I'm sorry, but your argument still seems diffuse to me. "Not an object", "anything in there"... these are terms so vague that anything we say about them could stand as irrefutable.
Your own feelings about your consciousness are unimportant to define consciousness. It's definitely irrelevant that you can't "experience" how other people feel the colour yellow, we still regard it as observable. The only difference is that we can define "yellow" as electromagnetic radiation with certain wavelengths, whereas we'll have to wait a bit to get an equally satisfactory definition for consciousness.
We shouldn't attribute a special epistemological status to the brain/mind/consciousness just because it's complex and we don't know it very well and just because it's ours.
Your own feelings about your consciousness are unimportant to define consciousness. It's definitely irrelevant that you can't "experience" how other people feel the colour yellow, we still regard it as observable. The only difference is that we can define "yellow" as electromagnetic radiation with certain wavelengths, whereas we'll have to wait a bit to get an equally satisfactory definition for consciousness.
We shouldn't attribute a special epistemological status to the brain/mind/consciousness just because it's complex and we don't know it very well and just because it's ours.