"Corley denied the motion, and in doing so, set the precedent that licenses like the GNU GPL can be treated like legal contracts, and developers can legitimately sue when those contracts are breached."
The GNU GPL was written on the basis that if someone does not accept its terms, then that without any other license from the copyright holder, redistribution puts that person in violation of copyright law.
Suing for damages on the basis of a breach of copyright law clearly does not require any contract.
So this is more about a technicality of the legal process in this particular case, rather than anything about whether copyleft is legally enforceable or not in general.
Specifically, because the motion denial was based on the defendant's own admission being deemed to be the agreement of a contract, this says nothing about the general enforceability of the GPL (future defendants could simply avoid making such an admission).
Further, since the ruling was in response to a specific motion, it only concerns the claims made in that motion: about whether a contract exists in this particular case. It says nothing about the "copyright violation if you don't accept the license" mechanism of copyleft.
Finally, the article does not provide any evidence that there has been any ruling that determined that the GPL is an enforceable legal contract, contrary to its title. The ruling as quoted just says that the defendant, by its own admission, did accept to enter in to the GPL-defined contract.
> ...doesn't it mean that the companies using the GPL'ed software are violating copyright?
It may be a technical violation. This wouldn't in itself make any difference to anything, however. It would only matter if a court would then award damages to copyright holders as a consequence of the violation. A violation in civil law doesn't mean anything in practice except when damages are awarded (and only changes behaviour when damages could be awarded).
Damages are awarded based on harm done. I think a copyright holder would struggle to show that any harm was done by the defendant, especially as the defendant would have been acting in good faith. Of course this depends on the details of the reason the court ruled the GPL invalid, so it's not really possible to speculate on your hypothetical further.
No. The plantiff made two key claims: breach of contract and copyright infringment. This is sensible, because the defendant has either accepted the GPL (and thus is in breach of contract), or has infringed copyright. This is key to the mechanism of copyleft. By suing for both, the defendant cannot just choose whichever is the most convenient and win on the technicality that the other was not considered by the court.
The judge ruled that the claim of breach of contract cannot be dismissed on the basis that the contract does not exist, because the defendant has effectively admitted that it did exist.
The judge also ruled that the claim of copyright cannot be dismissed on the basis of jurisdiction.
None of these things relate to the enforceability of the GPL in general.
I don't think you're wrong, I just think you're splitting hairs. The order says the license is a contract that exists, sure. Contracts are enforceable.
"...I just think you're splitting hairs." And splitting hairs is pretty much what the legal system is about.
It matters. The difference is the defendant said "yes, we entered a contract" and not that the judge ruled "whether you admit it or not, you entered a contract." The former does not set legal precedent. The latter probably does.
I see no justification for the arm of that 'iff' which is equivalent to "if what the plaintiff says is not true, then it is not the case that a contract probably exists".
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s reliance on
the unsigned GNU GPL fails to plausibly demonstrate
mutual assent, that is, the existence of a contract.
Not so. The GNU GPL, which is attached to the
complaint, provides that the Ghostscript user agrees
to its terms if the user does not obtain a
commercial license. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
used Ghostscript, did not obtain a commercial
license, and represented publicly that its use of
Ghostscript was licensed under the GNL GPU. These
allegations sufficiently plead the existence of a
contract. See, e.g., MedioStream, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 507, 519 (E.D. Tex. 2010)
(concluding that the software owner had adequately
pled a claim for breach of a shrink-wrap license).
Note the part that:
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
used Ghostscript, did not obtain a commercial
license, and represented publicly that its use of
Ghostscript was licensed under the GNL GPU. These
allegations sufficiently plead the existence of a
contract."
IE if what the plaintiff said is true, it's a contract.
I see nothing in the decision that says the court would have found a contract without these allegations being true.
> I see nothing in the decision that says the court would have found a contract without these allegations being true.
Parent is nitpicking the different between the court ruling that the contract is likely to exists and the contract actually existing. For the former, plaintiff's allegations are absolutely necessary, for the latter - not so much.
In a sense, one can't say that "only if plaintiff's allegations are true, a contract exists" because plaintiff's arguments can be bullshit and the contract may still be valid for other reasons, even if no court would recognize it without proper evidence.
Hope that helps. And yes, it is a nitpick on the semantics of logic. Parent understands what the court ruled, the issue was solely with your post being (possibly amusingly) ambiguous to people dealing with too much formal logic.
It may seem like "splitting hairs," but it's basic legal analysis. Learning when a contract is formed (which is the question at issue here; it's not about the substantive terms of the contract) is covered in everyone's first year of law school. And learning how contract and copyright relate is covered in the second or third year of law school, depending on when you take the course.
> Suing for damages on the basis of a breach of copyright law clearly does not require any contract.
I came here to say basically this. To make this really explicit - this result is completely and utterly unsurprising and does not set any new meaningful precedent. Nothing specific to the GPL was implicated.
Using someone else's source code without permission has always been, and continues to be a violation of copyright law.
The GNU GPL was written on the basis that if someone does not accept its terms, then that without any other license from the copyright holder, redistribution puts that person in violation of copyright law.
Suing for damages on the basis of a breach of copyright law clearly does not require any contract.
So this is more about a technicality of the legal process in this particular case, rather than anything about whether copyleft is legally enforceable or not in general.
Specifically, because the motion denial was based on the defendant's own admission being deemed to be the agreement of a contract, this says nothing about the general enforceability of the GPL (future defendants could simply avoid making such an admission).
Further, since the ruling was in response to a specific motion, it only concerns the claims made in that motion: about whether a contract exists in this particular case. It says nothing about the "copyright violation if you don't accept the license" mechanism of copyleft.
Finally, the article does not provide any evidence that there has been any ruling that determined that the GPL is an enforceable legal contract, contrary to its title. The ruling as quoted just says that the defendant, by its own admission, did accept to enter in to the GPL-defined contract.