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Thank you for that, and I hope that the people who keep arguing "if you can't trust your hardware, you can't trust anything, so we may as well just blindly trust the hardware" keep this in mind.

A bug deliberately introduced in an AES instruction, or in general purpose instructions that detects crypto operations and leaks information somehow, is much, much harder to implement and hide than a pseudo-random number generator that passes all tests that you apply to it, but produces predictable output for someone who knows some secret key.


> A 2010 document calls for “a new approach for opportunistic decryption, rather than targeted.” By that year, a Bullrun briefing document claims that the agency had developed “groundbreaking capabilities” against encrypted Web chats and phone calls. Its successes against Secure Sockets Layer and virtual private networks were gaining momentum.

This paragraph interests me the most.

For one, it's clear that their goal is opportunistic decryption; that is, decrypting everything and being able to search through it, rather than targeting known endpoints. This is an important point that a lot of people miss when debating cryptography. While it's fairly likely that the government can find ways to access any communication they want in a targeted manner, as they have so many means to do so (hacking the endpoints, physically breaking in and performing an evil maid attack, etc), widespread encryption is generally good enough to prevent opportunistic data gathering.

The other point I note is that they only mention "web chats and phone calls" in their breakthrough. It doesn't sound like the breakthrough is something that works well for arbitrary SSL connections. The main link I can see between web chats and phone calls is that they are long lived connections, with bursty traffic (HTTP or email protocols, on the other hand, tend to stream a lot of data at once, and then the connection is closed). I'm wondering if there's some kind of traffic or timing analysis vulnerability that they've discovered.

Also interesting is this quote from the Guardian article:

> To help secure an insider advantage, GCHQ also established a Humint Operations Team (HOT). Humint, short for "human intelligence" refers to information gleaned directly from sources or undercover agents. > > This GCHQ team was, according to an internal document, "responsible for identifying, recruiting and running covert agents in the global telecommunications industry."

Various technology companies have been adamant in maintaining that they haven't been been giving the NSA direct access to their data. However, with HUMINT programs like this, you always have to wonder if the NSA has hired anyone within such companies to put backdoors into their systems, without authorization by the company. Obviously, they'd have to be subtle about it (it's hard to install new gigabit fiber pipes to siphon off the data without anyone noticing), but just setting up a way for the NSA to covertly run queries, disguised as some other type of job that would normally run on the system, would probably not be too hard to do.


    (it's hard to install new gigabit fiber pipes to siphon
    off the data without anyone noticing)
If you have access to manufacturers that can put in back doors for you, I reckon you don't even need your mole to install stuff for you. Instead you just ask your mole to inform you want is going to be installed and then make sure that the company gets backdoored systems when hardware is installed/upgraded/replaced.

I'm wondering is datacenter monitoring utilities like the stuff Boundary[0] is working on could be used to identify anomalies in how network hardware is behaving versus how it should be behaving. I know that in my conversations with cliff, they are trying to get their monitoring solution to the point where they can visualize "the circulatory system" of a data system with the goal of spotting things that don't look quite right.

[0] http://boundary.com/


As Snowden showed you need only one rogue admin most of the times to get what you want


One of the vulnerabilities was already discovered by researchers in 2007: http://rump2007.cr.yp.to/15-shumow.pdf

At the time, it wasn't clear if this was a deliberate backdoor or an accident, but it was proven that there there was a possibility that there was a secret key that would allow someone to predict future values of a pseudo random number generator based on previous values. Now it looks pretty clear that it was a deliberate backdoor.

This really reduces trust in US based cryptographic standards. And US based cryptographic hardware, as they mention in the article that they convinced hardware manufacturers to insert backdoors for hardware shipped overseas.


This is almost definitely not "one of the vulnerabilities" implicated in the story today, because nobody uses CSPRNGs based on Elliptic Curve.


so what was the vulnerability found by ms in 2007 that they are referring to? (search for 2007 in single page version at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet...)

edit: reading in more detail around there, i am pretty sure that section of the article is referring to the CSPRNG vulnerability above. the article covers a lot of ground and not all of it is about problems with ssl. that particular section seems to be arguing that the nsa is trying to put backdoors into standards wherever it can.


I don't know. I'm just saying, weakening a CSPRNG design that nobody uses or is ever likely to use (it's extremely expensive) is not a particularly meaningful action.


It sounds an awful lot like that's the one the New York times was describing. Can you think of any other standard that was published in 2006 by NIST which two Microsoft researchers discovered a flaw in in 2007? That sounds exactly like Dual_EC_DRBG

> Simultaneously, the N.S.A. has been deliberately weakening the international encryption standards adopted by developers. One goal in the agency’s 2013 budget request was to “influence policies, standards and specifications for commercial public key technologies,” the most common encryption method.

> Cryptographers have long suspected that the agency planted vulnerabilities in a standard adopted in 2006 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the United States’ encryption standards body, and later by the International Organization for Standardization, which has 163 countries as members.

> Classified N.S.A. memos appear to confirm that the fatal weakness, discovered by two Microsoft cryptographers in 2007, was engineered by the agency. The N.S.A. wrote the standard and aggressively pushed it on the international group, privately calling the effort “a challenge in finesse.”

> “Eventually, N.S.A. became the sole editor,” the memo says.

Now, that may not have been an effective technique, as you point out it's so slow that no one is ever going to use it, and this vulnerability was discovered not long after it was published.

So, that's obviously not a vulnerability that they are actively exploiting. If they are actively exploiting a vulnerability that they introduced, it must be something else. It wasn't clear from the article that that's actually the case; it may be that the vulnerabilities they are exploiting are ones they've found, not introduced deliberately.

But it does appear to be an example of a vulnerability that they were able to get standardized, in the hopes of being able to exploit it. Until now, it has been only speculation that it was a deliberate vulnerability, but it now seems clear that it was.


Sure. I think we agree. If "it" is a crypto weakness they are actually exploiting, "it" is not Dual-EC DRBG.


Ah, yes, I wasn't trying to say they were exploiting that particular vulnerability. Just that we now have better evidence that that really was a (rather poor) attempt to subvert standards to make them easier to decrypt.

The NSA seems to be really divided between SIGINT and COMSEC. COMSEC wants to provide good, strong encryption, that can help secure US government and corporate communication. SIGINT wants to be able to read everyone's traffic.

For example, they changed the DES s-boxes in a way that made it more secure against differential cryptanalysis. They've released SELinux. There is a part of the NSA that does actually try to make encryption standards stronger.

But then there's the part that advocates for the Clipper chip, advocates for controls on exporting strong crypto, or strongarms NIST into standardizing Dual-EC DRBG. And that part does real damage, as everyone suffers from the weak export crypto (either people overseas have to work on strong crypto, or products are released with weak or no crypto because regulatory compliance is too complicated), or people stop trusting US software and hardware.

The NSA seems to be doing some real damage to technology companies in the US. I had thought that they had gotten better about it, after they gave up on the clipper chip and lifted most of the export controls, but it looks like I was wrong, they've just decided to take more covert routes to do the same thing, with the hope that none of the tens or hundreds of thousands of people who could find out about it would leak that information.


Nitpick: they changed DES's S-boxes. DSA doesn't have S-boxes. Skepticism about NSA's involvement in any crypto standard (a decade ago!) led NIST to document precisely the mechanism used to generate DSA's parameters.

I think maybe it's the fact that I started in the industry during the era of Clipper that stuff like this doesn't faze me much.


Gah. I even noticed that typo while writing it, then forgot about it after having edited another part of my comment. Yes, I meant DES, not DSA.


As you may well know, the NSA has its own ciphers (Suite A) it uses for top secret classified traffic, which to me is positive proof you can't trust anything they recommend (AES) - when they don't even use it themselves.


Not positive proof -- merely suggestive. Which is true of a lot of things in the secret world of the intelligence services.

The more you use a secret cipher, the easier it is to break. It is simply good operational practice to use a different cipher for a small fraction of communications -- namely, the most secret ones. Just like certain antibiotics are reserved for drug-resistant organisms. You don't want it to lose its effectiveness through overuse.

First, security-by-obscurity does indeed buy you some additional time. Because the cipher is secret, your opponent has to figure out the algorithm as well as the attack.

Second, this reduces the amount of traffic that the opponent can analyze. For example, suppose that only 1% of messages use Suite A, and 99% of messages use Suite B. With fewer messages to analyze, the job of breaking the cipher becomes much harder.

Third, the reduced volume also makes known-plaintext attacks more difficult. Especially if you avoid committing the cardinal sin of repeating the same message using two different ciphers.


I'm not sure that Suite A is actually stronger than Suite B. In fact, it may be weaker, for practical reasons (efficiency of encrypting high-bandwidth streams in resource-constrained devices), and so they are relying on an additional layer of security-through-obscurity to help keep it safe for longer.

There is some information known about some of the algorithms. Wikipedia has pages on BATON https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BATON and SAVILLE https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAVILLE. You may notice that these are frequently used for hardware implementation in radios, smart cards, encrypting video streams, etc; devices that are probably fairly resource constrained, and would be hard to replace with new hardware if attacked.

If you look at the description of BATON, it has a 96 bit Electronic Code Book mode. Yes, ECB, the one that is famous for leaking information, as you can tell which blocks are identical and get a good deal of information out of that.

But even with fairly efficient hardware implementations, adversaries have been able to use off-the-shelf software to intercept Predator drone video feeds because encryption was disabled for performance reasons: http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/12/17/drone.video.hacked/index.ht...

The NSA has approved both Suite A and Suite B for top-secret material. I really don't think that they have any worries about the security of Suite B (though as Schneier points out, you may want to be a bit paranoid about their elliptic curves, as it's possible that they have ways of breaking particular curves that other people don't, like they did with the Dual EC DRBG that they promoted). I suspect that Suite A is around for legacy reasons, as they have been implementing it for longer than Suite B has existed and many of the implementations are in hardware or otherwise difficult to update.


They use AES when dealing with "outsiders", but I have trouble believing that they use it internally (and instead use the Suite A ciphers -- it's impossible for others to break them if they don't know anything about them, right?)


> (and instead use the Suite A ciphers -- it's impossible for others to break them if they don't know anything about them, right?)

It is possible to break an unpublished cipher. Just more difficult, because you've got to figure out the algorithm as well as the key. As long as it is similar to existing algorithms, you can try and look for differences.

For example, American cryptanalysts broke the Japanese Purple cipher during World War II entirely from encrypted messages. It was only at the end of the war that they managed to recover parts of one machine from the Japanese embassy in Berlin. No complete machine was ever found.

(In contrast, Enigma machines were captured, so cryptanalysts could directly examine the mechanism and use this knowledge to look for weaknesses.)

Of course, if the algorithm is completely novel, and bears no resemblance even to any principle used in published cipher, then it's a lot more secure. It would be hard to even begin to analyze it.


That said, it's unlikely the NSA has truly novel algorithms. They recruit from the general public like everyone else. There principle advantage is that they're big (working for the NSA is appealing) and can classify in-house breakthroughs.


> The NSA seems to be really divided between SIGINT and COMSEC.

Anybody care to guess which group was responsible for the FUBAR that gave Snowden the keys to the kingdom?


Heh. It would be funny if people in COMSEC actually allowed this material to be leaked because they were disgusted about SIGINT putting so many vulnerabilities into publicly available crypto, and wanted to let it be revealed to stop that practice.

Unlikely, though. More likely that Snowden was just acting on his own. And he didn't really have "the keys to the kingdom"; just more access to a fileserver that had lots of PowerPoints on it than he should have had. If you note, almost everything that has leaked so far is PowerPoints where various branches of the NSA describe to each other and other government agencies what capabilities they have, but not the actual details of those capabilities. He probably had access to some fileserver used by the higher level executives at the NSA, but they do compartmentalize information and as they mentioned were very secretive about exactly what those vulnerabilities consist of, so there's a good chance that he didn't have access to systems where that was described.


This may be a case of the Times assuming that since 1.5 rounds to 2, 1.5 + 1.5 = 4. "The NSA breaks crypto" + "The NSA backdoored Dual-EC DRBG" = "The NSA breaks crypto via backdoored Dual-EC DRBG".


Not a crypto expert at all, but did they knew in advance that nobody would use it? Otherwise it could just be a failed attempt.


I don't know what they expected, but Dual-EC is self-evidently noncompetitive.


A RNG that is reducible to a different believed-hard problem has possible features, so it's not like there could never be a reason for someone to choose this generator. What we could be seeing is the discovery of one failed attempt of a shotgun approach to promulgate insecure primitives. It's hard to know what will happen to become commercially successful, so spray and pray.

Something this blatant does seem like a severe misstep, but perhaps what led to discovery of this case is the wide body of public knowledge on number theoretic crypto. The energy of the public sphere seems mostly devoted to studying problems with interesting mathematical structure. Symmetric crypto has been around a lot longer, and is sufficient for state security purposes, so one would expect the NSA to have a deep analytic understanding of it (hence the differential analysis olive branch). It's not hard to imagine that they'd have ways of creating trapdoor functions out of bit primitives, generating favorable numbers with plausibly-impartial explanations, etc.


> A RNG that is reducible to a different believed-hard problem has possible features

I think you got it backwards... shouldn't you reduce hard problems down to the problem whose difficulty you're trying to understand?


Yep, I misspoke. I simply meant 'is based on', and shouldn't have used big words so cavalierly.


Nobody uses them because they came out of the NSA with little precedent in the open literature, and independent analysis quickly uncovered this vulnerability.


Also nobody used it because it's a CSPRNG that requires bignum multiplication.


Well, it goes on to say "Classified N.S.A. memos appear to confirm that the fatal weakness, discovered by two Microsoft cryptographers in 2007, was engineered by the agency." The Dual_EC_DRBG vulnerability was revealed by two Microsoft researchers in 2007: http://rump2007.cr.yp.to/15-shumow.pdf

So I'd say yes, it sounds like that's what they're talking about.

Speaking of which, I'm really quite frustrated how many of these recent reports about the NSA elide the technical details. You have to read between the lines to figure out what's really going on, what weaknesses there really are.

As a matter of security, it would be better to know specifically what vulnerabilities there really are. Merely the announcement of vulnerabilities can allow a dedicated black-hat to find and exploit it; but someone who's trying to secure their system, and isn't following cryptography incredibly closely, won't know what they need to do or change to make their systems more secure against these types of attacks.

There's a reason that the security community advocates for full disclosure (or at least responsible disclosure, if it's possible to selectively disclose to a few vendors so they can do a coordinated release that fixes the vulnerability before it becomes public), in which you completely disclose a vulnerability so people aren't left guessing about it.


> Speaking of which, I'm really quite frustrated how many of these recent reports about the NSA elide the technical details.

Are you? Well please sign up to work for the NSA, learn the technical details, then go public with them. The reason that the NYTimes isn't publishing the technical details is because they DON'T KNOW THEM. (They might not publish them if they did.) They don't know them because Edward Snowden was a system administrator not a cryptography expert and he's releasing memos about the process.


From the article:

> "Intelligence officials asked The Times and ProPublica not to publish this article, saying that it might prompt foreign targets to switch to new forms of encryption or communications that would be harder to collect or read. The news organizations removed some specific facts but decided to publish the article because of the value of a public debate about government actions that weaken the most powerful tools for protecting the privacy of Americans and others."

NYT, the Guardian, etc do have access to these details, but chose not to publish them.


They say that they were asked not to publish at all, but did so anyway and chose to remove some specific facts. I don't understand how you get from that to concluding that they know (and are suppressing) the particular vulnerabilities that the NSA is exploiting.


So, how does this compare to the Corosync/Pacemaker cluster stack?


I'm not familiar with those tools, but from the clusterlabs website it looks like they're solving a different problem. Mesos is primary intended for use on clusters with thousands of machines and heterogenous application needs. It provides resource isolation and scheduling as well as some components that make writing distributed systems easier.


> A developer hires an international 'starchitect' like Viñoly to design them an office block because the architects reputation for design helps them to get away with a larger building on the site and therefore get more net lettable area for their investment in land.

Ah. I've always wondered why people pay "starchitects" to design horrible, hideous, poorly designed buildings. I've always figured that they were paying more to get something of worse quality, but figured that people were paying the premium just to be in vogue.

The reputation allowing them to get away with a bigger building on the same plot of land is a new explanation to me, and makes lots of sense.


>Ah. I've always wondered why people pay "starchitects" to design horrible, hideous, poorly designed buildings. I've always figured that they were paying more to get something of worse quality, but figured that people were paying the premium just to be in vogue.

"Fashion is a form of ugliness so intolerable that we have to alter it every 6 months" -- Oscar Wilde


That explains my grandparents remodeled their bathrooms every 6 months. (Yup, I guess that makes 'em hipsters.)

The way around hipster discontent is to stop caring; the only person you have to impress is yourself.


More expense is a bragging right and a substitute for thinking.

RFP should due-diligence recent projects to be sure they're not cutting corners. Also, shopping around for better results/value elsewhere.

(It makes you want to guard good value/$ firms that aren't big names.)


The U.S. could have participated only in targeted strikes against Al Qaeda, leaving the rest to local forces as a local matter that isn't our business, and not tried to occupy the country and engage in nation-building.

If they had done just a targeted strike against Al Qaeda, larger in scope but similar to what they did against Bin Laden's compound in Pakistan, we probably could have gotten Bin Laden years earlier and not spent more than a decade trying in the morass that is Afghanistan.

Our mistake was deciding that we needed to get rid of the Taliban and build a democratic nation from what was left after they were gone. There was never any hope of that; the Taliban just fled to the hills, to Pakistan, or just blend in with the local population because many of them are the local population. We have failed at building a nation that can take care of itself after we leave; within a year or two, the Taliban will be in power again.


Overthrowing the Taliban was almost a prerequisite for those types of strikes. The initial strikes and action in Afghanistan by special forces and CIA were almost completely reliant on assistance from the Northern Alliance - for which over throwing the Taliban was always the goal.

The initial air strikes (unguided from the ground) were totally useless. It wasn't until they got SF/CIA on the ground working with the Northern Alliance that they could get it working.

In any case, it would never have been as simple as 'leave it to the local forces'.


The U.S. could have participated only in targeted strikes against Al Qaeda, leaving the rest to local forces as a local matter that isn't our business, and not tried to occupy the country and engage in nation-building.

This is more or less our current counterterrorism strategy in the wilds of Pakistan or Yemen. While I'm skeptical that such a strategy could have seriously damaged 2001-era AQ's ability to operate inside Afghanistan, I also don't think I'm qualified to debate its merits today. But that's not my point.

My point is that if another 9/11-scale attack occurred and the bad guys were in Yemen and the Yemeni government was not extremely helpful in bringing those responsible to heel, that "drones and spies" strategy could never be the limit of our response. It's just not politically practical, not even close. When Schneier talks about the "waste" of a war in Afghanistan, he should remember that the entire time Bush was sticking around trying to nation build, the Democrats were making political hay that Iraq was a sideshow and that we weren't spending enough attention/money/troops on Afghanistan. And indeed when a Democratic president was elected, he proceeded to spend more attention/money/troops on Afghanistan.

Once it was established that AQ was responsible for 9/11 and that the Taliban were not going to give them up on our terms, a major military incursion was politically inevitable. It's a little more dicey just how inevitable a long-term occupation was: President Gore presumably doesn't have to deal with an Afghani-Hawks-By-Convenience wing of his own party, and maybe gets out quick. But Schneier doesn't make this distinction: He seems to be imagining a world in which the war never happens at all because we properly measured its risks. I happen to think he's wrong about the risk/reward tradeoff of aggressively rolling up AQ and their support networks, but I'm sure he's being Utopian if he thinks he's in anything but a tiny minority who would be against a massive military response to another 9/11-like event.


If they had done just a targeted strike against Al Qaeda, larger in scope but similar to what they did against Bin Laden's compound in Pakistan, we probably could have gotten Bin Laden years earlier and not spent more than a decade trying in the morass that is Afghanistan.

If it were so easy, they would probably have done that anyway as an opener. But it isn't.


Read LWN, or check Kernel Newbies, and you'll get a pretty good sense of what's going on.

Some of it is some fairly esoteric stuff that's not all that interesting unless it happens to be the kind of thing you're interested in. A lot of it is just more hardware support and drivers, which is of course only interesting if you have that particular hardware.

But some of it is really great new stuff; cgroups for dividing processes up into groups and being able to control them together, monitoring and limiting resources on a whole group basis. Namespaces (user, PID, network, etc), which together with some userspace tools give you containers for lightweight virtualization (this is what trendy things like Docker use to provide you with instant and easy containers for deploying apps). There are a couple of distributed filesystems (Ceph and Lustre) which have landed in the kernel recently, and there's btrfs which is developing rapidly as Linux's next-gen filesystem, supporting snapshots, checksums, integrated volume management and RAID, and so on. There's reshaping support in the software RAID system, allowing you to change RAID layouts on the fly (going from a 2-disk RAID 1 to a 3 disk RAID-5 to a 6 disk RAID-6, say). There are new SSD caching options, allowing you to use both an SSD and large but slow spinning disk, caching random reads and writes on the SSD, getting the best of both worlds. There are new sandboxing tools that give you the ability to run BPF filters on attempted system calls, giving you fine-grained sandboxing support (used by Chrome to better sandbox the renderer).

There's lots going on in the kernel space if you pay attention. You do have to be interested in infrastructure; if you're just interested in applications, you mostly wait until whoever provides your platform (Amazon or Heroku, or Google in the case of Android, or Canonical, or Red Hat) packages these up into a nice, easy to use platform, and you may not ever realize what kernel changes went on underneath to allow these new services. But there sure is a lot going on, and I at least think it's pretty interesting.


Well, remember that the chart was "change in percentage of GDP". GDP is fairly large, and scientific funding is fairly small relative to that, so the change in the percentage of GDP is going to be a fairly small value. The US's GDP is $14.99 trillion; so a -.05% change in scientific funding represents a change of about $7.5 billion, while in the meantime, China had an increase in scientific funding of close to the same amount (.1% of their GDP is $7.3B).

Now, they don't say how much that is relative to what the US or China spend overall on science. But still, that's a fairly big change either way.

If you take a look at the linked report http://www.asbmb.org/uploadedFiles/Advocacy/Events/UPVO%20Re..., it's even worse if you expand the time scale. Between 2010 and the estimated spending for 2013, there's a drop of more than $20B in scientific funding, from nearly $160B to less than $140B. That's a noticeable change; and based on the percent GDP figure, it's not just because the economy has been down, it's gone down more than the economy as a whole.

In fact, in constant dollars, taking inflation into account, funding has been declining since 2004, as funding levels were stagnant for a while and not keeping up with inflation. Now they are actively declining.


Well, Red Hat somehow manages to make over $1B per year selling FOSS.

So, I'm not sure it's right to say that it's not clear how to charge for FOSS. You sell a branded, licensed, and supported bundle of it to businesses, while simultaneously collaborating with the community on a free, unsupported, differently branded version that moves more quickly and is more experimental.

Now, the question is, can you make as much as Microsoft makes on this kind of model? There are tons of people who are perfectly content to use unsupported, unlicensed versions of their software, in the form of CentOS, Scientific Linux, Fedora, or other distros which incorporate a lot of software that Red Hat primarily funds development on. Likewise, there would probably be a lot of people who figured it would be cheaper to stop licensing Windows, if possible, and deal with support issues themselves (or via other "distros" of Windows which were supported but cheaper or free).


Couple of things you have wrong here:

1. RedHat make pretty much most of their money from support, training/cert and consultancy services, not selling F/OSS.

2. Your comment:

"There are tons of people who are perfectly content to use unsupported, unlicensed versions of their software, in the form of CentOS, Scientific Linux, Fedora"

RHEL is licensed under the GPL, they can't really change that and they can't not release the source, so CentOS, SL, Fedora (and Oracle Linux) are not actually unlicensed, they're GPL licensed distros from the RH upstream. Yes they may be unsupported, but they're certainly not "unlicensed" (or illegal/rip-offs if that's what you meant by unlicensed).

RedHat have no choice but to make the RHEL source available. You also forget that the Fedora folks feed back into RHEL a lot of cutting edge stuff that's stable.


1. That's actually not true; I even checked before posting. Check out their annual report, page 43: http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/RHAT/2659386793x0x581...

(numbers are in thousands)

> Subscriptions ... $ 965,575 > Training and services ... 167,528

They do, in fact, make most of their money from subscriptions (yes, selling FOSS), not training and services.

2. I apologize, I was unclear. I was referring to licenses that bore revenue, not all licenses. You need to buy a license to run RHEL, even if you can run all of the same actual software (just without the branding) in the form of CentOS or other distros. I didn't really mean "unlicensed", since obviously all of the software is under the GPL or other free software licenses, I meant "without buying a license from Red Hat". I was not trying to imply people were ripping off Red Hat, just that they aren't paying for it.

And no, I don't forget that Fedora feeds back into Red Hat. I explicitly listed Fedora as part of the strategy for how to make money selling free software; you sell a supported, branded, stable version to corporations, and release a free, frequently updated, bleeding edge for the community. That second part is important because it helps drive innovation, and allows you to take advantage of collaboration from outside contributors, while still deriving revenue from your enterprise distro.

I'm just not sure if Microsoft could continue to make the kind of money that they do, if they chose to go a Red Hat route, as there would be a large number of people who would choose to run free-as-in-beer distros (the Windows equivalent of CentOS or Fedora) rather than a paid version of Windows. Red Hat shows that it is possible to get people to buy paid licenses for free software; but I don't know if there are enough people for that to be a strategically viable move for Microsoft.


> I'm not sure it's right to say that it's not clear how to charge for FOSS.

I said this because many people have a fundamental misunderstanding of open-source, and insist that open-source software cannot be sold.

Your response makes a lot of sense, but it's not really applicable to smaller scale products, and it's certainly not applicable to web-services, which are significantly easier to rip-off.


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