The argument is that you are likely to be in a simulation, because most minds will be simulated minds. The precondition of most minds being simulated is massive computing power. If we can run a simulation but it requires half the world's computational resources and simulates one second per century of real time, then obviously most minds (and most moments of lived experience) would not be simulated.
> The precondition of most minds being simulated is massive computing power.
How so? I'm still not following the logic here. AFACS it does not matter how fast anything runs -- a simulation always proceeds a tick at a time. The simulated reality cannot (almost by definition) observe time at a smaller time scale.
The argument is that as a conscious being, your prior expectation of "where you are" should be a uniform distribution over all conscious beings. So the idea that you are "probably" in a simulation relies on the assumption that there will be more conscious beings inside simulations than in the top-level "real" universe.
> So the idea that you are "probably" in a simulation relies on the assumption that there will be more conscious beings inside simulations than in the top-level "real" universe.
I mean I can sort-of-see-it if this is the assumption, but the assumption itself seems quite circular to me.
EDIT: I also don't understand how this is connected to my point about speed-of-simulation, but...
