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Well, German law disagrees with you. (And cloudflare operates internationally.)


> This a completely arbitrary exemption.

Laws -- including constitutions -- are in some sense arbitrary.

But actually the distinction between political belief and sexual orientation makes a ton of sense and is not arbitrary.

Avoiding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is super easy and clear-cut.

But it's very hard for me to imagine a world where political belief is a protected class. The category is just way too broad and encompasses basically every legitimate reason you might want to fire someone or turn down a customer.

Every restriction I can think of (e.g., party affiliation) is weak to the point of basically being pointless ("I fired/refused to serve you because you support abortion and because you support theft of my money via taxation, not because you're a democrat").

So although I really do believe that 99.9% of people should not be fired for political beliefs (as long as those beliefs don't interfere with the work place), and that 99.9% of financial transactions should proceed regardless of political beliefs, I still don't think it's workable to make political belief -- writ large -- a protected class.

If we're going to outlaw firing people for political opinions, it might be much easier to just end at-will employment all-together. And if we're going to outlaw discriminating against customers on the basis of political belief, we might as well just force businesses to accept every non-fraudulent client. I don't really think anything less than this -- but which still achieves "no discrimination based on political belief" -- is practically implementable.

So, in my mind, that's the major non-arbitrary distinction. Discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation has a clear bright line. Political discrimination not so much.

And all of the bright line problems aside, there actually is a pretty big non-arbitrary distinction between being gay and being a Nazi. So we can talk about whether that distinction should be codified in non-discrimination law. Or even, in the case of Germany, in criminal law. But the distinction is pretty fucking non-arbitrary...

> Not in the US Constitution either.

Which is why it's legal for bakeries and others to discriminate against LGBT customers in over half of the 50 states. What's your point?


> Why is a debate worse than a discussion?

Debate works really well in two situations:

1. All parties are experienced with debates and enjoy debates. In particular, they can partake in a debate and then, afterward, dispassionately evaluate the arc of the debate; OR

2. The setting is inherently adversarial and there is a third party who will ultimately decide the outcome.

Almost all workplace conversations -- and indeed almost all life conversations -- do not fall into one of these two buckets. In particular:

1. Making use of debate in a search for truth is a difficult and non-universal skill.

For individual debaters to get something out of a debate, they need to know how to disengage from their advocacy and evaluate the arc of the debate from an objective vantage point. This is a skill that requires training. Discussions, on the other hand, allow people to perform this switching between viewpoints as the discussion unfolds. This is much more natural.

2. Adversarial settings create emotional attachment. In debates, people very often become emotionally attached to their arguments and advocacy, causing ego to get in the way of a search for truth. In contrast, discussions do not require a stable advocacy, they are non-adversarial, and no one "wins". These characteristics de-emphasize ego and place the emphasis on whatever actually important issue is at hand.

3. Debates often end up confusing quality of argument with ground truth.

It's always important to remember that constructing arguments is a skill and is time-consuming. It's certainly possible to "win" a debate and still be dead wrong about ground truths -- either by refining debating skill or by throwing more resources into argument construction.

4. Most people don't enjoy debates. I don't have any evidence here, but I think it's probably true. And in a work place, keeping your co-workers happy is probably a lot more important to achieving the company's goals than whatever epsilon benefit debate has over discussion.

Maybe if universities looked more like The Academy everyone would be competent and comfortable in debates, and also understand their inherent limitations as a mechanism in the search for truth. But that's not the world we live in.

So, although I enjoy a good debate as much as the next person, I've found that debates are a truly terrible method for making decisions in most professional settings.


You are actually trying to stifle debate on a topic you think is so self evident that it does not need any... and you are doing it by debating.


I'd say that this conversation fits under the first criteria I listed for circumstances where debate makes sense. Do you disagree?

If you read my post, it's immediately apparent -- from the very first sentence!!! -- that I am not stating that debate is always worse than discussion. I'm providing a list of reasons why debate is often not preferable to discussion, and particularly in workplaces (e.g., bullet point 4).

So I'm not trying to stifle this debate at all. In fact, exactly the opposite. I explicitly identified one class of circumstances -- which encapsulates this thread -- where debate actually works very well.

Rather, I'm explaining why debate is an objectively bad communication mechanism in many circumstances, and particularly in typical work places.

> stifle debate

Return to your original comment.

WHY is stifling debate bad? Basically, because debate forces us to substantiate our beliefs+. Why is substantiating our beliefs good? Presumably because we're interested in truth. So debate is not some inherent good; it's a useful and indeed sometimes indispensable tool for finding truth.

But I've claimed (points 1-4) that debate, in some circumstances, actually actively harms our search for truth. Again, not all circumstances, but some.

So it's very unclear to me why you would claim that stifling debate is a bad thing without responding to my four critiques of debate as a mechanism for finding truth.

Is having debates more important than finding truth? Is robust debate more important than getting things done? ++

> you think is so self evident that it does not need any

Oh cool, now I get to yell at you about dubious unwarranted claims ;-)

--

+ It's possible to have non-argumentative discussions in which everyone is forced to substantiate their claims; this is about good communication and critical thinking, not debate vs. discussion. Backing off from a combative tone is only equivalent to "stifling" when your communication skills are sub-par.

++ Finally, on a personal note, this realization that debate is often counter-productive was a huge turning point in my career and in my personal life. Identifying when debates are and are not appropriate is an important professional and life skill. E.g., I never, ever start a debate when I'm trying to convince someone to change a workplace policy. It's totally and completely unsurprising to me that doing so backfired in a big way, because the same thing has happened to me.


> Even if all you say is true and the guy is an odious anti-feminist, the points he made should be debated and refuted, not silenced.

I strongly disagree with your "even if" hypothetical.

Dialectics are a process for arriving at truth, not the source of truth itself. I think this is something hard-core rationalists often seem to forget.

In terms of time, emotional energy, and so on, evaluating arguments is very expensive.

Ignoring an argument because its source is "odious"ly biased is the political equivalent of using heuristics to prune a huge search space. It may not always give you an optimal answer. But then, climbing every ant hill to the bitter end may not get you to an answer in your lifetime anyways.

And remember, in an argumentative setting, the search space is adversarially constructed. So you can actually be pretty damn certain that without heuristics, you'll never find the truth.

> this is not reason enough to assume the worst

The degree to which people are "assuming the worst" seems to be one of the major sources of disagreement.

FWIW I don't think many of Damore's detractors are "assuming the worst" from the outset. Complaints about the essay tend to identify specific claims, specific phrases, specific arguments that serve as heuristics for choosing not to continue evaluating the argument in good faith.

You can argue against those heuristics all you want, but I don't think that this argument is even possible to have without some heuristics. Case in point: Damore uses his own set of totally unsound heuristics (see e.g., the complaining about "political correctness", the graphs that are actually just pictorial representations of prior assumptions, and so on).


> Ignoring an argument because its source is "odious"ly biased is the political equivalent of using heuristics to prune a huge search space.

You're proving Damore's point. You refuse to consider his arguments because of your prejudiced, emotional reaction. This is patently irrational.

> It may not always give you an optimal answer. But then, climbing every ant hill to the bitter end may not get you to an answer in your lifetime anyways.

This is a strawman and an argument to absurdity, i.e. also irrational.

> So you can actually be pretty damn certain that without heuristics, you'll never find the truth.

You'll never find the truth if you irrationally dismiss arguments that oppose your prejudiced opinions--unless, of course, you've already arrived at the truth. But believing you've already arrived at the truth would be arrogant and closed-minded, right?


> You refuse to consider his arguments because of your prejudiced, emotional reaction

GP gave a hypothetical, and I'm responding to that hypothetical.

In fact, I did not refuse to consider his arguments. I considered them. They're poorly sourced, terribly reasoned, and not very well communicated. FWIW I do feel bad that they guy lost his job for what amounts to poor communication, worse argumentation skills, and a misplaced belief that engineers are special enough to be exempt from the generally shitty employee/employer relationship as it exists in the USA.

But that's all beside the point, because I'm responding to a hypothetical.

> You'll never find the truth if you irrationally dismiss arguments

My point is that you'll ALSO never find truth if you climb every adversary-constructed hill in the state space. Your suggested method for finding truth is even worse than mine, and what's more, you're claiming the opposite.

I'm at least admitting that I have to use heuristics. You're just watching the tower of exponentials crank up and claiming "no problem! We can compute that!"

> But believing you've already arrived at the truth would be arrogant and closed-minded, right?

It's possible to remain open to new ideas and also not waste time on evaluating or responding to arguments that aren't motivated by a genuine search for truth. (Again, this comment was in response to a hypothetical.)

I highly doubt you actually disagree with me in practice, because such a life would surely doom you to misery and unemployment. Do you spend all your free time reading and/or responding to arguments from flat earthers, BS science posted on white supremacy forums, and marketing claims made by infomercials and bill boards? Do you engage with every crank preacher and evangelist who comes to your door or yells at you on the street? Of course not.


> In fact, I did not refuse to consider his arguments. I considered them. They're poorly sourced, terribly reasoned, and not very well communicated.

There are prominent, respected authorities and experts on both sides of the political spectrum who disagree with you, ones who have explained in detail why they disagree with you. What do you think about that?

> My point is that you'll ALSO never find truth if you climb every adversary-constructed hill in the state space.

I feel like you didn't read my comment, because you're repeating your previous argument: "...climbing every ant hill to the bitter end may not get you to an answer in your lifetime anyways," to which I responded, "This is a strawman and an argument to absurdity, i.e. also irrational."

> Your suggested method for finding truth is even worse than mine, and what's more, you're claiming the opposite.

Again, I feel like you didn't read my comment. Where did I suggest such a method?

> I'm at least admitting that I have to use heuristics. You're just watching the tower of exponentials crank up and claiming "no problem! We can compute that!"

Where did I say that?

> It's possible to remain open to new ideas and also not waste time on evaluating or responding to arguments that aren't motivated by a genuine search for truth.

I agree with this.

However, you are jumping to a conclusion by assuming that he is not interested in the truth. It is quite arrogant of you, to assume you know what is in his mind and heart. This is not good faith on your part.

> Do you spend all your free time reading and/or responding to arguments from flat earthers, BS science posted on white supremacy forums, and marketing claims made by infomercials and bill boards? Do you engage with every crank preacher and evangelist who comes to your door or yells at you on the street? Of course not.

Once again you prove Damore's point: by equating him with such people, and equating his memo with such things, you are evincing an emotional, prejudiced overreaction and stubborn refusal to seriously consider his arguments.


> There are prominent, respected authorities and experts on both sides of the political spectrum who disagree with you

Disagree with my about what? I think it would be helpful if you put in words the claim you think I'm making. I feel that we're talking past one another because you think I'm talking about Damore when in fact I'm responding to a hypothetical posited by another commenter.

> This is a strawman and an argument to absurdity, i.e. also irrational.

I don't pay attention to Nazi's scientific arguments for racism, anti-feminist's claims that women are incapable of certain tasks, or infomercials' claims about how amazing a product is. In each situation the signal-to-noise ratio is intractable and the arguments are not made from the position of a genuine search for truth. I'm better off encountering that evidence in other contexts presented by genuine actors, or simply never seeing it at all. Not all arguments are helpful. Some are intentionally crafted to distract and obscure.

If you think that makes me irrational, so be it. Your disagreement strikes me as hopelessly naive. I'd rather behave irrationally than waste my life chasing down the errors in arguments made by biased idiots who have no problem with lying to advance their ideology.

> Again, I feel like you didn't read my comment. Where did I suggest such a method?

Well if you have no better method then I'm not really sure what I'm supposed to do. Give up on truth?

> However, you are jumping to a conclusion by assuming that he is not interested in the truth

Please read the entire thread. I am assuming this because it is posited as a hypothetical!

I fact, I do not believe this is true in Damore's case. But it is certainly true in the case of many people who are defending Damore (eg Mike Cernovich), and I don't think taking their arguments on face value is worth the time or effort. They are not interested in truth, they are interested in power, so their arguments are pointless if what you're interested in is truth.

But again, nowhere in this thread have I stated anything about Damore. I was responding to a hypothetical.

> by equating him with such people

Again, I was responding to a hypothetical!!!


I was responding to a hypothetical!!!


Empirical consequentialism does not have a monopoly on "reason", "science", or "logical arguments". In fact, computational complexity theory and modern mathematical logic provide, IMO, some of the most compelling arguments against the idea that we can make good rational decisions without value systems and moral codes (aka heuristics for an otherwise intractable problem).


Tell me, what intractable problem are "value systems" and "moral codes" heuristics for? The hypothetico-dialectical method of talking about morality, as if it was simultaneously mathematics and politics, has always confused me. Plainly there ought to be some observable evidence that we've done the right thing, or the term "right" has no meaning at all other than "theorem within a politically fashionable consistent axiom schema."


> Tell me, what intractable problem are "value systems" and "moral codes" heuristics for?

Suppose you already have a solution in-hand for determining what the "best world" is, and everyone agrees on this definition of what is "right" and "good".

Now, can you calculate with any accuracy what actions each person should take in order for us all to arrive at that "best world"?

I think it's clear to most people who have taken an algorithms course that such a calculation -- even with perfect knowledge about the current and future state of the world -- is completely and totally intractable. (And besides, it doesn't take an algorithms course to notice we don't have that perfect knowledge; I don't even know if it will rain this afternoon.)

Value systems and moral codes -- e.g., "no stealing and no murdering except in X,Y,Z cases" -- provide us with a set of heuristics that while perhaps not optimal at least seem to keep us in decently good steady states for a while.

> The hypothetico-dialectical method of talking about morality, as if it was simultaneously mathematics and politics, has always confused me.

The point is to explore the theoretical limits of what's even possible. If we can show that something is impossible even in a highly idealized setting, then we can probably conclude that the same thing is impossible in more messy settings.

Of course, "all models are wrong" and all that.

But if pure consequentialism doesn't work well even in the most ideal of settings, that might be a good indicator that it also doesn't work well in far more messy settings.

> Plainly there ought to be some observable evidence that we've done the right thing

Why is that so "plain"? Besides, "what should I do?" is a far more... timely... question than "did I just do the right thing?"

> or the term "right" has no meaning at all other than "theorem within a politically fashionable consistent axiom schema."

Outside of religious and spiritual folks, I think most people agree that morality is socially constructed.


>Suppose you already have a solution in-hand for determining what the "best world" is, and everyone agrees on this definition of what is "right" and "good".

It doesn't matter whether people agree with it. It matters whether it's actually correct, and actually refers to real things.

>Outside of religious and spiritual folks, I think most people agree that morality is socially constructed.

Then stop talking about morality already. There's no point in spending massive sums of effort, money, and even military manpower on made-up constructions if you know damn well they're made up.

(Mind, I don't think morality is made up: I'm a moral realist. Of course, religious folks aren't moral realists, they're usually just plain confused about what counts as "real", as are you, since you appear to think "real morality" means "morality enforced by a giant authority figure in the sky".)


> It matters whether it's actually correct, and actually refers to real things.

You're completely missing my point.

Replace the quoted sentence with "Suppose you already have an actually correct morality that refers to real things". The computational intractability argument remains a damning condemnation of consequentialism. Just because you can state the theorem doesn't mean you can find the witnessing construction.

> Then stop talking about morality already

Just because things are socially constructed doesn't mean they aren't valuable, and it also doesn't mean that they have no effect on our lives.

> There's no point in spending massive sums of effort, money, and even military manpower on made-up constructions if you know damn well they're made up.

Why not?

Why can't we just say some things are "self-evident" and worth fighting for?

And if this is true, then why are moral considerations such potent rhetorical devices? The only possible explanation I can think of is extraordinarily condescending.

> I'm a moral realist

Now I'm even more confused.

First, the realists play this game all the time; each branch of moral realism basically corresponds to a different -- usually embarrassingly pseudo-scientific -- way of justifying a priori ethical concerns.

From my perspective, moral realism isn't an escape from the problem; it's just a way of ignoring the actually hard problem and playing games that are completely parametric in the actually hard problems.

Second, the view of morality as a social construction isn't even inconsistent with moral realism as long as you're willing to go past whatever nice distinctions make for easy-to-grade multiple choice exams in PHIL 101. E.g., one plausible (and, per usual, embarrassingly pseudo-scientific) hypothesis bridging this divide is that morality is a social construction that necessarily arises from ethical intuitions that have a physiological basis.


>Why can't we just say some things are "self-evident" and worth fighting for?

Because nothing is actually self-evident in the real world. It's all still made out of meat, with no convenient teletypes up to Plato's Heaven where the Self-Evident Propositions, Ideal Forms, and A Prioris live. "Self-evident and worth fighting for" isn't a factual claim, it's an effort to persuade people to believe (what you label) a delusion.

>And if this is true, then why are moral considerations such potent rhetorical devices? The only possible explanation I can think of is extraordinarily condescending.

Well, there are three possibilities here:

* Typical antirealism. Moral appeals are in fact appeals to ontological delusion. This sounds condescending, but it's the corner you back yourself into by trying to have your moral appeals and your anti-realism at the same time. You're the one saying, "let's appeal to morality, but only ever to my morality, left completely unaccountable to external facts beyond my intuitions." If you tried that in math, physics, sociology, psychology -- you'd be thrown out of the room.

* Moral appeals are used as verbal shortcuts to ultimately nonmoral things. For example, the moral stricture "do not harm the innocent" may ground out in "I feel empathetic pain when I see children get hurt". In this case, the moral appeal has a little bit more actual force, since it grounds out in a real motivation to which we can actually, well, appeal. In fact, if we can manage to talk about the rational content of that empathetic pain (something which antirealists vehemently disavow but which basically the entire rest of humanity for all of history upheld), we can achieve...

* Moral realism: moral appeals work because they appeal to real things that have motivational power. The empathetic pain is a real moral motivation, pain is bad, especially when the damage it accompanies is too permanent for it to be a learning experience. This is the typical view among basically everyone who hasn't been carefully trained to pooh-pooh our innate emotions and motivations as having no normative force, and remains the majority opinion among both professional ethicists and laypeople.

>First, the realists play this game all the time; each branch of moral realism basically corresponds to a different -- usually embarrassingly pseudo-scientific -- way of justifying a priori ethical concerns.

Well, I usually don't see the pseudo-scientific ones. I usually see the pseudo-mathematical ones. But oh well, my ethical concerns are a posteriori, just like my epistemological, uh, knowledge.

Mind, if I want to be dickishly precise, I'm a realist about value and interests at the organismic level, and merely observe that moral norms and imperatives at the social level often have deep anthropological reasons that ground out in the genuine interests of the individuals involved. Where they don't, those norms and imperatives tend to get changed over time.

That might be a form of constructivism at the social level, but constructivism isn't really a form of realism or antirealism (it roughly says, "morality comes from running this algorithm on these data, but you might need some nonmoral interest to get someone running the algorithm at all), and it's actually different from naive social constructionism ("people make up morality, agree tentatively on things, and then use it to persuade each-other about stuff").

>From my perspective, moral realism isn't an escape from the problem; it's just a way of ignoring the actually hard problem and playing games that are completely parametric in the actually hard problems.

Would you care to pose the actual hard problem, then?

>E.g., one plausible (and, per usual, embarrassingly pseudo-scientific) hypothesis bridging this divide is that morality is a social construction that necessarily arises from ethical intuitions that have a physiological basis.

That would still be a typical antirealist view, since it says that morality arises in a way that has nothing to do with moral facts as such.

(The nasty tricky part is what you're willing to count as a moral or normative fact in the first place. Fix that and the questions get a lot clearer. Make that slippery and you get hundreds of years of philosophizing instead of knowing what to do.)


> That might be a form of constructivism at the social level, but constructivism isn't really a form of realism or antirealism...

Isn't this exactly my point?

> Would you care to pose the actual hard problem, then?

Where the hell does your moral truth come from?

The way I see it, we actually operate in exactly the same way. The only difference is that I don't pretend that arbitrary things aren't arbitrary.

> I'm a realist about value and interests at the organismic level, and merely observe that moral norms and imperatives at the social level often have deep anthropological reasons that ground out in the genuine interests of the individuals involved.

This kind of inexact hand waving is exactly what I meant when I said "pseudo-scientific BS".


>Where the hell does your moral truth come from?

It's built into our everyday physical reality, or it is bullshit.


This is my point. Moral realism grounds out the same place that religion does -- it's real or it isn't. God (some moral truth) exists, and it is this particular God (moral truth). Or God doesn't exist. The choice is yours, and it's completely arbitrary. A matter of personal faith, no more and no less.

Moral realism has no epistemic superiority. It's just as "bullshit" as everything else; the rotten core of bullshit is just hidden under a bunch of layers of deduction.

I prefer to air the dirty laundry; realists are uncomfortable by stained underwear and would prefer to play logical games on top of an edifice without thinking too much about the sand underneath their feet.

But at the core all systems of morality have the same problem. Realism is no escape. In fact, IMO, it's worse than a mistake because it provides the illusion of solving an insurmountable problems.

I guess it comes down to this: "I choose to believe in God and I know that belief is arbitrary" is to me by far the most compelling apology. Things like Goedel's proof just make me yawn and squint.


> It doesn't matter whether people agree with it. It matters whether it's actually correct, and actually refers to real things.

This debate suggests that is not a safe assumption.

> There's no point

If it redirects money, there certainly is a point.


If someone is redirecting money by reference to things which apparently do not exist, it should be pointed out that they're duping everyone else, and that, so to speak, humanity will not be free until the last stone of the last church is cast upon the last priest.

Or people could just admit moral realism every time they try to argue moral stuff. You know. Alternatives.


> Or is it just something CEOs decide on a case-by-case basis after considering the degree of media outcry and misrepresentation involved?

Welcome to at-will employment without organized labor.

It has always been this way and always will be, a few nice and/or complacent CEOs not withstanding.


> Damore actually wrote his memo as a response to Google soliciting feedback. So he in fact got the "license" that you talk about from Google.

As an aside, this is an extraordinary dangerous assumption for an employee to make. Suggestion boxes aren't magical shields from blowback.

Tenure exists for a good reason, and parent's point is well-taken. If you aren't tenured (or even if you are), you should probably assume that you have to play a careful political game if you want to stay employed.

(I'm not making any judgement, just stating some IMO facts.)


That's true. But humans can't have it both ways. If you obfuscate the language, you are at risk of someone not understanding it and taking it literally. And then a hypocrisy can be revealed.

In one of the previous discussions, I linked to Charta 77. These guys did the same thing - they took the Czechoslovak government for the word that it respects human rights, because it was a signatory of some human rights agreements. They were persecuted.

The same problem you have with tenure. You are saying professors are protected with tenure, but are they really? Unless someone tests the boundaries, then you don't know if it really protects you. So assuming tenure will protect you is, likewise, a dangerous assumption.

Addendum: I would also like to point out this excellent book: https://www.amazon.com/Mistakes-Were-Made-But-Not/dp/1491514... That's why Google cannot change its mind even if it wanted to, sadly.


Again, I wasn't making any judgement one way or the other.

I'm just observing it's extremely naive to believe that a solicitation for feedback in an employment setting is somehow an invitation to free speech.


> Again, I wasn't making any judgement one way or the other.

I wasn't implying you did.

> solicitation for feedback in an employment setting is somehow an invitation to free speech

Without further qualification, in a literal sense, it is "invitation to free speech". That's the problem.


> Without further qualification

"The society you live in" and "a basic understanding of how the world works" are always that most important qualifications on any invitation to share your opinion.


>> The intent of the author isn't included when the reader interprets their work, because the author isn't there[1] to explain their intent

This is not a recommendation, and it is not a value judgement. It's just a reality.


This could be overcome by and large with a modicum of research and critical thinking.


> ...a modicum of research and critical thinking.

You're assuming that each piece of text has only a single possible interpretation when "research and critical thinking" are applied to its interpretation.

This is so far from the truth I'm not really sure what to say.

For the current topic, see e.g., https://www.quora.com/What-do-scientists-think-about-the-bio... You'd be hard pressed -- or perhaps simply obstinate -- to claim this piece is devoid of "research" or "critical thinking".

Beyond the current topic, your opinion becomes so obviously false I really don't know what to even say. As a base-line example, let's take any pair of 5-4 SCOTUS opinions on a constitutional matter. I suppose it's possible that half of the supreme court justices (and often slightly different halves) are routinely incapable of critical thinking of research to the text of laws and of the consitution. But that seems like an exceptionally arrogant explanation.

Believing "only my reading of the text is possible if you're remotely capable of research and critical thinking" is, for an author, an extraordinarily enormous mistake.


No, it can't. This is a fundamental limit of language, because language itself - which you're using to accomplish your research - requires using imperfect symbols.

If you don't mind 100% spoilers for Davey Wreden's game "The Beginner's Guide", I highly recommend watching "The Artist is Absent"[1]. It's a surprisingly good introduction to semiotics, death of the author, and enunciation theory, which together explain why you can interpret the narrator of a work, which should never be confused with the author.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4N6y6LEwsKc


> He sourced all of his claims

He didn't actually cite anything, though [1]. He used a bunch of bracketed numbers [2] to look scientistic, but didn't actually provide [3] substantive evidence [5,7,8,6,5,4,3]

Also, I can "source all my claims" and vehemently defend the Nazis. "Source your claims" is the middle school grammar teacher equivalent of "provide substantive evidence and use careful language when writing publicly on sensitive issues". In other words, kinda juvenile.

FWIW I don't think people should be fired for political beliefs, but the actual memo wasn't "well-sourced" and was the author was clearly trolling. I've heard the whole "google is a utopia" thing, but I can't imagine posting something like that in a work context even in the most liberal office environment...

> and himself has a Ph.D in Biology

IMO this makes the whole thing much more embarrassing for the author [9].

--

[1] If by "cite" you mean provide evidence.

[2] It is perfectly OK to use bracketed numbers for footnotes as well as citations, of course. But footnotes are not citations.

[3] If you're going to appeal to authority, at least actually appeal to an authority other than "additional ramblings.

[4-8] Don't dare disagree!

[9] Especially copious footnotes presented in a way that implies they're citations.

[10] There's some PG essay about this.


>He didn't actually cite anything, though [1]. He used a bunch of bracketed numbers [2] to look scientistic, but didn't actually provide [3] substantive evidence [5,7,8,6,5,4,3]

What are you talking about? He absolutely linked to all his citations, the fake news Gizmodo stripped out all of his citations/links and graphs when they published the memo.

Here is the full memo with all the links preserved: https://diversitymemo.com/


I read the full memo; the use of these things [1] is exactly as I describe.

> He absolutely linked to all his citations

Aside from non-sourced footnotes, the "sources" are for the most part hyperlinks to wikipedia articles, news articles, and position papers.

These aren't sources. Source substantiate claims. A list of people who agree with you is not a "source".

Also, the ACTUAL CLAIM -- that the set of uncontroversial differences between the sexes can explain gender disparity in tech -- IS entirely unsourced.


Considering it was the body text of the memo, and someone probably just copy/pasted it into an e-mail, I think what Gizmodo published was less fake than to call it "fake news."

There was a memo. Gizmodo thought they had the full text. They actually only had the body text. That's pretty darn close.


That is a blatant lie. Gizmodo explicitly stated that they stripped references and diagrams:

"Two charts and several hyperlinks are also omitted." [1]

[1] https://www.gizmodo.com.au/2017/08/exclusive-heres-the-full-...


Okay, so your argument is that it's "fake news" because Gizmodo nefariously stripped hyperlinks while openly telling everybody about it? Or was that note added later?

I still think it's clearly attributable to ignorance rather than malice because presenting the text of a document is not uncommon to do; the fact that it changed the tone of the memo is unfortunate, but doesn't make the news "fake"


> This case isn't about that

No. It was about fraud.

Why should we NOT punish people for fraud?

The ways that question are answered in this thread prove your assertion is false. This case IS about that, because without that, he'd just be one more pennyless felon.


> Why should we NOT punish people for fraud?

Who said he shouldn't be punished? I simply stated that since he made restitution prior to charges being brought, perhaps that should factor into sentencing. I don't know who you're arguing against, or what you're really arguing, but it doesn't seem to have anything to do with what I've been talking about.


> I simply stated that since he made restitution prior to charges being brought, perhaps that should factor into sentencing.

Restitution isn't the only reason for punishment.

> I don't know who you're arguing against, or what you're really arguing

That he's clearly unapologetic and simply got lucky, and that this should factor into sentencing.


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