As has already been said, private finance simply does not fix this problem, although it does increase the scope for the working generation to avoid their obligations - through stock market crashes and bouts of inflation.
In fact that is pretty much what all such crashes are - savers losing out to the producers. Although not widely acknowledged it is practically policy to promise (in both the state & private sector) gravity defying returns and then let savers down with short sharp shocks. The actuarial assumptions for pensions are returns in the region of 6-8%. The only way savings on average can reach these returns is if there is amortized monetary inflation of 6-8% or 4-6% in real terms if you generously give 2% for productivity. This is of course significantly more than the modal average inflation rate, whence the need for 'corrections'.
The unaddressed issues are do pensions perform better than worse than average (consider during the boom private equity was routinely making 20% returns leaving less on the table for everyone else)? And what about borrowers who borrow not to invest, but because of urgency (not a significant amount of money after houses became state backed investments, which leaves gamblers, current accounts and cash in circulation to try to balance that see-saw).
In fact that is pretty much what all such crashes are - savers losing out to the producers. Although not widely acknowledged it is practically policy to promise (in both the state & private sector) gravity defying returns and then let savers down with short sharp shocks. The actuarial assumptions for pensions are returns in the region of 6-8%. The only way savings on average can reach these returns is if there is amortized monetary inflation of 6-8% or 4-6% in real terms if you generously give 2% for productivity. This is of course significantly more than the modal average inflation rate, whence the need for 'corrections'.
The unaddressed issues are do pensions perform better than worse than average (consider during the boom private equity was routinely making 20% returns leaving less on the table for everyone else)? And what about borrowers who borrow not to invest, but because of urgency (not a significant amount of money after houses became state backed investments, which leaves gamblers, current accounts and cash in circulation to try to balance that see-saw).