I wonder if reframing the debate a little might help everyone realize that what Apple is doing doesn't actually impede law enforcement, and that iCloud backups actually can help them (a lot).
This is simple:
1. Most people will not actually "go dark" because the consequence of going dark is you lose everything if you lose your password. That severe consequence for a relatively common human error is not a good fit for most people's personal records and photographic life memories.
The right fit for most people is
(a) unbreakable security on their physical devices so they don't have to worry about getting hacked if they lose them, plus
(b) cloud backup that can be recovered by a trusted custodian, so they don't have to worry if they lose their password.
And that is exactly what Apple is providing. Law enforcement will still be able to go after their backups.
2. As for the case where someone really does want to "go dark", weakening physical device security isn't going to stop them. They will simply use alternative encryption software. Law enforcement still can't get it. So why make everyone more vulnerable to the hacking of stolen devices?
Case in point: law enforcement did get access to the terrorist's last iCloud backup. And if he turned off backups with the conscious intention of going dark, then even if Apple made that impossible on the iPhone, he would have simply used a different solution (e.g. not use the phone for secret info or use a different, secure phone with open source software if necessary, etc.)
Good points. Read the hearing transcripts. This is the position that Apple's specialist takes (but without as much details of Cloud backups) and pointed that they have helped in all ways other than the one thing it cannot do due by design. Thus they conclude the requests are to set a legal precedent.
I suspect a data breach or exploit of cloud storage or other service providers is more likely for most consumers than an attack on their device following theft or loss.
For both privacy and protection against criminals, cloud storage must become as impregnable as our physical devices. Do we truly lack the will or creativity to produce custodians who cannot recover our data without our permission?
> Do we truly lack the will or creativity to produce custodians who cannot recover our data without our permission?
It depends what you mean by permission. If you mean it's physically impossible, those exist, but then they can't help you if you forget your password so it's probably not the right option for most people.
This is simple:
1. Most people will not actually "go dark" because the consequence of going dark is you lose everything if you lose your password. That severe consequence for a relatively common human error is not a good fit for most people's personal records and photographic life memories.
The right fit for most people is
(a) unbreakable security on their physical devices so they don't have to worry about getting hacked if they lose them, plus
(b) cloud backup that can be recovered by a trusted custodian, so they don't have to worry if they lose their password.
And that is exactly what Apple is providing. Law enforcement will still be able to go after their backups.
2. As for the case where someone really does want to "go dark", weakening physical device security isn't going to stop them. They will simply use alternative encryption software. Law enforcement still can't get it. So why make everyone more vulnerable to the hacking of stolen devices?
Case in point: law enforcement did get access to the terrorist's last iCloud backup. And if he turned off backups with the conscious intention of going dark, then even if Apple made that impossible on the iPhone, he would have simply used a different solution (e.g. not use the phone for secret info or use a different, secure phone with open source software if necessary, etc.)