think that the per-password salt is not necessary. Then once the fixed salt were compromised, brute forcing individual passwords would become trivial.
Also remember, the attacker could easily create an account with a known password, and they can get the normal salt from the password database. Now they just need to brute force the single "fixed salt", and you're back to where you started.
No, it's much better to encourage people to just use strong password hash functions, like bcrypt or scrypt, with good, random, per password salts, than to try to apply a little security through obscurity by adding yet another salt that is likely easy to find.
Determining the fixed salt by using brute force is not feasible if some modern hash function is used. The fixed salt can be easily quite long, think about something like 200+ bits.
Note that password hashes are used for more than just password database; they are also used for key derivation functions, for example for deriving a key for encrypting a hard drive or document from a password that someone types in. Any full-disk encryption system needs to use a password based key derivation function for security, and your security if the disk is stolen is solely based on the strength of your password and the strength of your key derivation function (unless you have tamper-proof hardware that is able to store your key and only allows interactive authentication, rather than reading the key out and brute-forcing the password out of it).
In fact, encrypting files using a key derivation function was the original use for scrypt, not storing password databased.
> In general, strong password encryption is only useful to prevent bad public relations from too many users getting hacked at one time.
It's also good for lowering the value of cracking your system. If everyone (or a large fraction of developers) does it, it lowers the expected value of breaking into a random system that has low-value accounts. Since people frequently reuse passwords, stealing the password database for a low-value system and cracking them can be used for breaking into higher value systems, as you can try reusing the username or email and password pairs for logging into other systems.
It doesn't matter what you use it for. Encrypted passwords are simply not a strong enough single factor to prevent a successful attack. If you use FDE you should also be using a keyfob, thumb drive, etc. There's too many attacks on passwords alone, for example the most effective one, where the police compel you to reveal it. (Compelling you to reveal the location of a keyfob is arguably more difficult for them to do)
To be honest, I find it completely useless to hypothesize about why someone would attack a system, much less for something as silly as shared passwords. It's much less work to just attack the one account on the one system than to attack two completely different systems on the hope that the password is shared. And botherding/phishing to compromise accounts is much more simple & effective than trying to compromise a password database.
> It doesn't matter what you use it for. Encrypted passwords are simply not a strong enough single factor to prevent a successful attack. If you use FDE you should also be using a keyfob, thumb drive, etc. There's too many attacks on passwords alone, for example the most effective one, where the police compel you to reveal it. (Compelling you to reveal the location of a keyfob is arguably more difficult for them to do)
Security is not an absolute. There are plenty of attacks where a strong password & strong key derivation function for FDE will prevent many possible attacks. It helps plug the improperly erased discarded hard drives hole, the thief on the train who steals your laptop opportunistically looks through your data for anything valuable.
Yes, two factor is better, but it increases the complexity; and for many cases in which you want FDE, such as a laptop while travelling, there are far too many times where you keyfob and laptop will both be accessible to an attacker, thus negating the benefit of the separate factors.
It's better to have a good password and good KDF for FDE than it is to forgo FDE altogether.
> To be honest, I find it completely useless to hypothesize about why someone would attack a system, much less for something as silly as shared passwords. It's much less work to just attack the one account on the one system than to attack two completely different systems on the hope that the password is shared. And botherding/phishing to compromise accounts is much more simple & effective than trying to compromise a password database.
No, on an industry-wide scale it is not useless to hypothesize about motivations. If you decrease the expected value of an attack, you decrease the motivation for people to break into systems. Getting credit card numbers and easily cracked passwords out of databases that are accessible to front-end systems does a lot to help reduce the expected value of attacks, and thus reduce people's motivation to perform them in the first place.
Thus, recommendations for security should keep that in mind. If you make good, easy to implement recommendations for security, that help reduce the value of a successful attack, you can improve global security. For example, token based systems can help avoid credit cards being stolen; instead of each merchant storing CC numbers, if they store tokens that are only valid for them talking to their CC processor, then there's no valuable trove of CC numbers to be found by exploiting the database.
There's this really dangerous meme going around that if security isn't absolute it's worthless. That can be true if you assume a highly motivated attacker with government level resources at their disposal who is targeting you specifically, but that's not the attacker that actually causes most people problems. Instead, it's some bored Eastern European kid who doesn't have much in the way of job prospects and wants to make a quick buck, and figures that trying out some basic SQL inject exploits against a large number of sites will be likely to lead to some valuable information. If enough people remove that valuable information from their site or make it difficult enough to extract the contents by using good key derivation functions, there's less economic incentive to try that kind of wide-scale probing attack.
This is part of the principle of defense in depth. You are absolutely right, you should secure your password database so that it can't be stolen, and you should protect passwords in flight so that they can't be sniffed. But you should also have good, hard to break password encryption, so that even if you made a mistake and are vulnerable at that outer layer, your users are still protected from having their passwords revealed to attackers. Likewise, you should have both a firewall, and intrusion detection systems that live behind your firewall, and strong authentication and encryption for all services behind that firewall so that even if someone circumvents the firewall, they still can't get into any of your systems.
So yes. Prevent your password database from being stolen. Use strong passwords. Don't reuse passwords between sites. But also, use strong password hashing that's hard to crack so that your users are still secure even if all of the above suggestions fail.
I'm not disputing any of that :) My original post was pointing out all the other parts, to help people remember that there's more to it than choosing the perfect encryption algorithm.
If the password encryption is the last thing that protects your users, it should be the last thing you consider, not the first. Lazy people may ignore all the rest and assume strong password encryption will save their butts. It won't.
Yeah, the message shouldn't be "don't use bcrypt". It should be "use bcrypt in preference to any small fixed number of iterations of SHA-n or MD5, and in preference to PBKDF unless you need to comply with some particular standard, and use scrypt in preference to bcrypt if it's available in your environment."
I don't know of any distros (BSD or Linux) which have PBKDF or scrypt available as crypt(3) hashes, but there are distros which have bcrypt available. So, for many use cases, bcrypt is the most secure hash that's easily available without adding extra dependencies.
The big advantage of Tarsnap is that it supports efficient encrypted deduplicated snapshots; it only stores block that have not been stored before, so you can have many versioned backups using much less space than they would otherwise.