May apologies, but I intended to convey the opposite when I said this. I’ll read the rest of this comment later.
> My position is that there must be something wrong with the idea that a behaviorally identical simulation can be made which is not conscious. I think this because I do think phenomenal consciousness is playing a role in behavior, since surely my consciousness is a cause of memories of my consciousness (certain structure of physical matter in my brain has been caused by my consciousness); this is called the self-stultification argument against epiphenomenalism.
OH! Sorry - that's a different position then. Let's address it:
So you think a computer can't simulate a human brain.
But why do you think so? We've never found a physical system we can't simulate with a computer (and believe me, Searle and Penrose have tried).
Given there's no evidence that this is even possible, and for which you have no evidence to support it - you still believe computers can't simulate brains?
Why?
I think this is an even greater stretch than before.
You are fundamentally assuming all real concepts are reducible to arbitrary substrates like language. I believe there are real concepts which are not, like qualia. The entire premise of your belief is on this assumption I think but I don’t think you are aware that there is in fact an assumption here.
May apologies, but I intended to convey the opposite when I said this. I’ll read the rest of this comment later.
> My position is that there must be something wrong with the idea that a behaviorally identical simulation can be made which is not conscious. I think this because I do think phenomenal consciousness is playing a role in behavior, since surely my consciousness is a cause of memories of my consciousness (certain structure of physical matter in my brain has been caused by my consciousness); this is called the self-stultification argument against epiphenomenalism.