Remember that this expense is also reducing the cost of employers.
One of the best ways to finance this would be a payroll tax that is basically equal (in aggregate) to the insurance the company is (usually) already paying.
Big employers like having health insurance tied to employment. It makes changing jobs a riskier maneuver for employees as they do not know the quality of the other jobs' insurance coverage, and it creates higher overhead costs for smaller employers so it provides a competitive advantage there too.
Pretty specious argument in the days where SF companies are mandating RTO when it could be far cheaper to negotiate to WFH status those employees who didn't want to be in the bay area or bay area offices anymore.
Large metro areas have a large # of services available. From office furniture delivered in hours to a wide range of service industries available on demand.
From food delivery to sign printing to courier services, large, dense, cities have economics of scale.
I mean, they can lobby against it, but other than that, what does it matter that they don't like it? It's not like they are so management heavy that they can swing a vote.
> they do not know the quality of the other jobs' insurance coverage
And the fact that you can't actually take time off of work to pursue a career change or look for a new job, because you need your job in order to be able to afford basic healthcare. Which makes it a lot harder to pursue a career change or look for a new job, because you are stuck/busy at your current one + whatever other life responsibilities you have (not to mention the really high commute times in NYC).
Only because people are conditioned to only seek medical attention when it's absolutely necessary, because it's too expensive to be proactive even with insurance.
There is nothing stopping NY employers now from just giving people enough cash to buy a plan on the ACA marketplace. You're assuming this upcoming plan will have offerings employees will want, and charges employers whether or not this is the case.
> a payroll tax that is basically equal (in aggregate) to the insurance
Whereupon there is no reduction in cost to any employer.
Theoretically there could be a reduction because the state would be a larger pool of cross-subsidization than any particular employer. In reality the costs are worse since the state will use the taxes to subsidize non-employed persons.
I don't think they're saying that at all. I think the point was, a payroll tax won't necessarily increase costs for a company because it would be offset by eliminating the current healthcare costs.
Right, but my point is that to keep the relative advantage they’d have to pay.
For example imagine a company attracts talent by paying median + healthcare, and another that just paid median. For the latter they would have more costs, no?
The savings aren’t offset unless they were already offering the incentive.
One of the best ways to finance this would be a payroll tax that is basically equal (in aggregate) to the insurance the company is (usually) already paying.