> I'd like to see tailscaled run with far fewer privileges.
Yeah - I have a dislike for services running as root when it's not necessary, and then getting users to escalate to root to interact with them routinely.
One thing I was thinking about was trying to identify the Linux capabilities which let tailscaled run, and then look at if it's feasible to adjust the default systemd unit to run it as a non root user. Closely followed by then trying to harden up the service with as many of the recommendations as possible in "systemd-analyze security".
Despite there being a pretty good range of restrictions available, it seems to be pretty rare that service definitions actually come locked down... Might be something for the tailscale team to look at in future?
Software shipped by the distro maintainers I find is often properly locked down with systemd features, but third party stuff is always hit and miss. Definitely agree Tailscale should be shipping with the bare minimum privileges required.
Yeah - I have a dislike for services running as root when it's not necessary, and then getting users to escalate to root to interact with them routinely.
One thing I was thinking about was trying to identify the Linux capabilities which let tailscaled run, and then look at if it's feasible to adjust the default systemd unit to run it as a non root user. Closely followed by then trying to harden up the service with as many of the recommendations as possible in "systemd-analyze security".
Despite there being a pretty good range of restrictions available, it seems to be pretty rare that service definitions actually come locked down... Might be something for the tailscale team to look at in future?