What is your basis for calling the NSA petty? Or claiming it was a personal grudge?
On technical grounds the NSA's position makes sense. Baseband compromises are viable and an active threat, cellphone OS software compromises are also viable and an active threat, so effectively every wireless device inside of a SCIF could be turned into a bug at any minute.
Additionally the NSA doesn't let wireless devices into ANY SCIF, by Clinton or anyone else. Only the US president himself is the exception to this rule and even then we're talking about a specific device designed for official functions only.
What is your basis for calling the NSA petty? Or claiming it was a personal grudge?
There may have been valid (short-term) reasons as to why it would have been difficult (or costly) to provide her with a POTUS-like solution.
But the overall sense I get from the article (and in my view, the bigger issue at play here) is that Clinton and her secure technology coordinator (Donald Reid) felt they weren't being given a credible explanation as to why their request would be unworkable. And (subjectively) felt they were being ignored generally with regard to their request.
(And BTW no, the partial explanation they were given -- "use has expanded to an unmanageable number of users" -- meaning presumably legions of underlings probably shouldn't have been granted exceptions in the first place, is not, on the face of it, a credible explanation as to why an exception can't be granted for the 2nd most important office holder in the Executive Branch).
Only the US president himself is the exception to this rule
Umm, what "rule", and why is the POTUS the only exception?
These are the questions that Clinton and Reid were apparently unable to get an answer to.
> Umm, what "rule", and why is the POTUS the only exception?
Taking wireless devices into the SCIF. And because POTUS has a national security need for immediate communications (because they're the head of the military, have access to the football, and may need to make key strategic decisions).
The key question is: Are you going to risk more lives and save more lives by allowing potential bugs into the state's SCIF? Leaks from within a SCIF could almost certainly get people killed (foreign agents, US agents, US military personnel), the key question is if the Secretary of State can save enough lives by being instantly accessible in that one area?
> These are the questions that Clinton and Reid were apparently unable to get an answer to.
Or they received an answer but either didn't understand the answer or just didn't like it. There are a lot of people who claim that their issues are never addressed just because they don't understand the answer to the question they're asked.
I'm sure the NSA gave them a full report on why cellphones are risky and how they can be compromised. But I don't know if that information was received by state or understood.
By "rule" I was referring to the criteria by which exceptions were granted. I'll grant that wasn't clear in my language, but that's what I was driving at.
Because [the] POTUS has a national security need for immediate communications because they're the head of the military, have access to the football, and may need to make key strategic decisions).
The Secretary of State's job is also quite important, you know. They're also pretty high up in the chain-of-succession for direct access to the same duties as the POTUS.
Or they received an answer but either didn't understand the answer or just didn't like it. ... I'm sure the NSA gave them a full report on why cellphones are risky and how they can be compromised. But I don't know if that information was received by state or understood.
Drawing from the trove of recently released emails, the article itself says that most likely they were informed of (and understood -- or at least her staff understood -- the risks of) using private cellphones ("her staff was fully aware of the security risks associated with using her BlackBerry.") What they didn't understand is why a modified cellphone was considered a secure enough solution both for the POTUS, and for the predecessor SoS -- but not for the current one.
As to whether Clinton herself really understood the risks, or she did, why she continued to use a non-secured device, anyway?
That I don't know -- and I won't offer any defense for, either.
"These are the questions that Clinton and Reid were apparently unable to get an answer to."
So they just decided to do whatever they wanted because they feel that they are above the system.
I can't avoid asking myself what would happen if, some subordinate of them, just thought that some rule in their department was stupid and decided not to follow it.
Again, I see no defense whatsoever for the course of action Clinton ultimately took, both in regard to her BlackBerry and in setting up her personal email server.
No, the NSA was being petty.
Worse than that, actually. Most likely whoever made this decision had some kind of a personal grudge.