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> How am I going to explain this to my wife?

Someone has discovered a computational equivalent of bypassing tamper-proof seals, but only a specific brand of seals (SHA1) which is very currently popular. Other types of seals still work fine. This means we can no longer trust if the cake from the baker hasn't been tampered with even though the packaging it comes in has an intact SHA1 seal, we should therefore demand that the baker start using SHA256 seals lest we get poisoned by the delivery boy who wants to steal the shiny PS4 he noticed the other day.

Edit: perhaps delivery boy underplays how costly the attack currently is. Perhaps make the poisoner a person of means who wants inheritance money. As the attack costs go down, even delivery boys will start to afford it, multiplying the risk.



Er, if I'm following your metaphor correctly, you seem to be implying that if I create something and "seal" it, then send it along, that you can no longer trust it because someone may have tampered with it. That is not an accurate assessment of this vulnerability. The attacker needs to construct both the "good" and the "bad" document in order for this to work.

In non-technical terms I guess it's more like getting a document notarized with an embossed stamp or something, and this vulnerability is something that allows you to create a special document where you can get the stamp to apply to two documents at the same time (maybe one of them could be a document accepting $100 inheritence, and the hidden one is a document signing over the title of your house).

It's a bit hard to explain why this matters because most people have no non-technical equivalent of the sort of thing that this would matter for, because people use fuzzy social proofs where forgery isn't out of the question anyway (even notarized documents don't really have any indication of the contents of the document, as far as I can tell).




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