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how do you conclude that any TrueCrypt version is secure in light of this disclosure?


Because this happened to 7.2. Chances are, this is a warrant canary, and people will take the last known good 7.1 (i.e. the one that is being audited) and build their forks from there.


1. 7.2 just disabled things. It didn't introduce a vulnerability.

2. Warrant canary makes no sense. There is nothing for a warrant to grab.

3. Forking is legally troublesome. Just because you can see the source doesn't mean you can distribute the source.


>1. 7.2 just disabled things. It didn't introduce a vulnerability.

I had a look at the diff; I have neither the time nor crypto-specific skill to do an audit, but there are plenty of code changes that aren't warnings in there.

>2. Warrant canary makes no sense. There is nothing for a warrant to grab.

No, but they could have theoretically been asked to introduce a backdoor from a Lavabit-style order.

>3. Forking is legally troublesome. Just because you can see the source doesn't mean you can distribute the source.

Do you think that will stop people? Even if there is some legal issue, the Streisand Effect always overcomes it. So what if a TrueCrypt fork can't use Github because of that issue? Is the world suddenly lacking good hosting providers, perhaps in Switzerland or similar? Has everyone forgotten how to set up a public git repo themselves? Somehow, I think not. So what if many devs will probably have to contribute anonymously? With a product such as TrueCrypt, they probably should anyway.


been asked to introduce a backdoor from a Lavabit-style order

This makes no sense. Lavabit was compelled to turn over evidence it told the government it had, which is straightforward law. There is nothing "Lavabit-style" about "distribute a back door or else." You would need explicit legislation to allow that. If the developer's cat was kidnapped to force him to put in a backdoor, there is nothing "Lavabit-style" about that.

You do hedge with the word "theoretically," but "theoretically" this could be a message from the aliens.

Do you think that will stop people?

It will stop the smart people, and you need smart people to work on it. Otherwise you would only be allowed to distribute it by illicit means, and you could never trust it. It would be as trustworthy as warez sites. Why even bother with that nonsense?

Much saner to just build something new, having learned from TrueCrypt's experiences. For example, something that starts from the command-line and then has a GUI in top, instead of the reverse.


> "There is nothing "Lavabit-style" about "distribute a back door or else." You would need explicit legislation to allow that."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullrun_(decryption_program)

No legislastion authorizes that program, among many others. I think what the parent was referring to as "Lavabit-style" was the "compromise your users or face legal action" move. Turning over customer data or introducing a backdoor are both means to the same end, as far as the NSA is concerned.


Is there something at that Bullrun link that shows the USG uses legal methods (or even illegal methods) to force product makers to insert backdoors into their equipment against the product makers' will?[1]

The NSA inserting backdoors into the product without the cooperation or maybe even knowledge of the vendor -- while troubling for any number of reasons -- is vastly different. Especially when giving advice to developers about how to stay in bounds with the law. If the metagame becomes "the government can legally force you to insert backdoors into your product" any developer faced with this threat might believe it, when he should know it's bunk.

[1] RSA allegedly got paid $10 million to make a change the NSA wanted. RSA customers should demand an answer, but that's not forcing the RSA. People get paid to do things all the time.


Not there, but in the historical record for sure.

>Hushmail stated that the Java version is also vulnerable, in that they may be compelled to deliver a compromised java applet to a user.

>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hushmail#Compromises_to_email_p...

>Hushmail turned over cleartext copies of private email messages associated with several addresses at the request of law enforcement agencies under a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States.; e.g. in the case of U.S. v. Tyler Stumbo.

>if a court order has been issued by the Supreme Court of British Columbia compelling us to reveal the content of your encrypted email, the "attacker" could be Hush Communications, the actual service provider.


Wow, Huhsmail was pretty silly with their claims:

the company that provides Hushmail, states that it will not release any user data without a court order from the Supreme Court of British Columbia,

This is malarkey. Someone in the US could say "I'll fight all the way to the Supreme Court!!!" but you would be a fool to trust your business to their determination. Especially if they say it about a subpoena, which means they haven't even retained a lawyer to ask about this. (If your business plan depends on being able to wage a legal battle, you really shouldn't be scrambling through the yellow pages for a lawyer when you get your first subpoena.)

Back to the topic, I'll have to point out that this still isn't evidence of a company being required to backdoor a product. Hushmail, the same company that thinks it can fight a subpoena for third-party data all the way to the Supreme Court, said "well, we might be compelled to backdoor our product." This is just more repeating of the meme without evidence. It's unfortunate because some developer who remembers Hushmail might take their ill-informed legal opinion as reality.

Of course, Hushmail had access to cleartext copies of the messages. That's the killer. The government has the right to evidence about third parties in your possession. (Canada derives from British law tradition like the US. The government's right to all evidence is a concept that goes back centuries. If you can show that Canada broke from this tradition I would be most interested.)


> No legislastion authorizes that program, among many others.

No legislation forbids it either. If the NSA is legally able to search/seize a given piece of information why would you think they should not be allowed to forensically analyze it?


Orient themselves used to offer a hosted service, but they shut it down. IMHO there are some things that need to be ironed out before a hosted version is really viable.

In terms of sysadmin, it works pretty well out of the box for all but the hugest of datasets and busiest sites, and the configuration is well documented. It's no more difficult to set up than mysql for instance.


Regarding the choice between the REST API and the binary protocol - it depends :) If you're using a client library that supports the binary protocol it's probably worth using that because it exposes every feature of orient and it's the more efficient option. However, if you're writing a client library from scratch, you'll find the REST version a whole lot simpler to implement - the binary protocol has a few awkward edge cases. There are actually some hidden gotchas with both the binary and REST transports, but they are not show stoppers and they're being actively worked on.

Disclaimer: I wrote a client library for node.js[0] and am in the process of writing one for php[1].

[0] https://github.com/codemix/oriento

[1] https://github.com/codemix/php-orientdb


It's not really fair to call it a variant of Mongo's approach, OrientDB is an SQL powered, NoSQL document-graph database which can model relationships without requiring joins. It's quite different from Mongo in many ways.

Arguably OrientDB is the only data store on the market which actually matches the web's data model - Documents + Links.


While in some ways quite different from Mongo, it's also used for many of the same purposes. Hence my comment, and hence the article I referenced. The goal of my comment, btw, was to provide some context for the top link, which didn't really describe what the product was; I didn't intend to have anyone think I was disparaging either product.

OrientDB can do some things that Mongo cannot (as you mention, SQL access, and the great linking), but when I have seen Orient used, it's in an almost interchangeable way to how one would use Mongo (ie, folks not using the linking and leveraging the SQL just to ease querying). So, variant may not be the right word, but it's an open source NoSQL document oriented datastore, like Mongo, with the additional features you refer to which, for some use cases, make it a superior offering.


So does that make it similar to Neo4j? Or is this more of a hybrid document database with graph capabilities?


it's also quite different from Neo4j which is a graph only database and is poor at representing normal documents. Neo4j is also very expensive if you want to use it in a cluster, whereas OrientDB imposes no such restrictions.

Orient is definitely a hybrid - it was a document database before it became a document-graph database, but I believe it can still do everything that n4j can. One of the nicest things about it is that it is object oriented - you can define classes and then extend them, something you cannot do in mongo or any RDBMS that I know of. This makes it very simple to use, because the database structure can accurately reflect your application class structure, without any need for leaky abstractions such as ActiveRecord.


I'd say its a document database with direct links between documents, which can be quickly and easily traversed like a graph database.

The graph API that OrientDB exposes (the TinkerPop api, basically) seems to be built almost as a convention of which links should exist, on top of the document database.

OrientDB is very flexible and powerful because of this: representing your data as linked documents feels really natural.

I've been using RethinkDB lately, and I love it, but having used OrientDB previously, I find the lack of direct links between documents makes for complex and awkward nested queries. I'll continue to happily use RethinkDB, but I'm also eagerly watching OrientDB's progress and expect I'll be using it some more soon.


Nice! I'll definitely look into it in my next project.


it's improving, but is still very focussed on the official Java client. Would expect this to get better before 2.0 comes out.


The rest of JetBrain's products are cross platform, so there's a good chance that this will be in future.


We do have a lot of future plans for Nitra, but for now, it's worth pointing out that the products that are cross platform are Java based, while Nitra is based on .net. The project is currently Windows only.


Interesting, what made you decide on .NET (i.e. given you're predominantly JVM based)? Was it just based on the Nermerle's team preference?


I wouldn't say we're predominantly JVM based. We've also got ReSharper, dotTrace, dotMemory, dotCover and dotPeek, which are all .net based.

But basically, it's because Nitra is an extension and evolution of work done on Nemerle, and Nemerle is a .net language.


Is ReSharper written with C#? I thought I heard it was written with C++.


It's written in C#, with some of the Visual Basic support written in VB. Parts of ReSharper for C++ are written in C++ and C++/CLI.


Given the renewed spirit of open-ness at MS, and more support from Xamarin for Mono, there's a chance that this might be sooner rather than later?


lojack won't work for the reasons you mention, RFID really is the best solution because it's cheap and they don't need to change their existing inventory. There's no need for plastic pallets, they could embed the RFID tags into each of the wooden blocks which make up the corners of the pallet. If one doesn't already exist, it's probably quite simple to produce a nailgun like device which literally shoots an RFID tag into a block of wood, which would make tagging existing pallets straightforward and cheap.

The palettes are cheap enough that they actually don't need the exact location of each of them. All they need is the ability to track pallets at certain points in the supply chain, which will give them a good indication of global pallet movements.

RFID tag readers are also quite cheap so you could potentially fit a lot of them at relatively small expense. They could be embedded into the flooring of trucks, the entrances of warehouses and the arms of forklifts.


The problem with RFID for pallets is that the logistics space is still too decentralized. I work for a company which does a lot of custom RFID integration (we have worked with the companies in the article for tracking pallets.)

First, the RF properties of inserting RFID tags into wooden pallets just doesn't work well; it is far better to stick a label on the outside of the pallet. But then you get into durability issues, etc. So iGPS really had the right idea here, with molding the tags into the actual plastic pallet itself. Great read range.

The other problem is the hugely distributed nature of the supply chain. Pallet poolers like CHEP just don't have the resources to stick an RFID reader at every location that can possibly accept pallets, and distributors / store locations have no incentive to help CHEP out with returning accidentally-delivered CHEP pallets. RFID readers are unfortunately not cheap enough for CHEP to start parking readers everywhere to see where their pallets go.

Trust me, as a manufacturer of RFID readers, our company would absolutely love a scenario where RFID readers start being embedded in every trailer and on every forklift, however realistically that solution is still at least a few years out, and the cost needs to come down probably another order of magnitude to be practical for use in the pallet industry. iGPS was just too early to the game.


thanks for the insight! regarding embedding the tags I was imagining a small device around the size of a large coin with perhaps three prongs / nails attached. The prongs would embed into the wood keeping the tag in place, and the force of installation would depress the device into the wood slightly, but the RFID tag itself would remain on the exterior of the wood, so it should still be readable.


All of the examination of costs in the comments assume a zero cost of enforcement. Free courts, free police, free jailing or fine enforcement of any violators.

Without that free enforcement, these $5-$50 items would not be worth fighting over.

I don't believe that police protection should be a fee-for-service business, but are there no checks and balances on the use of public services for private gain?


Your argument applies to theft of any low value item. If a shopkeeper presses charges against a shoplifter, are they using public services for private gain? Should there be checks in place to stop shopkeepers from reporting too many thieves?


It would seem from the article that the business model not only requires the free protection, but that the enforcement of fines an judgements is a major driver of revenues.

In your hypothetical example, I believe you are referring to a physical storefront where the primary revenue generating activity is to sell merchandise.

If your hypothetical shopkeeper had a shop that made more money from forcing shoplifters to pay a fine for scaling, then... perhaps. I don't think your hypothetical shop exists, so it's tough for me to answer.


he was probably arrogant enough to assume he could do both.


a non trivial percentage of your posts are complaints about the quality of HN submissions, (35% or 50% depending on how you count), maybe you should find another website to read if you dislike this one so much?


Way to answer my question. Thanks.


Those laws were probably not on the books when this crime took place.


Apparently by local custom they were both two years old.


After 2 comes "many."


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