No. The plantiff made two key claims: breach of contract and copyright infringment. This is sensible, because the defendant has either accepted the GPL (and thus is in breach of contract), or has infringed copyright. This is key to the mechanism of copyleft. By suing for both, the defendant cannot just choose whichever is the most convenient and win on the technicality that the other was not considered by the court.
The judge ruled that the claim of breach of contract cannot be dismissed on the basis that the contract does not exist, because the defendant has effectively admitted that it did exist.
The judge also ruled that the claim of copyright cannot be dismissed on the basis of jurisdiction.
None of these things relate to the enforceability of the GPL in general.
I don't think you're wrong, I just think you're splitting hairs. The order says the license is a contract that exists, sure. Contracts are enforceable.
"...I just think you're splitting hairs." And splitting hairs is pretty much what the legal system is about.
It matters. The difference is the defendant said "yes, we entered a contract" and not that the judge ruled "whether you admit it or not, you entered a contract." The former does not set legal precedent. The latter probably does.
I see no justification for the arm of that 'iff' which is equivalent to "if what the plaintiff says is not true, then it is not the case that a contract probably exists".
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s reliance on
the unsigned GNU GPL fails to plausibly demonstrate
mutual assent, that is, the existence of a contract.
Not so. The GNU GPL, which is attached to the
complaint, provides that the Ghostscript user agrees
to its terms if the user does not obtain a
commercial license. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
used Ghostscript, did not obtain a commercial
license, and represented publicly that its use of
Ghostscript was licensed under the GNL GPU. These
allegations sufficiently plead the existence of a
contract. See, e.g., MedioStream, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 507, 519 (E.D. Tex. 2010)
(concluding that the software owner had adequately
pled a claim for breach of a shrink-wrap license).
Note the part that:
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
used Ghostscript, did not obtain a commercial
license, and represented publicly that its use of
Ghostscript was licensed under the GNL GPU. These
allegations sufficiently plead the existence of a
contract."
IE if what the plaintiff said is true, it's a contract.
I see nothing in the decision that says the court would have found a contract without these allegations being true.
> I see nothing in the decision that says the court would have found a contract without these allegations being true.
Parent is nitpicking the different between the court ruling that the contract is likely to exists and the contract actually existing. For the former, plaintiff's allegations are absolutely necessary, for the latter - not so much.
In a sense, one can't say that "only if plaintiff's allegations are true, a contract exists" because plaintiff's arguments can be bullshit and the contract may still be valid for other reasons, even if no court would recognize it without proper evidence.
Hope that helps. And yes, it is a nitpick on the semantics of logic. Parent understands what the court ruled, the issue was solely with your post being (possibly amusingly) ambiguous to people dealing with too much formal logic.
It may seem like "splitting hairs," but it's basic legal analysis. Learning when a contract is formed (which is the question at issue here; it's not about the substantive terms of the contract) is covered in everyone's first year of law school. And learning how contract and copyright relate is covered in the second or third year of law school, depending on when you take the course.
The judge ruled that the claim of breach of contract cannot be dismissed on the basis that the contract does not exist, because the defendant has effectively admitted that it did exist.
The judge also ruled that the claim of copyright cannot be dismissed on the basis of jurisdiction.
None of these things relate to the enforceability of the GPL in general.