> It would be solution aversion if you denied that the rate of suicides has been growing because you perceive that the main use of citing an increasing suicide rate is to push homeopathic education.
It's not as I understood it. Solution aversion would be denying that the rate of suicides has increased just because I don't think anybody should be administered psychological well being tests. Maybe because I'm secretly afraid that the effectiveness of those tests would prove my ideologically-motivated position wrong. Other than that, I shouldn't be able to provide much logical support for my stance.
> If your aversion to certain proponents relates back to what it is they are proposing, it is not really an aversion to those proponents but to their proposals.
If it were just an aversion to their proposals, it wouldn't reflect itself onto the statement that is ultimately being denied. I could be completely averse to the teaching of homeopathy, but that wouldn't influence my attitude towards the stated problem. In order to be so, there might have to be the relation:
Proposed solution -> assessment of the proponent -> assessment of their original statement.
> because Obama (or black people, "liberals" etc.) had made that claim, independent of the qualities of proposed solutions.
The proposed solution in fact allows me to place the proponent into a classification bin: scientist vs homeopath, conservative vs liberal, alarmist vs denialist. Or just savy vs fool.
> shouldn't normally mean that "Obama says that P" is evidence of not-P.
Not strictly, but remember that, in general terms, non-P is not equally probable to P. P is a specific statement about reality; non-P is any possible other configuration of reality that negates P. That's why the burden of the proof is generally on who makes assertions, not on who denies them.
It's not as I understood it. Solution aversion would be denying that the rate of suicides has increased just because I don't think anybody should be administered psychological well being tests. Maybe because I'm secretly afraid that the effectiveness of those tests would prove my ideologically-motivated position wrong. Other than that, I shouldn't be able to provide much logical support for my stance.
> If your aversion to certain proponents relates back to what it is they are proposing, it is not really an aversion to those proponents but to their proposals.
If it were just an aversion to their proposals, it wouldn't reflect itself onto the statement that is ultimately being denied. I could be completely averse to the teaching of homeopathy, but that wouldn't influence my attitude towards the stated problem. In order to be so, there might have to be the relation:
Proposed solution -> assessment of the proponent -> assessment of their original statement.
> because Obama (or black people, "liberals" etc.) had made that claim, independent of the qualities of proposed solutions.
The proposed solution in fact allows me to place the proponent into a classification bin: scientist vs homeopath, conservative vs liberal, alarmist vs denialist. Or just savy vs fool.
> shouldn't normally mean that "Obama says that P" is evidence of not-P.
Not strictly, but remember that, in general terms, non-P is not equally probable to P. P is a specific statement about reality; non-P is any possible other configuration of reality that negates P. That's why the burden of the proof is generally on who makes assertions, not on who denies them.