It's security theatre all the way from top to bottom: extra effort for devs and users alike, no real comprehension of any of the threat models at any level of interaction from the original design - which makes it fit right in with the rest of the entire java and advertising me-cosystem.
It's truly confusing to see businesses with real PII, financial, and technical risks choose not to simply disable java for all websites on work systems' browsers; bake settings and other restrictions into immutable VM templates. From these run ephemoral/disposable, per-application suite VM's to enable the office workers to use the tools required for their jobs.
If a worker wants user-upload and FB utility they are free to use their own devices (phones) when they are on break.
If a role has specific need for a specific site that requires special refinements/relaxation or the security policies then that can have it's own templateVM and this allows granular control of which VM instances have access to which other instances' clipboard and if it is one-way or bi-directional.
These techniques aren't novel, aren't actually that difficult, and are actually in-use in many workplaces. Even on legacy systems this has been possible with Windows environments which require full Office utility - since the XP era with 'Embedded' tools like WindowsCE <~ not the best way to do it, but I have seen it done at scale by multinational enterprises.
Every reboot spawns a completely clean; custom configured clone of the 'official' image; and if too much changes - that clone evaporates and restarts from read-only image.
All the rest of this ''back-end, front-end, let some people in, keep others out, filter by structure but not by content,'' ... it's just such an exhausting topic to even read about, and i wonder what kind of kool-aid everyone drinks to get them to pretend any of that is actually for any purpose than to allow FAANG/MANGOS/SPAM tech-bro cults to suck up all the user activity meta+data from the free garbage they are peddling.
I need either more coffee, or less Uisge beatha bhon Hosh.
It's truly confusing to see businesses with real PII, financial, and technical risks choose not to simply disable java for all websites on work systems' browsers; bake settings and other restrictions into immutable VM templates. From these run ephemoral/disposable, per-application suite VM's to enable the office workers to use the tools required for their jobs.
If a worker wants user-upload and FB utility they are free to use their own devices (phones) when they are on break.
If a role has specific need for a specific site that requires special refinements/relaxation or the security policies then that can have it's own templateVM and this allows granular control of which VM instances have access to which other instances' clipboard and if it is one-way or bi-directional.
These techniques aren't novel, aren't actually that difficult, and are actually in-use in many workplaces. Even on legacy systems this has been possible with Windows environments which require full Office utility - since the XP era with 'Embedded' tools like WindowsCE <~ not the best way to do it, but I have seen it done at scale by multinational enterprises.
Every reboot spawns a completely clean; custom configured clone of the 'official' image; and if too much changes - that clone evaporates and restarts from read-only image.
All the rest of this ''back-end, front-end, let some people in, keep others out, filter by structure but not by content,'' ... it's just such an exhausting topic to even read about, and i wonder what kind of kool-aid everyone drinks to get them to pretend any of that is actually for any purpose than to allow FAANG/MANGOS/SPAM tech-bro cults to suck up all the user activity meta+data from the free garbage they are peddling.
I need either more coffee, or less Uisge beatha bhon Hosh.