It did take it into account, but the incorrect angle reporting was not severe enough to result in the sensor being marked as faulty. From the sound of things it was designed to deal with large bit flips, sensor jamming the the home position or sensor misalignment (which is at fixed angles because of the mounting holes) rather than the sensor jamming in other positions or being horribly miscalibrated.
The company that repaired the sensor used in the Lion Air Flight did loose their license to repair any and all certified avionics parts and is probably out of business at this point. Donno about the technician that forged the post-install tests of that sensor.
The architecture of the system was such that no cross-checking could occur. There was a feature to implement an AoA disagree light, but that only came into play if an optional package was purchased.
The Lion Air crash data had the computer registering an angle off by a ridiculous degree that should not have even been attainable by flying one of these planes in the manner for which it was designed.
The Ethiopian FDR showed even more ludicrous measurements as I recall. It wasn't just a case of "It wasn't bad enough", it was a case of the computer believing the plane was belly flopping into the air stream (75 degrees AoA!).
Note the Space Shuttle only hits around 40 degrees on it's reentry in order to keep the wind hitting the thermally insulated bottom, and that only at Mach 10+.
There is no excuse for any software engineer/computer scientist to ignore the basic physics of the domain they are coding for to the point they cannot identify when a critical measurement is so far out of whack as to be instantly dismissed.
The company that repaired the sensor used in the Lion Air Flight did loose their license to repair any and all certified avionics parts and is probably out of business at this point. Donno about the technician that forged the post-install tests of that sensor.