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So, what is the "uproar against Elementary, My Dear Holmes" that is mentioned here? It sounds like we're missing half of the story.


Ah, after reading through the comments on the Kickstarter, it sounds like the controversy is because Ouya promised some kind of matching funds for successful Kickstarter campaigns, and so there are accusations that the Elementary, My Dear Holmes developers funded their own project to help get it over the line, in order to be able to qualify for the matching funds.

This seems like something the original article should have said. Instead, it just made vague references to "suspicious accounts;" I'm not sure if they were expecting anyone reading the article to already know the backstory, or if they were just being unhelpful.


I wouldn't be surprised if they funded themselves to get over the line of Ouya was going to match funds.

If you were only a few thousand off, and Ouya was going to match you would be very tempted.


From the allegations, it doesn't sound like it was a matter of being a few thousand off at the end of the campaign; it sounds like at the beginning of the campaign, before it had even gotten any publicity, a bunch of new Kickstarter accounts that had never funded anything else were created, and those accounts then wound up funding most of it. Then when the allegations came out, several of those accounts changed their names, and backed a bunch of other projects (presumably at a $1 donation level).

As in, if the allegations are true, this doesn't sound like it's a matter of pushing it over a little at the end, it sounds like they planned this from the beginning and self-funded most of the project just to be able to qualify for the matching funds.


There's no reason for them not to; I'm not sure why you would expect them to avoid doing so, if it would help them spy on communications. It's not like it's terribly risky for them; they can stick some exit nodes on some racks in a couple of data centers, with splitters that records all of the traffic coming out, and no one would be the wiser.

Or they can just find existing exit nodes, and ask the data centers to install splitters for them.

Exit nodes and relay nodes are not secret, so specifically targetting them for analysis would be pretty easy.


It's not a matter of some backdoor.

It's a question of whether the idea is fundamentally sound.

You're routing your data through several strangers, who are all volunteers and may be individuals who support anonymity or governments who are trying to break it, relying on them discarding logs in order to preserve your anonymity. Since the data is encrypted, and routed between several nodes, you do have some redundancy in place in case one of the middle nodes is an attacker.

However, there are several problems. The data coming out of the exit nodes is unencrypted. Now, everyone advises you to always encrypt anything that will pass through an exit node, but that's not always possible. Some protocols just don't have widely available encrypted versions (like DNS), or even with encryption, where you are connecting to is leaked, as well as some information in things like the TLS handshake that may be de-anonymizing.

There are also lots of ways that data can leak at your endpoint. For instance, many programs may make DNS queries that don't go through Tor, so what you are looking up may be leaked.

Furthermore, Tor doesn't sent data at a constant bitrate. Someone who can monitor traffic on a large portion of the network can correlate it across points.

Finally, due to the nature of routing traffic between several points, a fairly limited number of exit nodes, and the encryption, Tor is fairly slow. So most people won't really be able to use it on a day to day basis, making mere use of it somewhat suspicious, and likely to subject you to more scrutiny.

None of these are fatal flaws, but they are some fundamental weaknesses, and many of them can't really be fully fixed.

I think that focusing on widespread, end-to-end encryption, rather than anonymity service like Tor, would be more valuable. Yes, you will still be vulnerable to metadata monitoring, which is a problem, but it would help a lot more with the content of your communications.


> It's a question of whether the idea is fundamentally sound.

The problems it has are clearly discussed in multiple places -- websites, research papers, etc. I don't think it can be more sound than that.

> You're routing your data through several strangers, who are all volunteers and may be individuals who support anonymity or governments who are trying to break it, relying on them discarding logs in order to preserve your anonymity.

It doesn't matter. That is the entire idea behind Tor.

> However, there are several problems. The data coming out of the exit nodes is unencrypted. There are also lots of ways that data can leak at your endpoint. For instance, many programs may make DNS queries that don't go through Tor, so what you are looking up may be leaked.

The TBB already takes care of this. So unless you use some crappy third-party browser, you are safe from these problems because they know about it and they have been fixed.

Of course the exit node is not something you can trust. But your argument does not always hold true because TBB ships with HTTPS Everywhere by default. So almost all major websites will automatically use HTTPS and therefore the exit node sniffing your connection is rendered useless. Now if you are sending out your information over plain-HTTP, then yes, you will have it compromised.

> Furthermore, Tor doesn't sent data at a constant bitrate. Someone who can monitor traffic on a large portion of the network can correlate it across points.

Because Tor is a low-latency network, timing analysis is easy to perform if the entry and the exit node are controlled by the same entity. Now this depends on whether the NSA runs Tor exits or not and I cannot answer this question.

> Finally, due to the nature of routing traffic between several points, a fairly limited number of exit nodes, and the encryption, Tor is fairly slow. So most people won't really be able to use it on a day to day basis, making mere use of it somewhat suspicious, and likely to subject you to more scrutiny.

Anonymity loves diversity. Tor has a diverse userbase and it is getting better. I do not think it is that slow -- surely we can't expect it to be as fast as your normal internet connection -- but it is not bad either. I think FWIW, given what it does and what we need, there is no better solution so I think we might as well stick to it than trusting some proprietary software.


NSA doesn't need to run exit nodes, they just need correlate packet flows from exit nodes with packet flows to entry nodes. It's easy if you have both flows (say by taping most fiber lines). Tor doesn't protect you against a global passive adversary. That is the price you pay for low latency.


> say by [tapping] most fiber lines

You realize there are tens of thousands fiber lines in a city, right? Tapping fibers going from ISP cusomers to PoPs isn't scalable.

Hiding the equipment from the people working every day on splicing smaller fiber cables to the trunks would also be a major issue.


Sorry, most fiber lines is absurd, I should have said they could intercept most of the world's traffic by taping key fiber lines. Say, most of the major underseas ones and any of the major ones traversing the five eyes (US,UK,CA,AU,NZ) + at least Sweden and probably a number of other countries.


But if you run entrance nodes on your intranet, then they have to compromise your endpoint right? But if they compromise that then they don't need to correlate with timing attacks, do they?


>I think FWIW, given what it does and what we need, there is no better solution so I think we might as well stick to it than trusting some proprietary software.

The trouble with that is that often the illusion of security/anonymity is worse than not having it at all. See also: Enigma

Definitely don't trust proprietary software though.


> Now this depends on whether the NSA runs Tor exits or not and I cannot answer this question.

If running Tor exit nodes is what is necessary for the NSA to snoop on traffic, why wouldn't they do so?

If your security depends on "well, the NSA isn't going to run a service they need to snoop on your traffic", you're doing it wrong.

> I think FWIW, given what it does and what we need, there is no better solution so I think we might as well stick to it than trusting some proprietary software.

That's not really the choice. It's a question of where your priorities lie.

I don't think our biggest threats to privacy are in the NSA monitoring merely who we connect to. For some users, it's a substantial threat; for instance, for protesters in Iran, it may be a big problem, and for them Tor is invaluable (especially since it's unlikely that the Iranian government has the same resources to attack Tor that the NSA does).

Instead, our biggest (technical, as opposed to political or social) threats to privacy lie in a few places:

1) Email. Email has all kinds of problems (it's not verifiable, no good identity management, spam, and it's unencrypted in transit in many of its hops). 2) Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Twitter, etc. Big, closed services, that lock you in, and provide centralized places for monitoring. For many people in my social circles, Facebook is their primary means of online communication. 3) Web tracking: cookies and other web de-anonymization techniques 4) Unencrypted HTTP 5) Identity on the web. Almost every account you create requires an email address, which can trivially be used by the NSA to correlate data between accounts. Anonymous email services can be used to fight this, but managing databases of email addresses, usernames, and passwords to preserve anonymity is beyond most people's capabilities. The solutions to this are mostly to use one of the big services for login, which of course down't solve the anonymity problem at all. 6) The phone system. Telecoms have demonstrated repeatedly that they're more than willing to hand your data over without a court order. Tech companies at least act embarrassed about it in public; phone companies just lobby for retroactive immunity to keep themselves safe from their customers.

There may be more that I'm not thinking of, but those are some of the biggest.

Tor does very little to protect you from these kinds of threats. All it protects you from is someone monitoring who you are connecting to; but if most of the traffic they are interested in is to Google or Facebook, they don't need to attack it by monitoring your connection, they can just get the data straight from the endpoint.

I think that the biggest things we need, to preserve privacy, are replacements for many of the above problems, that even our grandmothers can use. Sure, a few privacy conscious geeks, a few Iranian protesters, some online griefers, some drug dealers, and some pedophiles can take advantage of Tor. It provides a useful service for some, but a fairly small portion, of people.

Getting ubiquitous encryption, better key management and identity management, a return to federated or peer-to-peer services rather than a few large centralized players, and getting all of that widely deployed and usable by your grandparents, are what we want to really improve privacy and security.


>. Some protocols just don't have widely available encrypted versions (like DNS)...

DNSCrypt encrypts communication between the user and the OpenDNS servers.

http://www.opendns.com/technology/dnscrypt/


But what happens when the LEOs are getting their data from the NSA? http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/05...

TOR is not perfect. The NSA, or any other sufficiently large global passive adversary, can defeat it, with global timing correlation. However, a connection over TOR probably requires more resources to track down than a direct connection. On the downside, a connection over TOR may go through a foreign country, which removes any domestic safeguards the NSA does have in place, subjecting it to indiscriminate spying.

TOR is also insufficient on its own. You need to use strong crypto, and be careful of your privacy in other ways (cookies, caches, etc) on top of it.


The NSA does not have domestic safeguards, and the act of actually using TOR makes you a primary target by being suspicious.


Yes.

If you are actually trying to hide something from a targeted government attack, you certainly don't want to use any hosted services like Google's.

If, however, you are merely trying to avoid the government passively sweeping up all of your data, searching through it, and maybe subjecting it to further scrutiny due to it containing the wrong keyword, it helps to know that it's encrypted in transit, and that in order to decrypt it, someone has to actually present a warrant to Google.

Of course, there's the additional problem of National Security Letters, as they aren't really real warrants and they have the secrecy around them.

These problems can be attacked on multiple fronts. We can improve cryptographic security, and work on more decentralized approaches to online services, and reign in the NSA's power at a legal level, and so on.


The battering ram isn't really the right analogy. It's not a matter of them having particular equipment, or techniques, which they can legitimately use as part of their job. And it's not like they are very visibly damaging lots of things.

This is more like a society in which the police routinely break into houses by picking the lock in order to rifle through your papers secretly, without telling you. They say that they have secret warrants to do this, but since they're secret, and they do the breaking in in secret, you can't even find out if they have broken into your house.

People don't like this; they don't like the idea that some cop may be in their home rifling through their things. So they start developing stronger and stronger locks. The police get worried that they won't be able to pick the locks on your doors, and will actually have to get a warrant and not break in secretly. So they lobby to pass a law that all locks have to either be weak enough to be picked, or have a master key that the police have. Of course, the people, who don't like the police breaking in with impunity, defeat this bill.

So the police don't stop there. Instead, they just make secret deals with a few key lockmakers, to build locks that accept master keys anyhow. When lockmakers standardize on key designs that are more secure, the police add a section to the standard that makes it so that any lock that implements that standard will be able to be opened with a particular master key, but in a way that you can't tell what that master key is from the standard. Since there are enough lockmakers that they can't subvert them all, and not everyone implements those standards they subverted, they also talk to a few doormakers to add a secret part that you can push to disengage the hinges.

Now this information comes out. People are outraged; their lockmakers are supposed to make locks that even the police can't get in through; people don't trust these secret warrants and secret searches, and with good reason, as the police have used these secret searches to investigate ex-lovers before, not just terrorists. They're outraged by the betrayal of the police, making an end-run around the law that they thoroughly defeated to prevent the police from having master keys. They're outraged by the lockmakers subverting their trust.

And what's the police response? "We need these tools to investigate terrorists and criminals." Never mind that in order to investigate terrorists and criminals, they've weakened everyone's security, and everyone's trust in their government and the companies that sold the compromised locks. Never mind that they've been through the houses of many innocent people, in a wide sweep to try to find evidence of a few criminals. Never mind that the system has been abused many times, but the only way the abuses have come to light is by whistleblowers who the police prosecute severely.

The police (or the NSA, to step back from the analogy to the real world) find these tools useful in their job. I'm sure they do. But the public finds these tools too intrusive. I'm sure it would be useful for the police to be able to secretly break into any house they wanted, rifle through people's papers, and find people who had jihadist leanings that way. We have amendments in our constitution specifically forbidding that, for good reason.

Likewise, regardless of how useful the NSA finds these abilities, we the public find them abhorrent. Just like the police should have ways to get warrants and under the authority of those warrants, search houses, there are definitely legitimate uses for some of what the NSA does, if properly regulated. But weakening everyone's security, so they can intercept and read your mail at will, in secret, with no oversight, is just as wrong as the police breaking into your house in secret, at night, and rifling through your belongings.


Read Kafka's The Trial.

Also, I'm surprised not more is being made of the massive security problem in Utah: who's defending the NSA perimeter?


This is a really great comment, and a great analogy. Thanks for taking the time to write and post it.


It's possible, but not likely. Targeting proprietary, commercial vendors is probably a lot easier than open source, as it's much easier to hide what you're doing. And many more of the targets they are trying to attack are likely buying fully supported solutions from commercial vendors, not COTS hardware and installing open-source software themselves.

Even for open source software, it would be easier to just target the integrator, such as the binary packages provided by the distro or preinstalled on hardware by a system integrator, rather than introducing vulnerabilities or causing problems in the upstream open source project.


Well, until recently, they haven't had direct access to the leaks, so covering the Snowden story or reporting on what the Guardian said were all they could do.

However, ever since the British government forced the Guardian to destroy a laptop containing leaked information, and detained David Miranda and confiscated his belongings, the Guardian has decided to partner with the NY Times, as they believe that the First Amendment, and American jurisprudence surrounding it, still provides better protection of freedom of the press than Britain's laws, so sharing information with the NY Times helps ensure that the British government can't stop the reporting on this story.


So wait. You want Paypal to require everyone who opens a PayPal account to have to write up what it's going to be used for, and wait in a queue before you can receive funds so that they can review it to ensure that it's not something like crowdfunding, and then require that you either never change what you use your PayPal account for, or submit any changes back to them, so that they can re-review it and approve your new use?

As far as I know, PayPal allows anyone to open an account and start using it without any review (I've never received funds with PayPal, only sent funds, but I don't recall any extra hoops that would be necessary to receive them).

Likely what happens is that either certain kinds of activity cause an account to be flagged for a manual review, or someone gets cold feet about the crowdfunding campaign and does a chargeback, so PayPal looks into it to see what you were selling. When they see that you are in violation of their very explicit pre-sale policy: https://www.paypal-businesscenter.com/content/presale-policy... they hold your funds until you are within 20 days of shipping your product.

They have a lot of rules about what you can sell via PayPal, and there's no way they could possibly check what you are going to use funds for before each transaction, as you could start using an account that was used for permitted transactions for ones that aren't permitted at any time. So, they wait until an automated system, a complaint, or a chargeback notifies them that something is amiss, and then hold on to the money until they can resolve the situation.


"So wait. You want Paypal to require everyone who opens a PayPal account to have to write up what it's going to be used for, and wait in a queue before you can receive funds so that they can review it to ensure that it's not something like crowdfunding, and then require that you either never change what you use your PayPal account for, or submit any changes back to them, so that they can re-review it and approve your new use?"

Not at all. I want them to say up front, when you sign up for an account, which apparently-innocuous activities will likely get your funds suspended for long enough to be useless. After that, it's on you if you go ahead with it. They're obviously not communicating clearly enough right now, or this wouldn't keep happening.


Was the link I gave, about not allowing pre-sales for items that won't ship within 20 days, not clear enough?

It's not some little footnote hidden within a wall of legalese. It's a pretty clear statement of what they allow and what they don't.

And why would you think that crowdfunding counts as "apparently-innocuous"? Crowdfunding is an area that is ripe for scamming. You create a glitzy campaign, get lots of backers, keep promising something that never quite gets finished, and then disappear with the money.

Apparently, ever since the Ubuntu Edge crowdfunding campaign failed, there's been a whole bunch of fake knock-off campaigns, of people capitalizing on the interest and trying to trick people into funding things that pretend to be related but really aren't.

Any time you have some kind of "amazing new investment opportunity", there are going to be scammers. And when you get down to it, crowdfunding is just an "amazing new investment opportunity".


Matt Mackall, the former maintainer of /dev/random, actually stepped down over this issue, because Linus overrode Matt and applied Intel's patch that used their hardware random number generator directly:

http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.cryptography.r...

> It's worth noting that the maintainer of record (me) for the Linux RNG quit the project about two years ago precisely because Linus decided to include a patch from Intel to allow their unauditable RdRand to bypass the entropy pool over my strenuous objections.

> From a quick skim of current sources, much of that has recently been rolled back (/dev/random, notably) but kernel-internal entropy users like sequence numbers and address-space randomization appear to still be exposed to raw RdRand output.

Ted Ts'o later reverted this, separating out Intel's hardware random number generation into a separate function that could be used to seed the entropy pool but wouldn't be trusted directly as the main kernel source of random numbers:

http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.g...


If Matt protested, he did so quietly/privately. I wasn't aware of the fact that he had stepped down until the authors of the paper described in http://factorable.net showed up and pointed out we had a really bad problem for embedded devices on the internet. I had always assumed he had gotten too busy and distracted on other interests, since I do follow LKML, and I didn't see any kind of public debate/controversy about the change to the random driver described above.

If I had to guess what happened, some intel people pushed this as a feature, probably pushing it via one of the x86 git trees, and Linus either (a) didn't notice, or (b) didn't understand the implications, and then Matt quit in a huff --- by just stopping to do work, and not even updating the entry in the MAINTAINERS file. (That didn't happen until I took over the random driver again.)


Ah, here's the thread I was looking for:

http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/1173350/focus=117...

It doesn't really look like he had NAKed it on paranoia grounds, but more on design grounds; others brought up the paranoia arguments. You were even involved in that thread, so you should have seen his stepping down, although he didn't submit a patch to MAINTAINERS.


You're right, if he did so, it must have been in private; I searched for a while to find a message on a public mailing list about it, and could not, so resorted to linking to that later message.

Regardless, I'm glad that paranoia did eventually prevail, despite Linus's original strong objections.


Sounds like Linus has some explaining to do...


Indeed. Where's Mr Sweary now, eh?


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