Or perhaps the Iran link was a misdirection. They were worried that people would notice the MITMed certs, so they MITMed a lot of Iranian customers to make it look like the attack came from there.
> They can legally compel Google to give them the email of foreigners in a foreign country.
They can, but they may wish to be more subtle than that. For example, if they were engaged in economic espionage, they might not want that story to break, and would be worried that someone at Google may leak the story. If they had to ask Google, there would be more people who would know about what's going on.
Didn't the slides show that it was the Diginotar compromise?
> We cannot have untrustworthy CAs in a system based on trust. That's simply not an option.
The entire CA trust model is broken. In the trust model, any CA can issue certs for any domain; so a Chinese CA could issue Google certs, or a US CA could issue certs for the Dutch government.
Self-signed certs with certificate pinning are indeed more likely to be secure than CA certs. Of course, you can do both; CA signed certs (which does add a small amount of trustworthiness, as the CA is at least supposed to do a little work to verify a real-world identity), and use certificate pinning to avoid this kind of attack.
DANE[0] (in combination w/ DNSSEC[1]) is starting to sound really good right about now... except that, you know, the U.S. also runs several root nameservers.
Root servers simply serve the content for the root zone, ICANN generates the contents of the root zone and signs it using an elaborate system of trust: http://dns.icann.org/ksk/
Perhaps you should, though. I mean, sure, normally you don't need to worry about it; but given how much personal data is being stored on our phones these days, and how easy this sort of attack would be (stick a charger in an airport that actually slurps up the data of anyone who uses it), it's definitely something to think about.
> You can blame the patrons, not the owners. The owners are behaving rationally, sadly.
You can blame both, in fact. The owners don't get a free pass on having a racist door policy just because a few patrons are racist as well.
If you want to keep the club from being "ghetto", then have a dress code, and turn away anyone, white, black, Hispanic, or other, who doesn't meet the dress code, and let in anyone who meets the dress code and is not obviously disruptive (belligerent, drunk, etc). Be very clear with bouncers that it's not OK to apply such dress codes differently based on someone's race.
I'm sorry, but if a patron is going to leave because a black person is going to come in, they aren't a customer worth having. If they're worried about the customers just going to another club, they should get together with the other clubs and agree to universally adopt a "no racist bouncer" rule, spelling out what kinds of rules and dress codes are acceptable and what kind are not.
This is a free market issue that would be solved with regulation - in their eyes, keeping out black people gives the club a higher chance of success. In order for one club to stop being racist, all of them have to so white patrons just have to deal with being around (shock horror) black people. It just takes one to waive from this policy, and there isn't a huge amount of motivation to stick to it. So, govm't has to stick it's nose in and make sure bouncers aren't being racist (fairly easy, just send sober black people in who are 100% conforming to the dress code and see if they get refused), and fine them massively if they are guilty, thus de-incentivising racism. Eventually, patrons will grow up and get used to the "scary" blacks and score one for equality.
> So everyone can act in an honest, forthright, and rational manner... and the results can still seem pretty ugly
Sorry, what? "Everyone can act in an honest, forthright, and rational way"?
The people adding "added ingredients" to their meals are acting in an honest, forthright, and rational way?
This isn't "rationality", it's acting like a racist asshole.
Now, it's not surprising if black people avoid places that have a bunch of racist assholes. But that doesn't mean that what's going on is self-segregation; that's overt, racist segregation on the part of the knuckleheads who are spitting in their food.
I'm really having a hard time following what you're trying to say, because it feels like you're trying to say "well, that's what happens when everyone acts rationally", and I'm not really seeing that, I'm seeing a lot of people acting in a racist manner.
I think the point is even if 9/10 places to eat where safe people would still avoid them simply because of 3rd party's that are not working at those safe places. Aka the risk is somewhat independent of the restaurants actions.
> Are the restaurants racist? Not really. They just happened to hire a nugget head. Probably, quite unknowingly.
He seems to be implying that "restaurants" (I guess he means the cooks, and owners who don't stop the cooks) who spit in black people's burgers aren't racist.
Even if, as you say in trying to give him the benefit of the doubt, he's talking about third parties who aren't working there, the restaurant has a responsibility to not allow patrons to disrupt other patron's meal. If someone were to spit in my food, and the restaurant didn't kick them out, I'd sure as hell be pissed off at that restaurant.
Racism (and other forms of discrimination based on who you are rather than what you do) is insidious and evil, and needs to be stood up against, not just passively saying "well, that's what they do, what are you going to do." It is fundamentally wrong to treat a person as a category, rather than an individual.
look... the owner may not even be around when a cook or waiter compromises someone's food. How can you say that the owner is a bigot simply because he or she has bigots working for him or her.
I've run into MANY bigots in San Francisco for instance. Many work at Apple, Facebook, Google and Yahoo. Does that, then, imply that the senior executives at these firms are bigots? At some point, you need to trust your employees. You only know what you see, and you can't see everything. This does not make you a racist... it makes you a human.
The presence of what may be single knucklehead, in Houston, drives blacks to patronize their own restaurants to the exclusion of others.
(I do realize that the practice of compromising the integrity of the food of black restaurant goers is probably a pretty widespread practice, and not the work of a "single knucklehead".)
My only point is... I doubt, in a lot of these cases, that the restaurant owner him or herself is racist.
Sorry, I know that "PHP is insecure" jokes are overdone, but that enormous blacklist that you have to find vulnerabilities seemed like it could be simplified a bit.
It's not too hard to embed it yourself; here's a quick proposal I did when the idea of embedding CSV in a custom element was being discussed on the WHATWG list: http://ephemera.continuation.org/csv.html
The issue of fixed headers is a styling issue, not an issue of what embedding types are supported; and that is solved by the "position: sticky" CSS attribute that this link discusses. There has been an experimental WebKit implementation of this for a while, this now adds an experimental Gecko implementation. Hopefully this will be standardized soon and available in non-experimental form.
Remember, this is a hardware implementation you're talking about. Nothing is ever "trivial". It would take a significant amount of extra silicon to add this kind of detection logic.
The reason for the basic paranoia about not trusting RdRand directly is that it's pretty easy and cheap to make it generate a random number stream that looks random, but is predictable (the RdRand function already is documented to use AES; all you would need to do is make it do AES of an incrementing integer sequence, rather than actual random noise, which is a pretty small change). And heck, if RdRand isn't backdoored (no one has presented evidence that is is; it's just a standard level of paranoia because subverting the random number generator is a favorite technique of the NSA), it might be in a future version, or AMD or ARMs implementation of a similar instruction in the future may be.
Detecting a code sequence and subverting it would be far more difficult. For one, there's the extra silicon. There's the extra chance of that change introducing other noticeable behaviors. There's the extra chance of discovery. It's just not worth the costs. And furthermore, if you really are worried about that, then there's no reason to limit your paranoia to the RdRand function; you may as well say you can't trust the chip to run any crypto code at all.
We can already rule out the extra silicon costs. Don't forget that a program like this one would be subsidised.
If you can't trust a chip with one instruction, why trust it with the others. I'm in no disagreement with you here. I was just responding to jgrahamc asking how it was going to work.
The main concern about random number generation is that if you use the output of RdRand exclusively, it's fairly easy to backdoor in such a way that it looks completely random to all outside observers, but the NSA has a key that could allow them to predict the output based on past output. However, mixing it with the state of an already good random number generator (which the kernel needs to have anyhow for platforms without an RdRand instruction) pretty much negates that attack.
No one (reasonable) is actually particularly concerned that Intel themselves has backdoored RdRand. But they do want to ensure that they are protected in the case that at some point in the future, some other architecture adds a random number generation instruction and that is backdoored. And since you need to continue to do software random number generation anyhow, the best way to use RdRand is to use both, mix them, and get the best of both worlds (fast entropy available in environments with limited entropy sources, and an auditable software random number generator).
All of the other attacks that people are suggesting require a whole hell of a lot more silicon, require changing the behavior of unrelated instructions, and so on. They're just too complex and too fragile to be feasible.
Instead, why don't we spend our time naming and shaming the companies that actually do use backdoored random number generation, like RSA security:
> Apparently, RSA Security BSAFE Share for Java 1.1 has DUAL_EC_DRBG as a default:
> "The default Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) is the Dual EC-DRBG using a P256 curve with prediction resistance off."
> I didn't find an obvious link for the equivalent C/C++ library documentation, but the RSA BSAFE CNG Cryptographic Primitives Library 1.0 FIPS 140-1 Security Policy document from RSA Security at the NIST site says (p.14):
> "The Module provides a default RNG, which is the Dual EC DRBG, using a P256 curve and SHA-256."
> Additionally, the RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro-Edition 3.0.0.2 FIPS 140-1 Security Policy says (p.17):
> "For R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_ECC and R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL_ECC, Crypto-C ME implements a Dual ECDRBG (Cert. #137) internally"
> I'd be more than a bit wary of any product using RSA Security libraries.
For a while, people were confused about why the NSA would have gotten the Dual EC DRBG random number generator introduced into a standard, as it's so much slower than most of the other available random number generators, and it was only a year after the standard was released that the potential backdoor was pointed out. Well, apparently RSA has decided that it's the best RNG available, perhaps with some influence from the NSA.
> 1. remap `caps lock` to `ESC`: goes without saying for vim, but extremely useful in other situations too (like playing starcraft and de-selecting units)
Or to Control, if you're an Emacs user. I've even seen some people remap a tap on it to ESC, and holding it down to Control, to cater to both needs.
> They can legally compel Google to give them the email of foreigners in a foreign country.
They can, but they may wish to be more subtle than that. For example, if they were engaged in economic espionage, they might not want that story to break, and would be worried that someone at Google may leak the story. If they had to ask Google, there would be more people who would know about what's going on.