So we are investing dollars in NSA so they make tools that bring us damage? I think there should be a limit on how long they can keep their "secrets". Snowden already showed that information can go outside, so any information will be leaked at some time. The society has much more to win when the software defects are repaired instead of used for hacking.
I think that all these NSA problems show bad management. They should be reorganized, or maybe even abandoned. They cost more than they deliver, and even costed us our privacy. Probably they are still breaking US and international laws on that. Breaking up NSA can allow the FBI and (open) security companies to take over the cybersecurity.
I suspect that we will soon have leaks of CIA tools too. But thanks to wikileaks companies can prepare for these future problems.
We can go deeper into who got these tools and who is using them. Some may even argue that the CIA leaked the NSA tools to weaken the NSA. Or worse, that some in the NSA want to create cyber chaos to push for more control over the internet in the future.
The article mentions the popular political scapegoats, and as usual this is just speculation. To solve NSA's problem we have to request very concrete evidence, otherwise we are just being played with.
Article: > The Shadow Brokers resurfaced last month, promising a fresh load of N.S.A. attack tools, even offering to supply them for monthly paying subscribers — like a wine-of-the-month club for cyberweapon enthusiasts.
This shows how we are being played with. The NSA could already have published the security details of all leaked tools, so we could all have protected our computer systems. We could have prevented Wannacry.
>This shows how we are being played with. The NSA could already have published the security details of all leaked tools, so we could all have protected our computer systems. We could have prevented Wannacry.
> unfortunately, not everyone keeps their systems totally up to date for various reasons
Because patching requires a quick risk calculation. Should I patch to the bleeding edge and get the latests security but risk a regression bug, or do I wait a bit so I can run a full regression test?
On my machines, sure I like to stay on the latest and greatest. But I'm sure there are plenty of companies that got bitten because some critical software they rely on didn't play well with the latest OS upgrade. Blame game notwithstanding, it comes down to a business disruption risk.
Of course, the right answer is to test the patches as they come out in a non-production environment, and go from there based on results. But I can see where some companies wouldn't have the resources devoted to do that on a frequent basis, which is unfortunate.
Similar to this, I didn't patch my OS X laptop for something like three months because the darn update was a firmware update. It said something along the lines of "Make sure your laptop doesn't lose power, and make sure you have a full backup before starting." Uh-huh. I do have a full backup, but clicking that "Later" button was far more valuable than dealing with the 0.001% chance of disaster.
And I'm a security guy. If I don't care enough to update every day, what do other people do? (There's not much reason to keep a personal laptop up to date when you're not interesting enough to be targeted and not in the habit of running random internet programs. Or rather, a few months of lag is fine, as long as you're paying attention to what the updates are for.)
I think we just don't like to acknowledge the fact that updates sort of suck, yet we bash people and shame them for not doing them. I mean, we don't have many other tools to force them to update, but surprise surprise when people are just concealing the fact that they don't update at all. Even in corporate settings.
Platforms should maybe get better at differing security patches from other types of updates to help make the choice easier. But, I suppose, at a certain point any sufficiently old setup is simply no longer supported because it becomes too difficult to align the security patches with old versions.
This. It still amazes me that MS hasn't done a better job of this.
I'd be interested to hear a heavyweight enterprise sysadmin's take on this, but my experience and read is that it's "toss it at the wall and see what sticks".
Which is crazy when MS knows all of the following things: (a) which files the patch changes, (b) how it changes those files, (c) which programs a customer uses, & (d) which MS files get loaded by which customer programs.
In days where we can do ISA-to-ISA conversion on the fly, you'd think it wouldn't be rocket science to be able to say "Warning! This patch may effect operation of commonly used programs X, Y, and Z". Or at least have an admin tool to provide that information.
Microsoft does a pretty good job at this, but some patches disrupt certain configuration. The latest round, for example, impacts printing for many people on Windows 7.
This is part of what I do. We do a risk assessment -- SMB and Kerberos get patched no matter what, everything else depends on a test cycle and may be deferred for up to 6 mo.
What? With the large monolithic patches that Microsoft has moved to, they have got worse, much worse, recently. It does make it easier to patch everything at once quickly, but if one thing goes wrong, you have to back it off and lose all protections.
Unless you were doing external vulnerability assessment, that granularity was a false sense of security. Rolling back sometimes re-introduced old bugs.
Granularity is impractical when applying patches is optional, as it drastically increases the number of applied patch combinations to QA.
But my point was more towards MS programatically alerting customers as to what programs and subsystems patches might effect.
As far as I've seen, they give you a file list, some brief notes on what the patch is for, and assurance that they internally QA'd it.
But I can't see why there's any technical reason that my system can't warn me that an MS library called into frequently by a particular program I use every day is modified in this patch.
Which is something I care about almost as much as "MS QA passed this patch" (side note: thanks so much to all the unloved, unknown internal QA folks out there, keeping things from breaking!).
I mean... they're trying pretty damn hard with Win10.
The LTSB version is designed to essentially stay the same with regards to applications/apis/etc while still proffering up security updates as fast they have them.
Yes, the final analysis showred that Windows 7 systems were the most affected by WannaCry. And they were targeted for more than a year by Microsoft with the multiple "upgrade now to 10" ads delivered through the security update channel. And I personally had the computers which didn't work under Windows 10, and worked correctly under Windows 7, so I really understand those who disabled auto-updates.
Not to mention that also afterwards there were Windows 7 patches that kept one CPU core 100% busy for days!
Windows 10 has tons of security patches in it. Yes, it also has some UI changes that are less than great, but, seriously, stop using Windows XP already.
Because XP patches only worked on valid licenses. A ton of XP in China is pirated. So Qihoo 360 created custom patches for all those pirated versions of Windows. Weird Alice in Wonderland situation.
Well, it's not how most Linux distros do it. If your update has breaking changes, it's not a security update.
There is no good reason to excuse Microsoft for maliciously disguising updates as security patches in order to manipulate the non tech-savvy into switching to their new unprecedentedly invasive OS. Especially when, as you said, the UI is worse.
The entire UX of Windows 10 is worse, every time I have to use it for something I get physical anxiety from claustrophobia.
I really don't like that I have to install untrusted 3rd party software on my computer in order to prevent my operating system from automatically ruining my user experience and spying on me.
Microsoft deserves ALL the blame for people still running XP. They broke so many hardware drivers with the XP->Vista change that people basically got stuck forever.
Then, not having learned their lesson, they pulled similar crap with the Windows 7->Windows 8 transition which pissed people off so badly that they refused to go to Windows 10 and are currently suing Microsoft for attempting to shove it down people's throats.
Insecure old version of Windows are Microsoft's own damn fault.
Drivers still run inside kernel. What was changed in Vista is that the kernel tries to detect when kernel data structures that should be immutable are changed, which some drivers do.
The idea of non-privileged drivers is neat, but in general is not worthwhile because the driver has to somehow access the hardware, which for significant amount of device/platform combinations leads to access to arbitrary memory locations.
Edit: perfect example are GPU drivers, which are for a long time typically composed of small priviledged kernel driver and all the complex logic in userspace. In many cases the interface between these two components could be abused to get code execution in kernel context (in 2k/xp times there was even RCE in kernel context triggered by displaying properly crafted image in IE)
As I recall, the issue they meant to address wasn't security but stability. Apparently a majority of BSODs were caused by faults in the driver taking down the kernel with it.
This means you aren't preventing drivers from having full access. You just need to prevent more unintended side-effects.
And you can do things like give people specific permission to access the kernel when doing the driver install. ie. "This driver does not adhere to Vista driver standards. Do you wish to install as an XP driver?"
Suddenly, people can run that business critical, single, old driver as unsafe while running the other drivers safely.
Alas, some manager at Microsoft decided it was more important to get his numbers up this quarter so he could get his bonus. In so doing, Microsoft orphaned a bunch of people on XP just like they orphaned a bunch of people on VB6.
Microsoft made its own bed; now it has to lie in it.
You're giving people too much credit. A lot of people, and companies, totally ignore their software. There's no risk calculation; they're not thinking about it at all.
Most of the time a security patch doesn't break software. There are exceptions and disasters have of course happened but you're kind of conflating general updates, upgrades and security patching. You can even canary test patches against percentages of your userbase since it's really simple with a Windows environment. Patching windows itself is probably the easiest thing to patch in an enterprise environment. The real reason these companies/organizations don't patch Windows is because they don't prioritize it and/or they're lazy.
There are plenty of companies where "most of the time it's not broken" is a big problem. Possibly bigger than the cost of a security issue (I don't know, because this is both hypothetical and I'm an outsider to the issues at play).
To not acknowledge that others would value a different part of the risk curve lacks perspective.
I mean, in my line of work Windows Update suddenly running and rebooting means fire risks. I wish I could connect the computer to the network so I could monitor equipment remotely, but it's too much risk. I hope utilities take the same measures. Certainly some work computers are vulnerable to all mess of viruses from not having gotten updates in years.
I agree in spirit, but there's always a balance. And to clarify, I meant "risk" in the "failure analysis" sense. I didn't intend to imply that such risks should go unmanaged. Disconnecting from the internet is part of that risk management, but of course it is multi-layered.
I can't buy an Emerson control system for a small reactor getting reconfigured every other week, and LabView on an un-networked Windows computer is perfectly fine.
I would not use a PC (with any OS) to control a 10 kg reactor though. At least directly. I think it'd be okay to use a PC to coordinate discrete controllers as long as they couldn't change state without a command (i.e. latching valves and the like) and as long as there was a backup safety that didn't have a computer in the loop.
Safeties that do things like shut off furnaces if temperature sensors break or valves that shut off flow if it becomes too high or detect a flame are common, analogous to a fuse on a circuit board. You sure hope not to use them, but they'll suffice for unexpected situations.
But there's definitely a risk that has to be managed, and connecting infrastructure and industrial equipment to the internet is not managing it very well!
I believe it was compounded in this case by the fact that Microsoft did not release the patch to all users. That OS was no longer supported so they only made the patch available to customers who pay for long term support.
All OSes vulnerable to wannacry are still under support.
Contrary to popular belief, wannacry will not spread to windows XP, it will just crash it. It will run on it if you fire the executable manually, but it will not infect an XP host through SMB.
Oh? I had heard that NHS didn't have access to the patch but I'd be happy to be proven wrong. I was under the impression that XP was the main vulnerable OS under WannaCry
The point is that people could have died because Microsoft decided not to release a zero day patch widely. In fact, once WannaCry got bad enough, they did release the patch.
What about Stuxnet? Did they go to companies and told them to patch against that once it was out? We don't even know how many more times these things have happened in the underground and used by criminals. We have just one example of NSA doing this, and even that wasn't sufficient because the "horse was already out of the barn."
> I think that all these NSA problems show bad management. They should be reorganized, or maybe even abandoned. They cost more than they deliver, and even costed us our privacy.
I.e. the average citizen.
Q: Is the NSA there to support the average citizen, or are they there to support the bureaucracy / power structures?
Q: depending on the previous answer, does your security or privacy matter to the NSA?
>Probably they are still breaking US and international laws on that.
Do the people who enforce the law get punished when they break it? On the whole, I don't think that's a clear "Yes". More of a "maybe, sometimes".
Democracy is technically orthogonal to this issue. If the rule of law is firmly established in the country, people who do illegal things get punished. This is equally possible in well-organized dictatorships as in democracies.
I will grant that there is a strong correlation between (the presence of) rule of law and democracy, but it's debatable in which way a causal relationship might flow or if they might both be caused by something else. (For example, economic prosperity seems to help)
Surely a dictatorship is necessarily contrary to rule of law as at least one person is not bound by the law?
Meanwhile, in a democracy, I can see you could have group not under the rule of law _iff_ any actions they take do not impact anyone who is going by the law, including an impact such as "gives an advantage or benefit to those under the law can't get". Otherwise the government whilst possibly being "by the people" would no longer be "for the people" but instead "for the preferred classes".
You could maybe finagle something that some people could do, that was illegal for others, but doesn't give the first group any benefit. But I don't think you can practically; so practically then democracy would be predicated on rule of law even if not technically required.
A dictatorship could conceivably alter the law such that whatever he/she does is not illegal, possibly even chinging the laws as he/she goes. If you're a dictator, changing the law need not be a long and difficult process.
I'll grant that in practice it is very difficult to have rule of law without democracy. It is interesting to think about as a "gedankenexperiment" though. :)
In what way is he dictator if he can be challenged and defeated in the courts? FWIW the Wikipedia page, on cursory view, only refers to him as part of political parties and having been elected: perhaps you can flesh it out a bit for someone not familiar with Singaporean history, thanks.
His party is a ruling party of Singapore since before independence, until 80s it won all seats in parliament. He was a prime minister for 30 years, current prime minister is his son.
Lee Kuan Yew was a benevolent dictator, except for his political opponents. Dictatorship is a spectrum :)
Can you expand on this? I'm willing to grant that it is true in practice, but it is not at all clear to me that a benevolent, lawful dictatorship impossible in theory.
A dictator can be benevolent, but he's out of the Law's reach, or he wouldn't be a dictator.
If everybody must follow the same laws, and nobody can change the laws at will, you will get a democracy. If some people can steer lawmaking at will or law does not apply to them, it doesn't matter if you vote on public representatives, they won't be submitted to your wills.
> Some may even argue that the CIA leaked the NSA tools to weaken the NSA. Or worse, that some in the NSA want to create cyber chaos to push for more control over the internet in the future.
Some may argue a lot of things that may or may not be true.
This will probably always be an issue so long as there are classified operations... Everyone who isn't privy will have their own interpretation of what really happened.
I've just been waiting for someone to send them a bill.
How much money have their tools cost folks in time, money, hardware, and personnel, even in just the last year? How much money have their unpatched exploits cost?
How's that all compare to their (mostly undocumented) annual budget, anyway?
I think that all these NSA problems show bad management. They should be reorganized, or maybe even abandoned. They cost more than they deliver, and even costed us our privacy. Probably they are still breaking US and international laws on that. Breaking up NSA can allow the FBI and (open) security companies to take over the cybersecurity.
I suspect that we will soon have leaks of CIA tools too. But thanks to wikileaks companies can prepare for these future problems.
We can go deeper into who got these tools and who is using them. Some may even argue that the CIA leaked the NSA tools to weaken the NSA. Or worse, that some in the NSA want to create cyber chaos to push for more control over the internet in the future.
The article mentions the popular political scapegoats, and as usual this is just speculation. To solve NSA's problem we have to request very concrete evidence, otherwise we are just being played with.
Article: > The Shadow Brokers resurfaced last month, promising a fresh load of N.S.A. attack tools, even offering to supply them for monthly paying subscribers — like a wine-of-the-month club for cyberweapon enthusiasts.
This shows how we are being played with. The NSA could already have published the security details of all leaked tools, so we could all have protected our computer systems. We could have prevented Wannacry.