It's cool but basically solves a problem that no longer exists. Once you've caused enough suspicion, they can simply dig up the records of all the data you've sent, both chaff and wheat, and serve you with an order to disclose your authentication key/lawfully hack you computer and obtain it without asking/apply some lead pipe cryptanalysis and get it anyway. In the end, it's no better than regular encryption, at the cost of being at least twice more inefficient.
Still, for all the crypto export nonsense, 1998 appears to have been a more innocent time:
> "But access to authentication keys is one thing that
government has long agreed that they don't want to have."
Near the bottom they mention using more than one wheat stream to achieve something like deniable encryption. If they ask you for the key, give them the one that produces innocent-looking messages.
Depends, how good are you at creative writing? I can think of a lot of messages you might send to someone that you'd want to be private that aren't nefarious plots. Weird fan fiction. Deviant porn. Messages exchanged with a secret mistress. Depending on the situation, you might even want to give them a fake copy of your nefarious plot. Include more than one extra set of messages if you like and give them whatever keys you like in whatever order is appropriate.
>In the end, it's no better than regular encryption, at the cost of being at least twice more inefficient.
He goes on to explain how to make it more efficient: If you need every "wheat" packet to reconstruct any part of the message, you can send a finite number of chaff packets (e.g. 1000) in random locations, which would make reconstructing a message of arbitrary length infeasible for an adversary that can't separate the wheat from the chaff other than by exhaustive search.
Still, for all the crypto export nonsense, 1998 appears to have been a more innocent time:
> "But access to authentication keys is one thing that government has long agreed that they don't want to have."