> So you must believe that consciousness is entirely uncomputable? Do you have any other examples of physical processes that are beyond computation?
I think all physical processes are distinct from their descriptions, and have a real existence. We can describe some things about them but our descriptions are not equal to them.
Oh whoops I replied above apologizing for my delay. I’m starting a new job and they’re threatening to make me do stuff (a great thing!!) But I will likely send my responses tonight.
I'm sorry - I missed this reply - which is why I asked it a second time below.
So - let me know if I have this right - if I created a simulation of you it would act like you and talk like you in all ways - but not actually feel like you?
And if I asked it if it felt like you (being a perfect simulation of you) it would answer as you do "Yes, I feel like me." But it would be what... lying about having feelings?
Do I have that right?
And if so - is it aware that it is lying to me? Does it believe what it's saying? I guess we could never tell, because our only recourse is to ask it, and it would just continue lying. Or, being a p-zombie, it wouldn't be capable of belief at all? Despite its claims?
And if I injured this simulation - it would cry out in pain and beg me to stop? All the while not actually feeling pain?
I'm curious - why does this scenario seem more likely to you than the more obvious explanation?
Why is it more likely that behavior which appears identical to a feeling creature is actually somehow faked?
And where does all this fakery occur?
Presumably my simulation is just simulating the interactions of atoms in the body. Does the body have systems for faking emotions that we are unaware of - that only come online while its being simulated? Or does my simulation have a secret fake emotion system I am not aware of?
I thought about how to respond to this for quite a while tonight (last night now as I fell asleep).
My position is that there must be something wrong with the idea that a behaviorally identical simulation can be made which is not conscious. I think this because I do think phenomenal consciousness is playing a role in behavior, since surely my consciousness is a cause of memories of my consciousness (certain structure of physical matter in my brain has been caused by my consciousness); this is called the self-stultification argument against epiphenomenalism.
So that just reaffirms my position, it does not argue against yours. I believe our physical models of reality are fundamentally limited and even within the limitations far from complete.
A truly behaviorally accurate simulation, by which I mean the simulation has parts corresponding to everything in the original, is a very high bar of course. So to address your point about faking directly, I would not call this faking, since faking seems to require a separate inner process to decide to do the deception, but I believe it is just a highly accurate mimic, and I don’t actually see anything wrong with this.
> A truly behaviorally accurate simulation, by which I mean the simulation has parts corresponding to everything in the original, is a very high bar of course. So to address your point about faking directly, I would not call this faking, since faking seems to require a separate inner process to decide to do the deception, but I believe it is just a highly accurate mimic
Yes, this is the situation which is most interesting, despite the bar.
Ok - we can call it mimicry if you like. That doesn't change my question -
If the simulation isn't using the same mechanism (feelings) as the physical system, then where is this mimicry coming from? Clearly the simulation is just following the laws of chemistry. No mimicry in there. Is it in the original atomic configuration - that seems unlikely.
You seem to be assuming the existence of some mechanism that was not described in the original physical system. Why do you insist that this must be the case, and is not simply the same as the physical system?
I feel like you're on the wrong side of Occam. There is an obvious answer to this question - and yet you're picking the hypothetical/undiscovered/possibly non-existent one.
(Remember, in this situation we are not describing an LLM, but a system generated from the rules of chemistry. I can see how mimicry might apply in the LLM case - but I don't see where it would be hiding in the physical simulation case.)
> Remember, in this situation we are not describing an LLM, but a system generated from the rules of chemistry
However, it is a system with a representation purported to be a correct description of all the relevant rules of chemistry and physics, and we don’t have knowledge of what all the relevant rules are.
And I might add that there is an assumption here that the relevant rules are representable via arbitrary description.
There is a basic idea I hold which we can highlight now. Since you find it implausible that there is such a description as alluded above beyond the currently known theories, you are led to conclude that there must not be anything else in reality. I don’t see why we can assume a priori that every true aspect of reality is arbitrarily representable independently of the substrate. In fact qualia and experience seem to be a first person view of processes which have third person effects. It seems like any precise description of this system could only refer to the third person effects, not the first person effects (since the description is third person).
> I feel like you're on the wrong side of Occam. There is an obvious answer to this question - and yet you're picking the hypothetical/undiscovered/possibly non-existent one.
I don’t think Occam’s razor or questioning my biases etc.. have any explanatory value for the actual question at hand. They might have value for ethics or sociology, but I want to know the actual truth. The substrate independent view which somehow conjures consciousness just seems less plausible than the alternative to me.
You already conceded that the simulation would act exactly as the real item. That is a concession that all the behavior is captured by the laws of chemistry.
The only thing you doubt is that the qualia is captured. And my question is - if the physical object doesn't need qualia to entirely duplicate the behavior of the creature - then where is this qualia coming from then? And why would Mother Nature add a system that is superfluous? And where is it hiding? And why doesn't it follow the laws of chemistry too?
And I also want to point out - if we ask the simulation if he feels conscious, if he has feelings, he will say yes. All of his behavior is captured by the simulation. He will vehemently insist that he does.
So why are you adding something extra? That's where my Occam question originates. Adding something extra is by definition less simple. And I think Occam is entirely relevant here... why would it not be?
May apologies, but I intended to convey the opposite when I said this. I’ll read the rest of this comment later.
> My position is that there must be something wrong with the idea that a behaviorally identical simulation can be made which is not conscious. I think this because I do think phenomenal consciousness is playing a role in behavior, since surely my consciousness is a cause of memories of my consciousness (certain structure of physical matter in my brain has been caused by my consciousness); this is called the self-stultification argument against epiphenomenalism.
OH! Sorry - that's a different position then. Let's address it:
So you think a computer can't simulate a human brain.
But why do you think so? We've never found a physical system we can't simulate with a computer (and believe me, Searle and Penrose have tried).
Given there's no evidence that this is even possible, and for which you have no evidence to support it - you still believe computers can't simulate brains?
Why?
I think this is an even greater stretch than before.
You are fundamentally assuming all real concepts are reducible to arbitrary substrates like language. I believe there are real concepts which are not, like qualia. The entire premise of your belief is on this assumption I think but I don’t think you are aware that there is in fact an assumption here.
I think all physical processes are distinct from their descriptions, and have a real existence. We can describe some things about them but our descriptions are not equal to them.