But according to solipsism you can't be sure my brain actually exists at all, right?

And for what it's worth - no - I do not believe neurons are so different than transistors. Sure, it could be possible - but really? That feels like a reach for a theory that wants to find a certain conclusion. They're both made of the same protons and electrons, right? They obey the same laws of chemistry and physics. You think consciousness is really in the carbon and not in the silicon? Do you have any justification for that belief? Is it the atomic weight? How could that possibly be?

> My view is that there cannot be a definition of consciousness that isn’t effectively like asking the other person to observe it.

Right. But that's circular, isn't it? Consciousness is what I feel like consciousness is.

Right but my belief is I live in a universe with regular processes depending on regular arrangements. It seems like a relatively weak axiom to hold and precludes the version of solipsism you mention.

> They're both made of the same protons and electrons, right?

They have different arrangements. A MOSFET is just a block of polysilicon sitting on top of another layer of silicon which has been doped to contain some arsenic or boron atoms (+ some other details). I can put some legos together which correspond conceptually to this, but they will have functional differences. The actual substrate is what causes the mosfet to have the function of a transistor. Of course the neurons in the brain are far more complex and have different physical properties.

To me trying to explain how protons and electrons put together results in consciousness feels the same as the pre-Newtonians trying to explain gravity with their mechanical philosophy. The only thing I know is my brain is conscious, and your brain is physically similar to mine. Substrate non-independence is actually the weaker of the two assumptions in a sense because it makes a positive statement about fewer systems.

> That feels like a reach for a theory that wants to find a certain conclusion.

The problem with this kind of thinking is one can impugn the beliefs of either side with underhanded motives. Maybe people self-identify as being moral and ethical and elevating the talking computer gives them status in their circle. Maybe the personhood for AI researcher has a big ego and wants their work to be extremely important today.

I honestly do not find it plausible that we cannot build a consciousness-free intelligent computer system. A computer system can be made out of marbles, or pulleys, or pen and paper. All of these are having an experience if you put the symbols or objects in the right order? It just seems absurd to me.

> Right. But that's circular, isn't it? Consciousness is what I feel like consciousness is.

A priori why must real concepts be reducible in the way you want? Gravity is the thing that makes stuff fall, actually it’s the curvature tensor of the spacetime metric? What is the spacetime metric actually? Maybe something in string theory? Eventually you get to irreducible primitives that simply correspond to something we observe. Why isn’t consciousness just this with fewer steps?

But this is just the "consciousness is based on information, not substrate" position, right? It seems absurd?

I understand that it troubles you that real computation can be done with marbles... but... it can. So you must believe that consciousness is entirely uncomputable? Do you have any other examples of physical processes that are beyond computation?

> A priori why must real concepts be reducible in the way you want?

Because everything we do in science is like this? Do you think consciousness is beyond the ability for science to study it?

> Gravity is the thing that makes stuff fall...

I agree that gravity is akin to an axiom handed down from on-high. But it's an extremely simple axiom. And it's possibly explained by yet undiscovered simpler axioms. I see no such axiom for the theory of conciousness, despite our extensive understanding of the physical mechanisms involved. Given its absence, it seems to me like the most reasonable explanation is the one we already have - rather than insisting it still must be undiscovered.

And... I'm sorry but your argument feels exactly like vitalism. Given the repeating pattern of man insisting he has a special place in God's universe and then fighting for it stubbornly but then being proved otherwise... I think it's likely this instance will fall the same way all the others have.

I don’t understand what you’re saying here. It doesn’t trouble me at all. I’m actually quite confident I could design a simple computer from scratch in a substrate of marbles and an electric motor to bring them back up.

Maybe we should separate these threads otherwise it’ll be too hard to keep branching out.

I'm comfortable going slower - although the site won't let me reply as quickly as it let's you.

So I take it that you disbelieve that consciousness/qualia can be created by computation. But you do believe, I suspect, that consciousness/qualia are a physical process. So I'm wondering, is this the only example of non-computable physical process you know of?

I didn't see your second reply above - so I answered it now. I look forward to continuing... tomorrow?

Your position seems to have non-trivial difficulties if its own. I take it you don’t believe that a sequence of unique rock states or wall states is conscious, which means consciousness is not merely caused by an abstract mapping to some sequence of information states. I.e., I gather you must believe there is something about the organization or causal structure of the processing necessary for consciousness. Before continuing I’ll share another thought experiment just to suggest why this must be. Put two supposed conscious AIs into conversation for a day. Take a long time writing down the states line by line in a (very!) big notebook. Then cover up each line with other sheets who paper, revealing them line by line in a sequence. From our perspective the same conversation must be getting expressed by the two AIs, but surely we don’t think this results in a new conscious experience for the two AIs modeled by the states.

Okay then my challenge to your position (and mine of course, but this is why I’m led to my beliefs ultimately) is it must explain (1) which kinds of casual and organizational structures count here and (2) how these result in conscious experience.

It seems to me that even though I also cannot meaningfully answer these, believing there is some special physics going on which is yet to be discovered seems necessary. I.e. the how part is that it’s just a feature of that physical process. The which kinds are “the physical ones of the right kind inherently have consciousness”. And I will point out that there has rarely been a time in the last 2000 years when we as humans did not think we were nearly at the end of understanding physics.

I think all physical processes are distinct from their descriptions, and have a real existence. We can describe some things about them but our descriptions are not equal to them.

I just wanted to thank you - our talk helped me develop my ideas around "emotion faking" - which I was having trouble articulating.

Thank you.

So - let me know if I have this right - if I created a simulation of you it would act like you and talk like you in all ways - but not actually feel like you?

And if I asked it if it felt like you (being a perfect simulation of you) it would answer as you do "Yes, I feel like me." But it would be what... lying about having feelings?

Do I have that right?

And if so - is it aware that it is lying to me? Does it believe what it's saying? I guess we could never tell, because our only recourse is to ask it, and it would just continue lying. Or, being a p-zombie, it wouldn't be capable of belief at all? Despite its claims?

And if I injured this simulation - it would cry out in pain and beg me to stop? All the while not actually feeling pain?

I'm curious - why does this scenario seem more likely to you than the more obvious explanation?

Why is it more likely that behavior which appears identical to a feeling creature is actually somehow faked?

And where does all this fakery occur?

Presumably my simulation is just simulating the interactions of atoms in the body. Does the body have systems for faking emotions that we are unaware of - that only come online while its being simulated? Or does my simulation have a secret fake emotion system I am not aware of?

I am very confused by this picture.

My position is that there must be something wrong with the idea that a behaviorally identical simulation can be made which is not conscious. I think this because I do think phenomenal consciousness is playing a role in behavior, since surely my consciousness is a cause of memories of my consciousness (certain structure of physical matter in my brain has been caused by my consciousness); this is called the self-stultification argument against epiphenomenalism.

So that just reaffirms my position, it does not argue against yours. I believe our physical models of reality are fundamentally limited and even within the limitations far from complete.

A truly behaviorally accurate simulation, by which I mean the simulation has parts corresponding to everything in the original, is a very high bar of course. So to address your point about faking directly, I would not call this faking, since faking seems to require a separate inner process to decide to do the deception, but I believe it is just a highly accurate mimic, and I don’t actually see anything wrong with this.

This message is getting long.

> A truly behaviorally accurate simulation, by which I mean the simulation has parts corresponding to everything in the original, is a very high bar of course. So to address your point about faking directly, I would not call this faking, since faking seems to require a separate inner process to decide to do the deception, but I believe it is just a highly accurate mimic

Yes, this is the situation which is most interesting, despite the bar.

Ok - we can call it mimicry if you like. That doesn't change my question -

If the simulation isn't using the same mechanism (feelings) as the physical system, then where is this mimicry coming from? Clearly the simulation is just following the laws of chemistry. No mimicry in there. Is it in the original atomic configuration - that seems unlikely.

You seem to be assuming the existence of some mechanism that was not described in the original physical system. Why do you insist that this must be the case, and is not simply the same as the physical system?

I feel like you're on the wrong side of Occam. There is an obvious answer to this question - and yet you're picking the hypothetical/undiscovered/possibly non-existent one.

(Remember, in this situation we are not describing an LLM, but a system generated from the rules of chemistry. I can see how mimicry might apply in the LLM case - but I don't see where it would be hiding in the physical simulation case.)

However, it is a system with a representation purported to be a correct description of all the relevant rules of chemistry and physics, and we don’t have knowledge of what all the relevant rules are.

And I might add that there is an assumption here that the relevant rules are representable via arbitrary description.

There is a basic idea I hold which we can highlight now. Since you find it implausible that there is such a description as alluded above beyond the currently known theories, you are led to conclude that there must not be anything else in reality. I don’t see why we can assume a priori that every true aspect of reality is arbitrarily representable independently of the substrate. In fact qualia and experience seem to be a first person view of processes which have third person effects. It seems like any precise description of this system could only refer to the third person effects, not the first person effects (since the description is third person).

> I feel like you're on the wrong side of Occam. There is an obvious answer to this question - and yet you're picking the hypothetical/undiscovered/possibly non-existent one.

I don’t think Occam’s razor or questioning my biases etc.. have any explanatory value for the actual question at hand. They might have value for ethics or sociology, but I want to know the actual truth. The substrate independent view which somehow conjures consciousness just seems less plausible than the alternative to me.

The only thing you doubt is that the qualia is captured. And my question is - if the physical object doesn't need qualia to entirely duplicate the behavior of the creature - then where is this qualia coming from then? And why would Mother Nature add a system that is superfluous? And where is it hiding? And why doesn't it follow the laws of chemistry too?

And I also want to point out - if we ask the simulation if he feels conscious, if he has feelings, he will say yes. All of his behavior is captured by the simulation. He will vehemently insist that he does.

So why are you adding something extra? That's where my Occam question originates. Adding something extra is by definition less simple. And I think Occam is entirely relevant here... why would it not be?

May apologies, but I intended to convey the opposite when I said this. I’ll read the rest of this comment later.

> My position is that there must be something wrong with the idea that a behaviorally identical simulation can be made which is not conscious. I think this because I do think phenomenal consciousness is playing a role in behavior, since surely my consciousness is a cause of memories of my consciousness (certain structure of physical matter in my brain has been caused by my consciousness); this is called the self-stultification argument against epiphenomenalism.

So you think a computer can't simulate a human brain.

But why do you think so? We've never found a physical system we can't simulate with a computer (and believe me, Searle and Penrose have tried).

Given there's no evidence that this is even possible, and for which you have no evidence to support it - you still believe computers can't simulate brains?

Why?

I think this is an even greater stretch than before.

You are fundamentally assuming all real concepts are reducible to arbitrary substrates like language. I believe there are real concepts which are not, like qualia. The entire premise of your belief is on this assumption I think but I don’t think you are aware that there is in fact an assumption here.

You insist that computers cannot effectively simulate brains despite:

1) there being no evidence for such,

2) it would be the first ever situation we've discovered, and

3) there are strong arguments that it's not even logically consistent.

If I'm mistaken please tell me where.

2) I see no problem here.

3) What is the strongest argument? I’ll double check our thread but I have yet to find any, otherwise I would change my position.