Oh, heavens no. I'm human, so I almost certainly make logic errors all the time, whether in terms of truth or validity.
However, one thing I am very careful about is that the definitions I use are falsifiable, which makes them minimally empirically testable. ("A hypothesis forbidding some observations means that hypothesis is testable.") In the best case, I can proceed a priori with my reasoning and entirely sidestep needing to approach a posteriori, but real life is very often not that nice.
I generally find capital-L Libertarian free markets less than useful for analysis because the syllogism tends to break down thus:
1. Free markets produce prosperity.
2. Prosperity indicates the presence of a free market.
3. Therefore, free markets are prosperous.
Like, that'd be a perfectly valid form of proving both directions of a biconditional if it were possible in this framework to show the presence of a free market that doesn't produce prosperity or that prosperity happens without a free market. Unfortunately, they're taken as axiomatic, so they don't admit the reasoning required for such a proof.
I want to be wrong though. Perhaps I'm missing something?
> Free markets correspond with prosperity, in case after case.
I'll caution that correspondence does not admit causal inferences.
Oh, heavens no. I'm human, so I almost certainly make logic errors all the time, whether in terms of truth or validity.
However, one thing I am very careful about is that the definitions I use are falsifiable, which makes them minimally empirically testable. ("A hypothesis forbidding some observations means that hypothesis is testable.") In the best case, I can proceed a priori with my reasoning and entirely sidestep needing to approach a posteriori, but real life is very often not that nice.
I generally find capital-L Libertarian free markets less than useful for analysis because the syllogism tends to break down thus:
1. Free markets produce prosperity.
2. Prosperity indicates the presence of a free market.
3. Therefore, free markets are prosperous.
Like, that'd be a perfectly valid form of proving both directions of a biconditional if it were possible in this framework to show the presence of a free market that doesn't produce prosperity or that prosperity happens without a free market. Unfortunately, they're taken as axiomatic, so they don't admit the reasoning required for such a proof.
I want to be wrong though. Perhaps I'm missing something?
> Free markets correspond with prosperity, in case after case.
I'll caution that correspondence does not admit causal inferences.