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The answer is "N/A." The .ly tld is not signed so DNSSEC could never attest to the authenticity of the A record for bit.ly.

In order for this to be a useful exercise you should structure the question in such a way that there is as much potential for government interference as possible. (Unless you are looking for a specific answer and you are trying to lead the respondent.) Government interference with DNSSEC is not limited to the `.` zone. Or put another way, DNSSEC's attack surface area is not limited to the sacred KSK.



If bit.ly implemented DNSSEC exactly to spec, and it appears clean to a user, who could be an attacker and in what way?


Anyone can be an attacker that can exert influence (legal/kinetic/digital) over:

  Here:        .
  Here:     .ly.
  Here: .bit.ly.
The attack surface of freebsd.org is similiar except there is a different set of actors that can exert legal influence over .org.

  Here:             .  # G/K/D same as bit.ly
  Here:         .org.  #   K/D same as bit.ly
  Here: .freebsd.org.  #   K/D same as bit.ly




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