I get the optics point but the policy substance is narrower than the headline and there are ways to keep it from becoming the "unconditional victory" you’re worried about. Recognition is not equal to a blank check.
> The Hamas and the people that celebrated October 7th in the West will celebrate this as a victory and for a good reason because of the timing (in fact, they already did...).
Some will. But policymaking can’t be held hostage to who posts what on Telegram. The question is whether the net effect shrinks Hamas’s political space so give non Hamas Palestinians a credible horizon and resources only if they meet benchmarks that Hamas refuses. That’s how you break the militants monopoly on results.
> However, they recognized a state while the previous position was that they would not recognize one until an agreement is found with Israel.
Because the last 30 years show waiting for perfect conditions just entrenches the status quo. Recognition now creates a legal/political anchor (Palestine exists in principle), while the capacity to exercise that sovereignty is earned. It flips the incentive so reformers can tell their own street, "we can actually deliver borders/freedom if we keep Hamas out and meet X, Y, Z..."
> What happens when Hamas or an a similar faction kill any reformist and take back control for example?
Then you haven’t "rewarded" terrorism, you’ve precommitted the world to a two state endgame while keeping teeth so you freeze benefits, tighten sanctions and preserve the political baseline for the day spoilers weaken. That’s still better than the current loop where only hardliners can claim momentum.
So I’m not hand waving the risks. I’m arguing that recognition + hard conditionality + security guardrails gives you a strategy, not a hope. It separates Palestinian national rights from Hamas’s fate, creates leverage over the PA and builds a path where spoilers lose material advantages the moment they act like spoilers.
I see the recognition, where are the hard conditionality or the security guardrails? If the PA doesn't cooperate, what leverage exists?
This move alone could have accomplished a lot of reforms. So far all I've seen is:
1) the PA supposedly end "pay for slay" where Palestinians that commit terrorist attacks or their family gets more money for more dead and injured victims or for longer prison terms (this program may have actually ended, it's just really hard to tell because of mixed signals),
2) Abbas condemn October 7th once in a letter to France and Saudi Arabia in June 2025 (for the first time and a little under 2 years after October 7th happened), and
3) the arrest of a person that committed a terrorist attack in France in the 1982.
I really hope there was a lot more behind the scenes, because those seem pretty small.
Having elections they should have had for many years now wouldn't be that impressive either.
Why not condition recognition on 1) releasing the hostages and 2) Hamas / Palestinian Islamic Jihad / Al-Qassam / etc disarming? Those 2 things could end the current war.
> The Hamas and the people that celebrated October 7th in the West will celebrate this as a victory and for a good reason because of the timing (in fact, they already did...).
Some will. But policymaking can’t be held hostage to who posts what on Telegram. The question is whether the net effect shrinks Hamas’s political space so give non Hamas Palestinians a credible horizon and resources only if they meet benchmarks that Hamas refuses. That’s how you break the militants monopoly on results.
> However, they recognized a state while the previous position was that they would not recognize one until an agreement is found with Israel.
Because the last 30 years show waiting for perfect conditions just entrenches the status quo. Recognition now creates a legal/political anchor (Palestine exists in principle), while the capacity to exercise that sovereignty is earned. It flips the incentive so reformers can tell their own street, "we can actually deliver borders/freedom if we keep Hamas out and meet X, Y, Z..."
> What happens when Hamas or an a similar faction kill any reformist and take back control for example?
Then you haven’t "rewarded" terrorism, you’ve precommitted the world to a two state endgame while keeping teeth so you freeze benefits, tighten sanctions and preserve the political baseline for the day spoilers weaken. That’s still better than the current loop where only hardliners can claim momentum.
So I’m not hand waving the risks. I’m arguing that recognition + hard conditionality + security guardrails gives you a strategy, not a hope. It separates Palestinian national rights from Hamas’s fate, creates leverage over the PA and builds a path where spoilers lose material advantages the moment they act like spoilers.