The most frequently cited example is that Singapore pays its government executives market wages, and they consistently rank in the top 5 least corrupt nations[0]
But so do Australia and New Zealand, and the salaries here in the government sector are much lower than they are in the private sector.
This is a well researched field[1]:
> In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behavior.
There is no link between wages and corruption - there are many, many other factors that make up corruption.
Punishment and likelihood of being caught also seems to not disuade corruption. China has a large and very well funded public prosecutors office that focuses solely on corruption cases, the onus of evidence is low, it is the #1 domestic issue with much political pressure and the usual sentence on conviction is death (frequently plea bargained down to life or less in return for implicating others, but many corrupt officials have been executed).
There is no link between wages and corruption - there are many, many other factors that make up corruption.
Yes there is. If public servants are grossly underpaid, or vulnerable, they'll turn to corruption for income or safety (think of a policeman looking the other way in countries like Argentina). In Argentina, for instance, policemen were very poorly paid after the 2001 crash, and at the same time, an incredible wave of crime washed over the country, much like in Greece today. Police started getting paid much less, for a much more dangerous job (the murder rate for policeman rose dramatically). So they simply demanded bribes (long list of ways how to do this) and stayed out of trouble when they could. To compensate for the danger imposed by their job, they started looking the other way more.
The prosecution systems in China are led by the local and central party leaders, who actually supervise their administrative counterparts, i.e. the mayors and governors. In several sensitive cases of local government head appointment, the removal of local police and prosecutor heads followed, in a violent way that some of those removed got prosecuted, even committed suicide[1].
IMHO, as the lack of independency in justice and persecution branch go, it is highly doubtful that the prosecutors were not a tool for political use other than purely anti-bribery purposes.
But so do Australia and New Zealand, and the salaries here in the government sector are much lower than they are in the private sector.
This is a well researched field[1]:
> In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behavior.
There is no link between wages and corruption - there are many, many other factors that make up corruption.
Punishment and likelihood of being caught also seems to not disuade corruption. China has a large and very well funded public prosecutors office that focuses solely on corruption cases, the onus of evidence is low, it is the #1 domestic issue with much political pressure and the usual sentence on conviction is death (frequently plea bargained down to life or less in return for implicating others, but many corrupt officials have been executed).
[0] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corruption_Perceptions_Index#Ra...
[1] "Fair Salaries and the Moral Cost of Corruption" - [pdf] http://128.243.80.167/cedex/documents/papers/2002-05.pdf